

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM AND REINFORCEMENT PROCEDURES

IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

MISSION: To prepare a factual annotated report of the Organization and Operation of the Reinforcement System and of Reinforcement Policies and Procedures used in this Theater.

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THE GENERAL BOARD  
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER  
APO 409

REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM AND REINFORCEMENT PROCEDURES  
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

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REFORCING SYSTEM AND REINFORCEMENT PROCEDURES  
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

PART ONE

ORGANIZATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM, EUROPEAN THEATER

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION OF THE REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM

SECTION 1

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

1. The directive of the Theater General Board outlining the study of the Ground Force Reinforcement System, European Theater of Operations, prescribes that the period to be considered is 1 March 1944 to V-E day, 6 May 1945. However, it is believed necessary to briefly recount in a narrative form the early planning for the reinforcement system. Only in this way can the development of theater policy and procedures in effect in the European Theater as of 1 March 1944 be understood.

2. Prior Planning by Higher Headquarters for a Replacement System in the European Theater of Operations.

a. "The replacement system for officers and enlisted personnel is designed to assure dependable and timely arrival of properly qualified replacements are handled by replacement depots and separate replacement battalions located in the Communications Zone and the Combat Zone." These two statements in FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations, Administration, called for advance planning at Headquarters, European Theater of Operations in order to establish a replacement system in the European Theater of Operations. G-1, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, presented an outline of a replacement plan on 12 March 1943, in accordance with which the Commanding Generals of the 8th Air Force and Services of Supply could initiate replacement planning, and institute preliminary surveys and estimates primarily for the build-up phase.<sup>2</sup>

b. A letter was issued 24 March 1943 to the Commanding Generals of the 8th Air Force and Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations directing that replacement plans be initiated for the build-up period prior to operations and for operations preparations.<sup>3</sup> The "present" or then existing system of requisitioning replacements would continue until further notice, but Headquarters European Theater of Operations would recommend to the War Department that the procurement system of Ground Forces and Services of Supply replacements be modified for the build-up period.

c. The "present" system of furnishing replacements to the United Kingdom was based on monthly requisitions in which were set forth the shortages in each branch including specification serial numbers of all enlisted men. Time was lost between requisitioning by units and the receipt of the replacements. Headquarters European Theater of Operations

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recommended to the Adjutant General, War Department,<sup>4</sup> that the "present" system be altered "to that outlined in paragraph 2 of AGW.R Cable #2385 dated 21 July 1945. As proposed in that cable, Headquarters European Theater of Operations would indicate in advance under shipping priorities, requests for the number of replacements needed during a particular period, such number to be broken down into branch and specification serial numbers by the War Department according to occurrence rates available for non-battle casualties". The modified system would be applicable to the Ground Force and Service of Supply European Theater of Operations, not for the Air Force, for which no change was contemplated.

d. Subsequently, after further exchanges of recommendations and directives between Headquarters European Theater of Operations and the War Department (details of which are described in the "History of the Ground Force Replacement System, European Theater of Operations"<sup>5</sup>) concrete action was taken with the granting of authority to the Commanding General Services of Supply European Theater of Operations, subject: "Field Force Replacement System, European Theater of Operations" to "establish and operate a replacement system for the Field Forces". This letter described the composition of a system, the objectives of the training program, available schedule, target dates, etc. The system was to be ready to commence operations not later than 1 January 1944, and to have completed installations and facilities not later than 1 March 1944. Until the Field Force Replacement System was established, replacements were to be assigned to Field Force units as overstrength - "overstrength increments attached to divisions whose primary mission is preparation for the assault: 2500 replacements per division". Letter Headquarters European Theater of Operations, 2 November 1943, subject: "Disposition of Field Force Replacements" to Commanding General, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations directed "it is desirable that all Field Force replacements now in or subsequently received in the Theater from whatever sources be assigned to Field Force units as soon after receipt at the Replacement Depot as it is practicable. These replacements will be assigned to such units as are designated by Commanding General, First US Army."

e. On 24 October 1943, the Commanding General Services of Supply was directed by secret letter, Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, to establish and operate a replacement system for the Field Forces. Colonel Walther G. Layman was designated as Commanding Officer. Headquarters was established at Bon Hall Farm, Cheltenham, England. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Replacement Depot was utilized in the organization and operation of the Headquarters.

f. The actual establishment of a Field Force Replacement System was accomplished in pursuance of General Order #122, Headquarters Services of Supply European Theater of Operations, issued 24 November 1943. This same General Order made the Field Force Replacement System responsible also for the Services of Supply Replacement Depot and placed the replacement depots and pools, to be established within the several base sections, under the supervision of the respective base section commanders.

g. The Theater directive, calling for the replacement system to be in operation by 1 January 1944, meant that some 6000 training troops had to be assigned oriented and given final training for their mission; also that overhead units consisting of 11 headquarters and headquarters companies, replacement depot, 35 headquarters and headquarters detachments, replacement battalion, and 168 replacement companies, had to be assembled and a headquarters and 8 replacement depots established ready to process and distribute approximately 74,000 replacements.

h. Since only a small percentage of this overhead personnel was available, it was necessary to divide the 3rd Headquarters and Headquarters Company Replacement Depot and send the major portion to Northern Ireland for the purpose of preparing for the Field Force Replacement Depots to be located in that Base Section. The necessary personnel to operate the Office of the Chief, Field Force Replacement System, in addition to the attachment of six officers and thirty enlisted men left behind by the 3rd Replacement Depot, were drawn from American School Center and from newly arrived replacements.

i. By the end of November, Colonel Leyman was able to report that plans were nearing completion for the organization to operate replacement depots in Southern, Western, and Northern Ireland Base Sections. His most critical problems at that time were key personnel for the depots, the completion of the construction of necessary housing, training aids, the supply of individual weapons necessary to equip the replacements who were being sent to this theater without weapons, and additional weapons above the Table of Basic Allowances of the training organizations necessary to train the replacements. Another problem was the relocation of the Army Service Force and Specialist Training Replacement Depot, due to its facilities being made almost wholly available for Civil Affairs Division Officers. Many long hours were spent in overcoming the handicaps of insufficient personnel in order to meet the opening date of 1 January 1944. However, due to everyone taking hold, personnel were spread over the depots, and an organization formed and sufficient equipment procured to open 5 depots in part strength on the date set and to receive all scheduled replacements without the slightest confusion or delay."

j. The replacement plans of the Theater called for more replacement depots and battalions than the War Department had activated for the purpose in the United States. This lack was realized and authorization was given to the Theater to locally activate five replacement depots and 16 replacement battalions, and to organize 11 provisional battalions, using personnel that could be made available for these units from personnel in the Theater. These units were activated and organization was commenced on 3 February 1944. The Field Force Replacement System then was faced with the problem of securing officer and enlisted personnel for these units, organizing them and seeing that they received routing training as well as a special orientation that would be needed for their operation in the replacement system.

k. The Commanding General, Services of Supply European Theater of Operations, directed on 24 December 1943 that base sections, as specified in the order, issue the necessary orders to establish 7 depots of the Field Force Replacement system. The base sections subsequently issued orders establishing 7 depots of the Field Force Replacement System. The base sections subsequently issued orders establishing the following depots: Depot #1 - Llandaff, Wales; Depot #2 - Bristol, England; Depot #3 - Yeovil, England; Depot #9 - Shropshire, England; Depot #6 - North Ireland; Depot #7 - North Ireland; Depot #8 - North Ireland.

l. Depot #1 was designated as an artillery depot, to be used for field artillery, coast artillery, and tank de-

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troyer replacements. Depot #2 was established as a staging area for incoming troops. Depot #9 was established for the accommodation of armored force replacements, and the remainder of the depots, #3, #6, #7, #8 were intended as infantry replacement establishments. Troop capacities of these depots were as follows: #1 - 10,946; #2 - 2,200; #3, 13,686; #6 - 10, 276; #7 - 7,926; #8 - 9,657; #9 - 8,266.

m. Again to quote from the Ground Force Replacement System history: "Thus by 1 January 1944, the target date set forth in the original Theater directive for the commencement of operations of the Field Force Replacement System, Colonel Layman was able to report the following accomplishments: Headquarters well organized and in a position to handle and process replacements; accommodations for replacement depots all found, except locations of Army Service Force Replacement Depot and Specialists Center; organizations functioning in five of the replacement depots; training units in position and prepared to carry out their mission; reconnaissance parties had studied problems in each depot area and had made necessary arrangements to acquire suitable training areas; housing facilities and accommodations had been determined; communication net was well on the road to being established, making use of teleprinter network connecting depots with Headquarters; Standing Operation Procedure had been prepared and distributed; training equipment and training aids had been requisitioned, including additional weapons and familiarization firing ammunition; training directives and programs had been prepared and distributed."

n; thus ended the period described in Services of Supplies directives for establishing the reinforcement system as the end of their phase three which was to terminate when the replacement system was to become operative, on 1 January 1944.

SECTION 2

GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENT COMMAND ORGANIZATION

3. The final organization period, 1 January to 1

March 1944.

s. Plans for the establishment of the Theater replacement program prepared by the Chief of Administration, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, specified four phases, as follows:<sup>5</sup>

Phase 1 - Build-up of Field Force and Services of Supply Replacement Depot at Lichfield, England, to be composed of one headquarters and headquarters company, replacement depot, and five replacement battalions.

Phase 2 - Reorganization, under the control of the Services of Supply, into two headquarters and headquarters companies, replacement depot; ten headquarters and headquarters detachments, replacement battalion, and forty replacement companies. Also in this phase, the training of the nucleus of the Assault Force Replacement Depot as to be completed at Lichfield and the depot moved to Southwest England, where it would begin operations.

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Phase 3 - (1) Establishment of a Field Force Replacement Pool with headquarters at Bristol, England, and with the depots of the pool to be located in Southwest England, and Northern Ireland.

(2) Inclusion in the Field Force Replacement Pool of the following units:

- (a) The nucleus of the Assault Force Replacement Depot
- (b) The following units to arrive from the US; five headquarters and headquarters companies, replacement depot; eight headquarters and headquarters detachments, replacement battalion; training units; twenty-eight replacement companies; and a portion of the station complement.

(3) The above would permit the activation of depots in Southwestern England, but none in Northern Ireland.

(4) Institution of

- (a) Replacement control section of Army regulation system.
- (b) Regulating and assignment group within the AG Section of Army Headquarters to be organized under the Army Classification Officer.

(5) Initiation of the replacement system as prescribed in TM 100-10 with the above groups functioning in the system for the Field Forces.

Phase 4 - January 1944 until commencement of combat operations.

(1) Commencement of replacement operations at the Field Force pools with the shipment of all Field Force replacements direct from the United States to Field Force pools, processing of replacements for the Field Forces to offset normal attrition.

(2) Separation of Field Force replacement operations from the Services of Supply Replacement Depot at Lichfield, as of 1 January 1944.

(3) Institution of a training program for the replacement stockage, which consisted of continuation training, refresher training, new techniques and methods, and specialists' training.<sup>54</sup>

b. The target date set by the theater directive for the Replacement System to assume control of all Ground Force replacements was 1 January 1944. On that date, the only operating personnel which had been made available to the system were two headquarters and headquarters companies, replacement depot; three separate headquarters and headquarters detachments, replacement battalion; and certain training troops.<sup>55</sup> The available replacement units were skeletonized and detachments

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were forwarded to as many of the camp sites as had been made available. The training troops, totaling approximately 285 officers and 6,050 enlisted men, which were drawn largely from units of the First US Army had been designated. Units of these training troops were dispatched to the various camps with instructions to prepare ranges and training aids required for the instruction of the maximum capacity of the camp, and to give refresher courses to the instructors covering the subjects prescribed by the training program. It became increasingly apparent that the required number of replacement units would not arrive from the United States in time to prepare for the scheduled flow of replacements. Authority having been given by higher headquarters, the Field Force Replacement System activated three provisional headquarters and headquarters companies, replacement depot; six headquarters and headquarters detachments, replacement battalion; and thirty replacement companies.<sup>5</sup> The provisional units were required to receive the replacements scheduled to arrive in the United Kingdom during the period 1-15 January 1944. On 3 February 1944, authority was given by the War Department for the activation of the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th Replacement Depots, along with sixteen replacement battalions, and forty-five replacement companies.<sup>5</sup>

c. The Ground Force Replacement System was a command operating directly under the Deputy Theater Commander. It was the Theater agency charged with the responsibility for the replacements for all units other than the Air Force under the jurisdiction of the Theater commander. The Headquarters was established at Cheltenham, England, with the headquarters of the Deputy Theater Commander, early in the month of November, 1943. The headquarters staff was developed so that by 1 January 1944, it was ready to commence operations controlling and directing the service of supplying replacements.<sup>55</sup>

d. On 1 March 1944, a total of ten replacement depots had been established and were ready for operation in the Ground Force Replacement System. The mission of each of these depots is shown in the chart below:<sup>5</sup> The several units and detachments of training troops had arrived at their assigned stations:

Depot No.	Replacement Capacity	Mission
1	7,395	FA TD CAC
2	1,750	Replacement Staging
3	9,438	Infantry
4	5,000	Specialists
5	5,635	Infantry
6	9,181	Infantry
7	6,126	Infantry
8	7,489	Infantry
9	5,950	Armored Force
10	7,087	SOS
Total:		62,051

e. The headquarters companies of the 12th, 14th, and 15th Replacement Depots arrived in the United Kingdom from the United States during the month of March, thereby completing the total of replacement depots which it had been estimated would be required for the operation (twelve in all).<sup>47</sup> Information was received, during the early part of April 1944, that several replacement battalions scheduled to arrive from the United States would not arrive prior to the arrival of a large shipment of replacements early in May. Authority was granted to activate in this Theater thirteen replacement battalions and fifty-three replacement companies.<sup>56</sup> These provisional units were utilized until the arrival of three replacement battalions early in June and the decreased amount of stockage made their further retention unnecessary.

#### 4. Continental

a. Plans for the operation "Neptune" called for the early support of the operation by replacement units.<sup>58</sup> In order to coordinate this support and to act as a liaison group, an Advance Section, Headquarters, Ground Force Replacement System was organized and moved to the readiness area on 27 May 1944. It consisted of a deputy commander, seven officers and twelve enlisted men.<sup>59</sup> The Advance Section, Headquarters, Ground Force Replacement System, functioned in the management of Continental replacement activities until 4 August 1944, when the Headquarters, Ground Force Replacement System, moved to the Continent and assumed direct command. When the main headquarters moved to the Continent a rear headquarters was designated to command and coordinate replacement activities in the United Kingdom.

b. Few major changes were made in the basic organization of either the headquarters or the supporting depots of the reinforcement system during the Continental operations. Commencing about 15 July 1944, when it was realized that the system was accumulating a surplus stockage of specialists and service troops, the mission of retraining men for assignment as infantry riflemen became increasingly important. This retraining mission of the Ground Force Replacement System was gradually enlarged during the Fall of 1944. In December 1944, the Ground Force Replacement Training Center Number 1 was formally designated at Shrivicham, England.<sup>51</sup> In January 1945, the 6960th Reinforcement Depot (Provisional) was organized on the Continent for the purpose of retraining service and Air Force personnel to be used as infantry riflemen,<sup>50</sup> and, during the same month, the Ground Force Officers' Training Center was established, utilizing the 9th Reinforcement Depot as the parent unit.<sup>56</sup> These added training functions required an enlarged training staff. In the headquarters, deputy commanders, each in the grade of brigadier general, were appointed to supervise reinforcement activities and training activities. As the armies advanced into Germany it became necessary to send forward an advance section of the Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command. This unit, known as the Forward Command Post, effected close liaison with the army groups and armies, and actively supervised reinforcement activities in the forward zone. It was commanded by the Deputy Commander for Reinforcements.<sup>53</sup>

c. A growing psychological reaction against the use of the word "replacement" caused a change, during the month of December, 1944, in the designation from the "Replacement System" to the "Reinforcement System", and it was directed that the Reinforcement System be composed of the Ground Force

Reinforcement Command, and the Air Force Reinforcement Command.<sup>44</sup> All units of the Reinforcement System in the European Theater were directed to use the term "reinforcement" and to cease using the term "replacement."<sup>39</sup>

SECTION 3

ARMY AIR FORCE REINFORCEMENT COMMAND ORGANIZATION

5. The 70th Reinforcement Depot, later designated as Reinforcement Command, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and then as Army Air Forces European Theater Reinforcement Command (Provisional) was the outgrowth of the 12th Reinforcement Depot, the original Air Force unit in the European Theater responsible for processing reinforcements arriving in the Theater, and personnel returning to the Zone of Interior.<sup>18</sup> The maximum capacity for processing such personnel within this command was approximately 21,000 individuals at any given date. These facilities were divided among several stations, the largest capacity of any one station being approximately 7,500.<sup>83</sup>

6. Shortly before D-Day two reinforcement battalions were relieved from assignment to the Air Force Reinforcement Command and assigned to the Ninth Air Force, the tactical Air Force operating in this Theater, for the purpose of processing individual reinforcements for the Ninth Air Force only. With these two battalions, reinforcements in numbers sufficient to replace initial losses during the first sixty days after the invasion were supplied. The initial losses were far less than anticipated and the operation of separate reinforcement battalions proved unnecessary, and after about four months service with the Ninth Air Force these battalions were reassigned to the Reinforcement Command, and all Air Force reinforcement establishments operated under one headquarters directly under supervision of the highest Air Force Headquarters.

CHAPTER 2CHARACTER OF THE REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM, EUROPEAN THEATERSECTION 1GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENT COMMAND7. Operation in the United Kingdom.

a. The Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, operated directly under the Deputy Theater Commander. It was the Theater agency charged with the responsibility for the Reinforcement system for all units, other than Army Air Forces units, under the jurisdiction of the Theater Commander. In any study of the Reinforcement System it becomes quickly obvious that three factors greatly influenced the trend of operations:

(1) The logistics of handling reinforcements in the contemplated action were never adequately planned. Of the sixteen depots ultimately utilized, only six were organized and trained in the United States. The failure of required units to arrive in this Theater in advance of the arrival of the stockage of reinforcements not only caused the activation of provisional units composed of untrained officers and men, but also caused the existing units of the system to be perpetually overcrowded. Companies designed to house and train from 300 to 400 men habitually were required to accommodate from 600 to 800 men, while battalions and depots were similarly overtaxed.<sup>75</sup>

(2) A great many of the agencies of the Theater have not realized the enormous difficulties of a reinforcement unit commander. It was common practice to make available for assignment to reinforcement units officers of all grades who were considered the least suitable for command purposes in combat units. Officers can readily function in this type of duty if their deficiencies are principally physical handicaps, but officers selected for duty with a reinforcement unit require a high capacity for true leadership. The changing nature of the officers and men in the stockage of a reinforcement unit deprives the commander of many of the aids upon which a commander of a regularly organized unit normally depends, such as unit esprit de corps, and permanent squad, platoon, company, battalion, and regimental organizations, with their fairly constant staff of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The reinforcement realizes that reinforcement units are only "key stations" and, unless real command leadership is available, the training, morale and discipline of officers and men deteriorate at the very time when it should be brought up to "key pitch"--just before entering battle.

(3) A great many of the senior officers of the Army had only a hazy knowledge of the organization, functions, and limitations of the Reinforcement System.<sup>75</sup> Many did not realize the magnitude of the reinforcement activities of a command of the size of the European Theater and the part that the smooth operation of this portion of the command plays in the entire operation. Officers of the Reinforcement System were frequently required to spend long hours explaining in detail the functioning of the system to base section, divisional, and regimental commanders and their staffs, before even minimum cooperation was given, and only after several months of combat did the scope and limitations of the Reinforcement System commence to be generally understood and recognized by all ranks.<sup>75</sup>

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b. The operations of the Reinforcement System during the period 1 March through 6 June 1944 centered around the receipt and housing, and the training of the initial stockage of reinforcements. Most of the men arriving in the United Kingdom had been in staging camps in the United States from two to six weeks, and had been en route an average of two weeks. Strenuous training programs were set up by the system headquarters contemplating the physical conditioning of all men for field service and refresher courses to cover individual and small unit training for each arm and service. Groups were broken down as far as possible, in order to facilitate training, by assigning officers and men of the same arm to certain reinforcement depots. The Theater troop basis, which prescribes the flow of reinforcements into stockage, indicated that certain of these men would be on hand as stockage for several months during the period when the stockage in the reinforcement pool was being built up to the required 70,000 men. Staging and training activities were generally concentrated in the south and southwest part of England and in Northern Ireland. The stockage of the combined depots of the Replacement System grew from a total of 27,649 on 6 March 1944 to 88,869 on 7 June 1944.<sup>57</sup> Early in April, the advisability of concentrating all reinforcements as near as possible to the southern coast of England became increasingly apparent. As many as could be diverted were forwarded to those depots then located in Southern England. The stockage of one of the depots in Northern Ireland, which had been used for the training of paratroop and airborne reinforcements, was disposed of by assigning the officers and men to paratroop units as overstrength, and all of the depots stationed in Northern Ireland were moved to Southern England prior to 10 May 1944.<sup>58</sup> On 1 May 1944 the assault Training Center was made available to the Replacement System, and the depot which had been utilized for training field artillery, tank destroyer, and coast artillery stockage was moved, with its stockage, to this area, where better facilities were available.<sup>59</sup>

c. Plans had meanwhile been perfected which called for the forwarding of all reinforcements to the Continent during the early stages of operations, using the package system. The packages were to consist of groups of officers and men totaling 250 to 300 in each group, and were generally to be divided into packages containing, infantry rifle-trained men; heavy weapons-trained men; composite headquarters, service, cannon, and anti-tank companies and other arms and services as required.<sup>60</sup> It was estimated that eighty per cent of all reinforcements required would be sent to the Continent in these pre-formed packages, and the remaining twenty per cent would be made the subject of special requisitions based on actual requirements. During the month of May, 1944, the greater part of the activities of the Replacement System was centered around the formation of these packages. A total of 35,500 men had been formed into these packages at D-day.<sup>61</sup> The operation was carried on principally by the 9th, 11th, 12th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th Replacement Depots. Packages were prepared for shipment to the Continent prior to D-day and held by these depots until shipment was ordered by G-1, European Theater of Operations; on a semi-automatic shipping basis, complying with advance requisitions for estimated initial loss replacements during the period D-day to D plus 14.

d. Plans for the operation "Neptune" provided for the initial support of the three assault corps by three replacement battalions (separate), which were to be forwarded to the Continent during the period D plus 3 to D plus 9.<sup>62</sup> These battalions, the 41st, 86th, and 92nd were relieved of all troop activities and assembled at Camp Houndsome, Yoxil, for the purpose of preparing for the crossing. The 14th Replacement Depot, which was scheduled to be established on the

Continent on D plus 9, was also alerted and placed in charge of the preparation of those battalions for the crossing. At the same time, the advance headquarters of the Ground Force Replacement System, consisting of seven officers and twelve enlisted men, who were to set up the advance headquarters of that command on the Continent, was prepared for shipment, and plans were made for its crossing with the 14th Replacement Dept.

### 8. Operations on the Continent.

a. The early operations of the Replacement System on the Continent were carried on almost exactly according to the plan set forth in the operation "Neptune". Replacement overhead units arrived approximately on schedule and the "peckage" system of supplying less replacements proved entirely adequate. Combat units were maintained at approximately 70% strength and by D plus 20 a replacement depot was in operation on the Continent and had on hand a stockpile of approximately 5,000 men. During the period from D-day to 30 June 1944, a total of 2,835 officers and 33,213 men had been delivered to combat units, and corps battalions and the replacement depot had received operating stockpiles.<sup>61</sup> The headquarters of the Ground Force Replacement System moved to the Continent on 4 August 1944, and 12 August 1944 there was a total of four depots, sixteen battalions, and sixty-four companies in France.<sup>5</sup> Shortly after 15 July, 1944, it became evident that the Ground Force Replacement Pool was accumulating a large overstockage of headquarters company, infantry company, antitank company and service company troops. This overage was caused largely by the fact that, in making loss estimates, a certain percentage of losses had been estimated for the crossing of the Channel and the losses in this operation had been much lighter than had been anticipated. In order to utilize those men and to bolster up the small stockpiles of infantry riflemen on hand, a program of retraining all of those men who had originally been trained as infantry riflemen was instituted. Some 3,000 men were involved in this retraining program and were eventually reclassified and assigned in their original specification numbers as infantry riflemen.<sup>5</sup> Headquarters, Ground Force Replacement System, advanced with the advance of the armies, and, on 13 August 1944, was located at Conisy, France. Plans were then proposed by the Commanding General, Ground Force Replacement System, to establish the Replacement system generally in the vicinity of Le Mans, France, it being pointed out that this area offered excellent rail, highway and billeting facilities, and training areas. In compliance with this plan, the Headquarters, Ground Force Replacement System, was moved to Le Mans on 23 August 1944, and several of the depots were moved into that general area.<sup>61</sup> The rapid advance of the armies rendered this area unsuitable within a short period of time and the headquarters was moved to Paris on 6 September 1944, where it remained until V-E day. On 4 October 1944, the Ground Force Replacement System was directed to organize and train sixteen provisional military police battalions and seven prisoner of war overhead detachments.<sup>62</sup> On 7 October, 1944, there were on the Continent seven replacement depots, thirty-two replacement battalions, and one hundred twenty-eight replacement companies.<sup>5</sup>

b. During the fall of 1944, it became increasingly apparent that a readjustment of the use of the existing available personnel within the Theater would be necessary. The number of men who had been classified as limited service through war wounds and other causes was increasing by leaps and bounds beyond the ability of the combat units to utilize this class of personnel. Many general service enlisted men were being utilized in positions in the Service Forces and in the Air Forces who could be utilized in the combat divisions. In addition,

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a serious shortage of combat officers of junior grade was developing which would not be filled by the scheduled flow of reinforcement officers from the United States. The mission of retraining these enlisted men and operating an officers' school for the training of officer candidates and the retraining of junior officers of the services for infantry duty was given to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command. During December, 1944, the Ground Force Training Center No. 1 was established at Shrivenerham Berrecks, England, for the purpose of retraining limited assignment personnel whose physical standards were below those required by MM 1-9 for use as specialists.<sup>63</sup> During the month of January, 1945, the Ground Force Officers' Training Center was established at Fontainebleau, France, with a mission of providing for the training of 1,000 officer candidate graduates per month and the retraining of 400 officers of company grade for duty as infantry officers per month. The courses of training were to cover a period of twelve weeks.<sup>64</sup> The same directive prescribed that the enlisted infantry retraining facilities be increased to a capacity of 40,000. The mission of this program was to retrain as infantry general service personnel drawn from Communications Zone, Air Forces, and field force elements. The course was established to extend from four to six weeks.

c. On 30 November 1944, the Replacement System was given the added mission of processing temporary duty personnel for return to the United States for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery. This duty, involving the reequipping, packaging, and shipping of several thousand men per month, was added to the mission of the Army depots and certain depots of the rear areas, and required no major change in operation.<sup>5</sup>

d. During December 1944, The Reinforcement System was directed to conduct infantry riflemen refresher training for negro volunteers selected from the Service Forces to qualify them as infantry riflemen.<sup>68</sup> These men were trained and formed into rifle platoons led by white officers selected from the combat forces. Thirty-seven platoons were forwarded to the armies during March 1945 and an additional group of twelve platoons were forwarded shortly thereafter.<sup>69</sup>

SECTION 2

ARMY AIR FORCE REINFORCEMENT COMMAND

9. The Army Air Force Replacement Command in the European Theater operated independently of the Ground Force Replacement Command, and minimum use of Ground Force installations was made. The Air Force Reinforcement Command was operated directly under the highest Air Force Headquarters and had but slight relations with the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.<sup>18</sup>

10. The problems confronting the Air Force Reinforcement Command in its operation differed greatly from those of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command. Very little training was conducted by the Air Force Reinforcement Command ~~was of prime importance~~. Replacement of combat crews, with the different composition and training required for the different type planes, constituted a problem for which there was no counterpart in the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.

11. While for a short period of time separate reinforcement battalions were assigned to the Ninth Air Force, during the bulk of the campaign in Europe all reinforcement establishments operated under one headquarters directly under supervision of the highest Air Force Headquarters.

12. In addition to processing reinforcements, the Air Force Reinforcement Command of the European Theater was responsible for the operation of a maximum of ten rest homes for the benefit of Air Force Personnel (to a large extent combat crews) who were so fatigued operationally as to require rest, recuperation, and rehabilitation.<sup>78</sup>

### SECTION 3

#### FACTORS AFFECTING OBLIGATIONS AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES TAKEN

13. Organizational. In a group of units to which are assigned the diverse missions given to the various units of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, it is obvious that standard tables of organization cannot always be followed exactly. Depots given the mission of re-training enlisted men will require different facilities and different personnel from depots supporting an army. The War Department recognized this fact in the make-up of the tables of organization (T/O and E 12-42), but no specific notation was made in the published tables of organization allowing for flexibility and allowing for changes in cellular attachments of supporting service units depending on the mission of the depot. The shortage of attached personnel, particularly in training troops, troop movement personnel, military police service troops, utilities troops, and postal personnel, became evident immediately after the commencement of operations.<sup>75</sup> As an instance of the inadequacy of the allowed overhead, reference is made to the army postal unit which the tables of organization prescribe for the reinforcement depot (T/O & E 12-601). The mail of the reinforcements forwarded through an army depot was sent to the army depot post office for forwarding. The time interval from the sailing date of the reinforcement to the date when the New York Post Office received the postal address of the reinforcement in his new permanent assignment was, in many instances, as much as three months. With army depots forwarding an average of nine hundred men per day, the volume of postal directory service required was stupendous. The delivery of mail was further complicated by the fact that many reinforcements were assigned to permanent units and wounded and forwarded to hospitals before their change of address was received in New York. A partial solution of this problem was reached by requiring all mail to pass through the 14th Beast Post Office, which was the central post office of the Reinforcement System, and requiring a postal locator card to be sent to that post office by all individuals entering or leaving the Reinforcement System. This and other deficiencies in organization were remedied by using men from the slow-moving specialty numbers in stockage as augmentation until authority for increasing the overhead could be secured from higher headquarters.<sup>75</sup>

14. Tactical. The stockage of manpower in the Reinforcement System pipe line, which included, potentially at least, all individuals from the time they boarded transports in the United States until they were actually assigned to a combat unit, composed a very important strategic reserve force which the Theater Commander could shift at will to influence the course of any action. Certain reinforcement battalions had been attached to the assault corps of both the First and Third U.S. Armies in the early stages of operations on the Continent. These corps commanders and the army commanders, especially the Commanding General, of the Third U.S. Army desired to retain control of the corps battalions and the army depots, and such stockage as had been assigned to them. These units operated entirely within the boundaries of the zones assigned to the corps and armies. These commanders recommended that the command of these units be vested in the commander of the supported unit in whose area the reinforcement units were functioning. It was decided that the control of all stockage of reinforcement units not allocated should remain with the Theater Commander, and a directive was issued clarifying the status of the command of corps reinforcement battalions.

and army depots and fixing the command and control of unallotted stockages in the hands of the Commanding General, Ground Force Reinforcement System.<sup>65</sup> Corps battalions and army depots were, as a matter of Reinforcement System policy, utilized continuously in support of the same units and were shifted with those corps when the corps changed tactical command. Depots supporting armies were directed to operate in close co-operation with army commanders and to comply with orders and directives of the tactical commanders in all matters excepting the obliging of the parts of the stockage of those depots which had not been allotted to armies by the approved assignment policies of the Theater as enunciated in Ground Force Reinforcement System assignment directives.

### 15. Reinforcement flow versus requisition.

a. The Commanding General, Service of Supply, was directed by European Theater of Operations in January, 1944, to "...maintain a stockage for the Field Force Replacement Fcl at a level not in excess of reasonably firm estimates of losses for all causes for 60-day periods from D-day forward."<sup>66</sup> Two factors were considered in making requisitions on the War Department to establish the reinforcement flow:

(1) Normal attrition losses based on the troop basis month by month.

(2) Combat losses anticipated. (Prior to D-day, this latter consideration could include the building of the Ground Force Replacement Fcl to the required initial reserve strength.)

b. Requisitions to establish the reinforcement flow were prepared by the Commanding General, Service of Supply, and submitted to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, monthly covering the requirements for the third succeeding month. Consolidated reinforcement requisitions by specialty serial number and branch for the commands were submitted by the commanders of the major field units direct to the Chief of the Field Force Replacement System. The Commanding Generals, U S Services for the Tactical Air Forces, and Services of Supplies, established reinforcement priorities within their respective commands and furnished priorities to the respective reinforcement systems. In order to give the field force commanders constant information concerning the availability of reinforcements, the Headquarters, Field Force Replacement System, submitted to the commanding generals of the major tactical units a weekly status report, showing the general status of availability of all reinforcements on hand and an estimate of the number to be expected in the near future. Casuals arriving in the Reinforcement System from hospitals, leave, or through straggler collecting units were returned to their units automatically.<sup>76</sup>

c. Due to the very nature of combat, the relationship between the reinforcement flow and the number of men requisitioned invariably turned out to be a "feast or famine". When the tactical units were meeting heavy enemy opposition, the requirements of the reinforcements were heavy.<sup>75</sup> The lack of movement allowed the reinforcement pipe line to deliver reinforcements promptly to the army depots, and the reinforcements were assigned up to the limitations imposed by the European Theater of Operations. But, when the tactical units were pursuing the retreating enemy, these units did not considerably suffer great many casualties, nor did they desire to receive reinforcements. Requisitions during these periods were not submitted, and the reinforcement pipe line became filled up to and including the army reinforcement depots. This added immeasurably to the difficulties experienced by the army depots in maintaining their position within the army rear boundaries. While it had been the enunciated policy to return casualties to their former units,

it was at that time also the policy of the European Theater of Operations to preserve the strength of the reserve in the reinforcement System by limiting the size of the tactical units, and major tactical units were not allowed to become overstrength. Since the divisions had not had any major combat losses and reinforcements had been plentiful, a great many of them were up to their T/O strength, and returning casualties could not be forwarded to their own units.<sup>113</sup> This caused an added load on the army reinforcement depots and great dissatisfaction and loss of morale among the casualties. This unfavorable situation was later corrected by an order which directed the automatic return of casualties to their former units without requisition and regardless of the strength of their unit.

**16. Supply.** One of the major tasks which confronted the reinforcement System during the entire operation was the problem of furnishing supplies for reinforcements.<sup>5</sup> In the period immediately prior to and following D-day, all reinforcements were forwarded to the Continent in detachments, or packages, of 250 to 300 men. Some of these detachments were homogeneous groups composed of one Military Occupation Specialty; others contained infantry plus three or four other arms. Men of each specific function number were required to be armed and equipped exactly as prescribed, so that they could be moved directly into the line. This required a vast diversification of individual equipment and arms, and a very thorough checking system was instituted to insure that each individual was properly armed and equipped to include ammunition as prescribed and for the zeroing of his individual arm on a target range prior to departure from the United Kingdom. The securing of supplies in the army depots became especially acute as the depots moved away from the beachhead in support of their respective armies. While the problem of command of the depots had been settled<sup>65</sup> the source of supply of the army depots still remained with the Advance Section, Communications Zone, through requisitions approved by Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement System. As the armies moved across France in pursuit of the enemy, great difficulty was encountered by the Advance Section, Communications Zone, in maintaining supply dumps sufficient to meet all demands within easy hauling distance of the army rear boundaries. Due to the warm weather and to the fact that the reinforcements had been informed by casualties that the combat divisions immediately wither all clothing except one complete uniform from reinforcements, great difficulty was encountered in getting the men to bring the prescribed equipment to the forward depots. Large quantities of clothing were required to fill shortages at these forward depots so that men would be forwarded fully equipped. The problem of securing this clothing was solved by agreements with the army commanders, so that depot requirements were included in the shipments to each army.<sup>75</sup> Reinforcements were habitually ordered from the United States without arms, thereby throwing upon the Reinforcement System the burden of re-equipping and retreining the soldier in the firing of his individual weapon. A shortage of individual arms which developed in the rear areas during the early months of 1945 caused the forwarding of reinforcements to army depots without individual arms. Arms were secured from army battlefield recovery stocks, reconditioned in the depots and issued to reinforcements. This procedure threw upon the army depots an added burden of firing to familiarize individuals with their weapons, delayed the forwarding of reinforcements and casualties and placed in the army area a sizeable group of men who could not be immediately used for combat due to lack of weapons.<sup>75</sup> In the fall of 1944, the coming of winter weather developed an extreme shortage of suitable winter clothing, especially of Arctic overhauls. Attempts were made to obtain overhauls from every available source. When normal channels of supply failed to produce these overhauls in the forward depots, shoes were obtained from the evacuation and field hospitals, and one large shipment was flown to the Continent by air from the United Kingdom.

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CHAPTER 3

RELATIONSHIP OF REINFORCEMENT UNITS WITH THE OTHER

HEADQUARTERS AND COMMANDS IN THIS THEATER

SECTION 1

HEADQUARTERS GROUND FORCES REINFORCEMENT COMMAND AND HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES-EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS-REINFORCEMENT COMMAND (PROVISIONAL)

17. General Order No. 62, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, 10 June 1944, announced the establishment of a Replacement System, European Theater of Operations, consisting of two (2) commands:

The Ground Force Replacement System, European Theater of Operations.

The Army Air Force Replacement System, European Theater of Operations.

18. The Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, was a command operating directly under the Deputy Theater Commander. It was a Theater agency charged with the responsibility for the Reinforcement System for all units of the Field Forces and Communications Zone.

19. The Army Air Forces, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Reinforcement Command was a command operating under direct supervision of the highest Air Force Headquarters of the Theater.<sup>18</sup>

SECTION 2

DEPOTS

20. Depots Remaining in U.K. As of 1 February 1945, the Ground Force Reinforcement Command installations remaining in the United Kingdom were the 10th and 12th Depots, the Ground Force Training Center No. 1, and the Rear Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command. The mission of the 10th Depot was the processing and shipment of hospital returnees, earmarked shipments and returnees to the Zone of the Interior. The mission of the 12th Depot was Infantry Retraining. The mission of the Ground Force Training Center No. 1 was retraining limited assignment personnel. All of these depots were under the control of Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command and the Rear Headquarters was operated in London for this purpose. Supply was through the appropriate bases in the United Kingdom.

21. Staging Depots, or port depots, operated at the ports of Le Havre and Marseilles, Depot No. 15 operating at Le Havre and a separate battalion, the 54th Reinforcement Battalion, at Marseilles. These Ground Force Reinforcement Command units, while under control of Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, operated with close liaison and cooperation with appropriate base section, Communications Zone, and Port Headquarters.

22. Training Depots, were under the direct control of the Deputy Commander for Training, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, and were supplied by the appropriate base section.

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23. Retraining Depots were under the direct supervision of the Deputy Commander for Training, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, and were supplied by the appropriate base section.

24. Stockage Depots, being in the Communications Zone, were also supplied by the appropriate base section. As of 1 February 1945, the 19th Reinforcement Depot, in addition to functioning as a stockage depot, also handled Communication Zone casualties.<sup>5</sup> In this role, it processed and shipped these casualties to Communications Zone units.

25. Forward (Army) Depots were habitually in support of the army in whose area they were located. Except for a short while in the Fall of 1944, when the 17th Reinforcement Depot was attached to the Third United States Army, these depots were not under the direct command of the Army Commander. This situation, wherein the Reinforcement Depot was in support of, rather than attached to, an army, was an unfavorable one in many ways for the depot.<sup>55</sup> Supply was difficult, because of the distance to Communications Zone supply installations and the inadequacy of transportation. Post Exchange, Red Cross, Special Services, and United Service Organization activities were likewise difficult to obtain. In such cases, the depot commander was forced to rely upon securing the cooperation and help of the army by personal visits and persuasion in order to secure such services for his depot.<sup>55</sup> It is the opinion of the General Board that army depots should habitually be attached to the army which they are serving. They should be under the technical supervision of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command Commander, but should be under the direct control of the army commander. In this way, the army will be responsible for the supply of transportation during peak-load movements of reinforcements.

SECTION 3

BATTALIONS

26. Separate Battalions. The 54th Reinforcement Battalion operated as a separate battalion in Marseilles for port receiving and shipping (Section II, 1 above), and in this role was in close support and liaison with the Delta Base Section and Headquarters 6th Port.<sup>75</sup>

27. Battalions with Depots in Communications Zone, usually located comparatively close to the headquarters of the depot and were actively controlled by the depot headquarters in matters of supply, administration, training, and technical operation.

28. Battalions with Depots in Army Areas. Forward battalions of army depots were generally situated well forward in the area of the particular corps which they were supporting. This made possible close liaison with the corps headquarters and, in some cases, with the various division headquarters. It was found that the best location of these forward battalions was in the vicinity of the corps class I supply installations, so as to enable non-divisional units to pick up reinforcements with the same vehicles that drew supplies.<sup>10</sup>

29. The rear battalions of army depots were usually centrally located in the army areas and in fairly close proximity to the depot headquarters.

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SECTION 4

COMPANIES

30. During the landing operations of the Seventh United States Army in Southern France, companies of forward battalions were in close support of divisions, which proved an effective way to insure early landing of reinforcements.<sup>105</sup> Those companies landed with the divisions. With the exception of this landing operation, however, reinforcement companies were normally under direct control of their battalion headquarters and were located in the proximity of the battalion headquarters.

SECTION 5

DISCUSSION

31. Importance of Reinforcement System. It is essential that the importance of the reinforcement system be recognized by all echelons of command. The great effect it will have on the success of the campaign and the morale of the troops cannot be overestimated. The reinforcement system in the European Theater like Topsy "just grew". A very close study of the development of the system impressed the Board with the tremendous endeavor it had been. Brigadier General Layman (then Colonel Layman) had been directed to bring together an organization of the size and ramifications of a combat corps with its full complement of divisions and supporting troops. The system was later to have a capacity of over 100,000 men, a training cadre composed of all branches and the more important services, a training personnel exceeding 6,000 men, a reinforcement unit cadre in excess of 20,000 men, and before its disbandment will have handled 2,100,000 through the system. Thus, by the time the reinforcement system expired, it had handled one half of the entire personnel in the theater.

32. Untrained Personnel in the Reinforcement Command units. Throughout the history of the reinforcement system can be traced the results of using personnel untrained in the United States in the duties, functions, and operation of reinforcement units. These individuals had to learn and at the same time operate a very difficult technical job without the aid of a field manual to assist them. To quote from the history of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command:<sup>5</sup> "No operating units being as yet available, the first efforts at headquarters were directed towards getting together the necessary units and preparing training programs for these units, to get them ready for the task of handling replacements. By the end of November 1943, Colonel Layman was able to report that 'plans were nearing completion for the organization' to operate replacement depots in Southern, Western, and Northern Ireland Base Sections. His most critical problems at that time were key personnel for the depots. The only trained replacement personnel made available to assist in this work were the officers and men of the Third Replacement Depot."

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THE GENERAL BOARD  
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER  
APU 408

REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM AND REINFORCEMENT PROCEDURES IN  
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

PART TWO

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION OF REINFORCEMENT POLICIES IN THIS  
THEATER IN THE LIGHT OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCES

CHAPTER 1

PRIOR PLANNING FOR REINFORCEMENT

SECTION 1

PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS

33. General. a. Estimated monthly reinforcement requirements for all Field Forces and Service Forces troops in the European Theater from D-Day to D + 209 were based on estimates of battle casualties and non-battle casualties during this period.

b. Battle casualty factors were prescribed by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, which also prescribed a normal attrition rate of 1.7 admissions per day per thousand troops, or a daily admission rate of .17%. Experience in the Theater up to May 1944 showed a daily admission rate of about 1.5 per thousand. The figure 1.7 per thousand was used throughout the long range casualty estimate.<sup>32</sup>

34. Estimate in Detail. a. The Commanding General, First US Army, using Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force factors, prescribed daily casualty factors for each of the first 15 days of operations based upon his operational plan.

b. G-1, First US Army Group, in computing battle casualties after D + 14, followed the methods and factors prescribed by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Battle Casualty Factors for D + 15 and thereafter, which were applied against the entire effective force (Field Force and Communications Zone), were:

D + 15 to D + 29	- - - - -	.35%
D + 30 to D + 59	- - - - -	.25%
D + 60 to D + 90	- - - - -	.20%
Thereafter	- - - - -	.15%

c. During the first 30 days, drowned or voyage casualties were also calculated on the force sailed. Thereafter, drowned losses were assumed to be negligible. British estimates showed drowned loss of 3,000 on D-Day and zero thereafter.<sup>32</sup>

## R E S T R I C T E D

d. In making monthly estimates of reinforcement requirements, sick and non-battle returns to duty and wounded returnees to duty were computed using Love's factors which give the percentages of hospitalized sick and percentages of hospitalized wounded that are returned to duty after various periods of hospitalization.<sup>92</sup>

35. Revision of estimates. a. As the campaign in Europe progressed, revised projected estimates of reinforcement requirements were made, based upon experience tables for the Theater. The factors used in making the initial estimates were proven sound in the light of actual experience, but unforeseen factors contributed to the necessity for revision. The drowned losses were much less than had been initially provided for. Other factors were: the adoption of Theater 30 day policy for evacuation to the Zone of Interior, activation of many units in the Theater that had not been provided for in the troop basis, and augmentation of units already authorized.<sup>92</sup>

b. As shown in paragraph 2 above, the initial estimates for daily losses after D + 90 were .15%. The actual American battle casualties sustained from 1 July 1944 to 9 April 1945 were as follows:

MONTH	BATTLE CASUALTIES	AVERAGE PER DAY	% BATTLE LOSS PER DAY
July 1944	47,423	1529	.385
August	59,196	1265	.210
September	30,937	1032	.154
October	18,797	606	.085
November	47,924	1598	.208
December	59,584	1986	.246
January 1945	37,986	1225	.142
February	23,882	853	.088
March	35,691	1151	.105
April (1 to 9)	12,364	1374	.119

SECTION 2DIGESTED PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION BY ARM AND SERVICE

36. Initial Estimate. During the planning stage for operations on the continent, G-1 European Theater of Operations, US Army, prescribed the following breakdown by arm and service for use in computing battle casualties:

ARM OR SERVICE	PERCENTAGE
Infantry	70.3%
Armored	5.6
Cavalry	1.0
Field Artillery	7.2
Anti-Aircraft Artillery	1.9
Tank Destroyer	2.4
Total Arms	88.4%
Engineer	5.3
Medical	3.0
Signal	1.0
Ordnance	0.5
Quartermaster	0.6
Military Police	0.2
Chemical Warfare Service	0.4
Transportation Corps	0.6
Total Services	11.6%
Total Arms and Service	100.0%

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37. Changes in Percentages Composition. a. During the initial stages of the operations on the continent, it was found that infantry losses exceeded considerably the original estimates, while losses in the armored units and field artillery were considerably less than estimated. As operations continued, however, the percentage of infantry losses gradually decreased until a percentage slightly above that of the planning estimate was reached.<sup>86</sup> The percentage of losses in armored units, as the campaign progressed, increased over that in the early phase. In the field artillery the percentage decreased further as the operation progressed.

b. The following table shows the percentage breakdown by arm and service of reinforcements furnished to units under command of the 12th Army Group during the European Campaign. For the purpose of comparison, the table contained in paragraph 1 above is repeated here:

ARM OR SERVICE	% BREAKDOWN USED IN ORIGINAL ESTIMATES	% REINFORCEMENTS FURNISHED	
		PERIOD D-Day to D + 74 (19 August 44)	PERIOD D-Day to D + 343 (15 May 45)
Infantry	70.3%	82.9%	72.4%
Armored	5.6	1.5	5.0
Cavalry	1.0	1.4	2.2
Field Artillery	7.2	3.2	4.8
Anti-aircraft Artillery	1.9	.9	1.4
Tank Destroyer	2.4	.7	1.6
Total Arms	38.4%	90.6%	87.4%
Engineer	5.3%	3.5%	4.5
Medical	3.0	2.9	3.2
Signal	1.0	0.4	1.2
Ordnance	0.5	0.4	0.8
Quartermaster	0.6	0.9	1.6
Military Police	0.2	0.2	0.5
Transportation Corps	0.6	0.4	—
Chemical Warfare Service	—	0.6	0.3
Branch Immaterial	—	0.2	0.5
Total Services	11.6%	9.4%	12.6%
Total Arms and Services	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

\* Included in Branch Immaterial

38. Comparison of the above tables indicates that the principal fault in the percentage breakdown used for planning purposes was underestimation of the infantry losses. This was reflected in the serious shortage in infantry reinforcements in the Theater which necessitated an extensive restraining program in the Theater, as the flow of infantry reinforcements from the Zone of Interior was insufficient to supply the requirements.

SECTION 3ALLOCATION OF REINFORCEMENTS

39. Only when reinforcements are in short supply is there any need for an allocation of priority of reinforcements to be made by higher headquarters. Critical shortages developed early in November 1944, at which time 12th Army Group found it necessary to allocate infantry and armored reinforcements to armies, and army in turn found it necessary to allocate these reinforcements to divisions. When the shortages became more acute in December 1944, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces stepped into the picture and allocated reinforcements to army groups. 79,89,91

40. Reinforcement allocations were based on a number of factors, such as current personnel shortages, reinforcement stockage in army depots, estimated flow of hospital returnees, and future tactical requirements as determined by G-3. Examples of the method used to determine allocations are contained in Exhibits 7, 8 and 9. 30,31,38

41. The following factors operated to change allocations of reinforcement to armies or to change the estimated date of arrival in army areas of reinforcements.<sup>32</sup>

- a. Change in allocation to army group by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces.
- b. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces directive that certain units be filled at once from the over-all pool.
- c. Shipments being short from the Zone of Interior.
- d. Sea accidents.
- e. Delays in crossing channel from the United Kingdom.
- f. Delays in landing.
- g. Delays in transportation on the continent.<sup>75</sup>
- h. Limited ability of handling facilities to process new arrivals.<sup>75</sup>

## CHAPTER 2

### STOCKAGE LEVELS

42. In the Theater. The stockage level of the theater was set at reasonably firm estimates for losses from all causes, for sixty-day periods from D-day forward.<sup>66</sup> This estimate, as published in the flow chart annexed to the basic directive,<sup>66</sup> provided for an initial combat force stockage of 70,000 officers and men. This stockage was attained before D-day and it increased gradually until, on 13 July 1944, the total stockage, including Army Service Forces personnel, was 8,010 officers and 102,804 enlisted men in the System.<sup>73</sup>

43. In army reinforcement depots. The rated capacity of an army reinforcement depot consisting of three stockage battalions and three corps battalions is 9,600 men. During the period of operations the actual stockage, including personnel being returned to their units, varied downward from a high point of over 27,000 men. The average daily stockage, including corps battalions, in the First US Army depot from 1 August 1944 to V-E day amounted to 11,960 men.<sup>74</sup> In practice the army group commander frequently withheld a portion of the stockage of the army depots by limiting the allotment of men to the army.

## CHAPTER 3

### FLOW OF REINFORCEMENTS AND RESUPPLIES

#### SECTION 1

##### CLASSIFICATION AND SUBSTITUTION OF MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES

###### IN THE REINFORCEMENT SYSTEM

44. Classification and substitution of Military Occupational Specialties in the Reinforcement System is seldom necessary when the flow of reinforcements is in sufficient quantity and in the proper arm/service breakdown and Military Occupational Specialty distribution. During the European Campaign, substitution of Military Occupational Specialty (and in some cases, re-classification) was resorted to in order to reduce the stockage of slow moving Military Occupational Specialty personnel.<sup>55</sup>

45. When the shortage of infantry riflemen became acute in the theater, and prior to institution of a retraining program in the Reinforcement Command, considerable substitution of Military Occupational Specialties was done to fill requisitions for infantry riflemen. Notwithstanding the fact that most of these men had at one time received basic infantry training, few of them were mentally or professionally conditioned for infantry combat duty.<sup>15</sup> This was particularly true of non-commissioned officers.

#### SECTION 2

##### THEATER EVACUATION POLICY AND ITS EFFECT

###### ON FLOW OF REINFORCEMENTS

46. The evacuation policy within the theater was of importance

to the Ground Force Replacement Center because of the effect that this policy had on the number of wounded returns to duty that would be available as reinforcements.

47. The evacuation policy on the continent was determined by two factors, namely the requirements for mobile beds on the continent and the availability of fixed hospital beds on the continent. After arrival of general hospitals on the continent, it was planned to establish a 120-day evacuation policy and to eventually provide complete, definitive care on the continent, evacuating cases requiring more than 120 days for recuperation to the Zone of Interior. The delay in setting up general hospitals on the continent resulted in a dangerously low reserve of fixed hospital beds in the Theater; consequently, the 120-day evacuation policy for return to the Zone of Interior had to be reduced to 90 days.<sup>19</sup>

48. The evacuation policy in the United Kingdom was materially affected by the delay in establishing general hospitals on the Continent. The continued flow of casualties from the Continent prevented the closing out of the hospitals in the United Kingdom for movement to the Continent; therefore the evacuation policy in the United Kingdom was also reduced to 90 days.

49. The change in policy of evacuation from 120 days to 90 days did not affect to any considerable degree the returns to duty of non-battle casualties, but did have a considerable effect on the number of returns to duty of battle casualties. The following table, prepared by the Statistics Section, Secretary to General Staff, European Theater of Operations, on 18 December 1944 gives an indication of the effect of the change in policy:

Percentage of Returns, 90 days vs 120 days

	Battle	Non-Battle
90 days	59.5%	93.0%
120 days	64.8%	93.4%

Note: Of total returns to duty, 28.6% of battle and 5.3% of non-battle were estimated to be limited assignment.

50. Initially, hospital-returned-to-duty personnel were automatically returned to their units. However, in August of 1944, when the divisions were incurring few casualties, the returned-to-duty exceeded the vacancies caused by losses. At this time, the Commanding General, 12th Army Group prescribed priorities by which those returned-to-duty personnel would be returned to their units.<sup>35</sup> Later, the policy was established of holding returnees in the Reinforcement Command until requisitioned.

SECTION 3

RETRAINING

51. One of the most serious problems encountered by the Ground Force Reinforcement Command developed from the shortage of infantry rifle reinforcements. The shortage was acute early in the European Campaign, and became serious in December 1944 and January 1945.<sup>35</sup>

52. The first retraining of reinforcements was initiated in July 1944, when basic privates of other arms and services were made available for retraining as infantry reinforcements.<sup>35</sup>

RESTRICTED

53. When the serious shortage of infantry reinforcements occurred in December and January a program was initiated to retrain as infantry reinforcements all available and physically qualified general assignment personnel who could be replaced by limited assignment personnel. Such personnel were taken from service elements of the Field Forces as well as Communications Zone.<sup>5</sup>

54. In order to insure control of reinforcement requirements by branch, which were thrown considerably out of balance as a result of several conversion training programs conducted by the Armies, the Commanding General, European Theater Operation United States Army, on 17 January 1945, directed that all conversion training, or retraining, to provide additional infantry reinforcements in the theater would in the future be conducted by the Ground Force Reinforcement System.<sup>10</sup>

55. In addition to retraining of enlisted men, officers volunteers of the services were given conversion training to furnish combat infantry officer reinforcements. This training comprised an eight week's course at Reinforcement Depot number 9.<sup>5</sup>

56. The total number of enlisted men received for retraining during the period 1 January 1945 to 5 May 1945 was 95,349. During the same period, 858 officers were received by the Ground Force Replacement Center for retraining.<sup>5</sup>

57. It was the opinion of the bulk of divisional officers consulted that the state of training of reinforcements retrained by the Ground Force Replacement Center was very poor compared with the caliber of men received from the Infantry Replacement Training Center in the Zone of Interior.<sup>14</sup> It is the opinion of the Board that this can be attributed to several factors, namely:

a. The quality of men furnished by Service Force and Field Force Service units for retraining was inferior.

b. The Ground Force Reinforcement Command lacked both qualified personnel and proper training facilities to give a quality of training comparable to that provided at the Infantry Replacement Training Center.

c. The mental attitude and morale of the retrainees was very poor.

58. Discussion.

a. In the initial organization of an army a large percentage of men occupying positions in the army service forces and in the rear areas of the army zone will be general service men who are thoroughly qualified for front line combat duty. As the action continues, a portion of the combat officers and men will become limited service through wounds or other causes. Many of these men must be retrained to qualify them for a new specialty in the rear areas of the army zone or for duty other than combat. The men released by these limited service men will then provide a sizable force of reinforcement material. This program calls for two types of training; first, the specialists school to retrain the limited service personnel, and, secondly officers and enlisted refresher training schools to requalify the general service men relieved by these limited service men for assignment to combat units.

b. How important this factor will become in a theater of

operations is indicated by the fact that during this European campaign 129,800 men were made limited service, given retraining in specialist schools and reassigned. This was in addition to those limited service men whose previous education qualified them for immediate reassignment with no further instruction.

#### SECTION 4

##### OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL

59. The establishment of a Ground Force Training Center in the theater for the purpose of training officer candidates as combat infantry 2nd Lieutenants was announced by Circular 13, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, 31 January 1945. Officer candidate school production in the United States had been curtailed because of lack of qualified candidates, and the flow of officer reinforcements from the Zone of Interior was being greatly reduced. It therefore was imperative that every possible effort be exerted to furnish officers from within the Theater. It was not contemplated that officers commissioned by direct appointment in combat units be sent to this school. The 9th Reinforcement Depot was selected as the site for the school, and a 12 weeks course was proscribed. A group of 30 officers and four enlisted men were sent from the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, to organize and operate this school.

60. Up to 5 May 1945, 5626 enlisted men had been received by the Ground Force Reinforcement Command in the Theater for officer candidate training. Of this number 499 had been graduated and given commissions.

61. Inasmuch as the initial graduates of the officer candidate school conducted by the Ground Force Reinforcement Command reported to their units too late to allow observation of their performance under combat conditions, it was difficult to evaluate the training received by those men. However, most divisional officers consulted have expressed satisfaction with the training of the officer candidate school. 14

62. A training center for infantry lieutenants who had received battlefield appointments was also established at the 9th Reinforcement Depot. The length of the course for those who had been commissioned from the Infantry was three weeks, and for those commissioned in the infantry from other branches of the service eight weeks. 5

#### SECTION 5

##### PROCESSING AND MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS TO USING UNITS

63. Reinforcements were received by the Ground Force Replacement Center, to be processed and moved to using units from the following sources:

- a. From the Zone of Interior.
- b. From Communication Zone hospitals in the United Kingdom.
- c. From Communication Zone hospitals on the continent.
- d. From army hospitals in the army areas.

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- e. Stragglers, deserters, and absent without official leave from military police installations in the Communications Zone.

64. Considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed by officers of combat units with apparent delay on the part of Ground Force Replacement Center in processing and forwarding reinforcements, and with failure to properly equip the reinforcements prior to shipment to using units 87,93. It is the belief of the Board that while many of the complaints were justified, there were also many that indicated a failure on the part of the using units to understand the problems confronting the Ground Force Replacement Center, and a failure on the part of the using units to cooperate with the Ground Force Replacement Center.<sup>55</sup>

65. Some of the factors causing delays in the processing and movement of reinforcements were:<sup>55</sup>

- a. Reinforcements arriving in the Ground Force Replacement Center from the Zone of Interior or hospitals with incomplete, faulty or missing records. This entailed an immense amount of clerical work on the part of Ground Force Replacement Center personnel.
- b. Reinforcements arriving in the Ground Force Replacement Center lacking essential clothing or equipment, introducing a major supply problem. This was especially true of hospital returnees, whose property was invariably left in the unit area when they were evacuated.<sup>102</sup> Because of difficulty in drawing more items from supply installations, reinforcements were held up in Ground Force Replacement Center depots awaiting equipment and clothing.
- c. Poor supply discipline on the part of some reinforcements
- d. Intentional loss of clothing or equipment on the part of some reinforcements.
- e. Lack of sufficient transportation available to a Ground Force Replacement Center installation to move reinforcements. (When armies were badly in need of reinforcements, they invariably assisted).
- f. Lack of a sense of duty on the part of officer reinforcements, and their failure to appreciate their responsibilities in disciplinary control of enlisted reinforcements.
- g. Different operating procedures in the various installations of the Ground Force Replacement Center, with resultant confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the reinforcements.
- h. Inefficiency and lack of leadership on the part of some individual officers and non-commissioned officers of the Ground Force Replacement Center.

66. On 8 April 1945 Headquarters European Theater Operation United States Army announced a policy calling for the training and shipment of reinforcements in platoon and squad units and in groups of four<sup>103</sup>. It was recommended that field force unit commanders

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make every effort to assign members of each platoon to the same unit in as low an echelon as practicable and that the four-man group be assigned habitually to the same unit.

67. In an informal letter to the G-1, 12th Army Group, the Commanding General, Ground Force Replacement Center reported on 22 November 1944: "Daily infantry rifle returns from the hospitals to the Replacement System are averaging 250 in the United Kingdom and 360 on the continent. It takes an average of 16 days to process United Kingdom returns to the army depots available to their unit. Every effort is being made to reduce this time element. Approximately 80% of the Continental returns are in the army area and are available for return to the unit in about 72 hours. The balance of Continental returns require approximately six days to make them available to their unit."<sup>104</sup>

CHAPTER 4TRAINING OF REINFORCEMENTSSECTION 1IN COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

68. Training in the Communications Zone divides itself into three subheads: First, the physical conditioning for field service and refresher training in the basic specialty which must be given to those reinforcements in the pipe line of the system in order that they will arrive at the unit at least as ready to do battle as they were when they left the United States; second, retraining of individuals who have become limited service; and third, general service officers and enlisted training and retraining.

69. Comments received from division and regimental commanders indicate general satisfaction as to the state of training of reinforcements, with the general exception of armored force reinforcements.<sup>55</sup> After the commencement of hostilities, the Reinforcement System was seldom able to meet the demands of the armored force units for trained tank commanders. In considering the alleged failure, all blame should not be placed on the Reinforcement System. Consideration should be given as to whether or not the specialists were adequately trained when they were released from training centers in the United States. It is questionable whether the total training time allotted in the United States to the training of armored force crewmen was sufficient to thoroughly train men in basic training, operation and maintenance, gunnery and tactical operations. A second important factor is the fact that, during their further battle training in the United Kingdom and their combat experiences on the Continent, officers and enlisted men became vastly more proficient in their duties. In comparison with these experienced men, the training of the Reinforcement System having no facilities for instructing armored reinforcements, had laid great emphasis on physical conditioning for field service. This type of training was carried out in depots throughout the Communications Zone and continued in the Army depots. Refresher courses designed to maintain the mobilization Training Program level of training in each specialty were carried out in the depots of the Communications Zone.<sup>52</sup> Training units of the appropriate arm and branch were present with each depot and, in addition to their organization equipment of crew-served weapons and armored vehicles, a sizable addition of extra equipment was allowed the reinforcement depots. Due to the large number of reinforcements handled it will probably always be impossible to give tank drivers and other members of crew-served weapons enough practice during their stay in the Reinforcement System so that they can pass immediately from the Reinforcement System to a position in the crew on the front line without a short period of training on the divisional or regimental level.

70. The special training and retraining missions allotted to the Reinforcement System constituted a major portion of its operations. On the Continent, the mission of retraining enlisted men for duty as infantrymen, which commenced with the retraining of an overstockage of headquarters and service company personnel in July 1944, frequently increased so that on V-E day there were reinforcement depots (12th, 16th and 6900th), each considerably augmented in reinforcement capacity and training staff, were engaged in retraining general service men selected from the Army Service Forces units and Air Forces units for infantry combat duty, and about 40,000 men were being retrained in each six weeks' course. One other depot (9th), also greatly augmented by an added training staff, was operating an officers' training center with three training missions:

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- a. Refresher course of junior officers commissioned in service arms for duty as infantry platoon commanders (capacity 600 per month).
- b. Refresher course for officers who had received battlefield commissions (capacity 1500 per month).
- c. Officer candidate school (capacity 1500 per month).

71. Other important training missions accomplished include:

- a. Organization and training of sixteen provisional military police battalions and seven prisoner of war overhook detachments.<sup>5</sup>
- b. Training of negro enlisted Communications Zone volunteers for duty as infantry riflemen.<sup>5</sup>
- c. Basic training of American citizens inducted in the European Theater of Operations.<sup>5</sup>
- d. Rehabilitation training of enlisted personnel.

SECTION 2

IN ARMY DEPOTS

72. It is interesting to note that upon arrival in army depot the interest of the individual reinforcement in combat training increased noticeably over that displayed in the rear depots. Here, for the first time, recent war damage was visible on all sides, friendly and enemy airplanes were frequently seen, and artillery firing could be heard. The army depots concentrated on training in physical conditioning and in the firing of all weapons common to the arm of the reinforcement. In order to further satisfy the increased interest in combat training, each army depot made arrangements with the army commander to furnish a special orientation and training centre of combat trained officers and noncommissioned officers who were sent to the depots on a rotational basis.<sup>85, 98, 99</sup> These instructors presented a program of practical training in battlefield living and problems which was invaluable. The Board feels, however, that, if the recommendations presented later for the establishment of division receiving and training battalions (or companies) is approved, this final combat training should be scheduled in that organization where it can be co-ordinated with division methods and combined with the division indoctrination period.

SECTION 3

STATE OF TRAINING, PHYSICAL CONDITION, AND MORALE OF REINFORCEMENTS; ORIENTATION AND INDOCTRINATION

73. Morale: The state of morale of reinforcements constituted such a serious problem that it warranted extraordinary attention and efforts on the part of all echelons of command. The Theater studied it and made changes in an effort to improve it. The Reinforcement System considered it one of its major problems, and the army groups and armies did likewise. The low morale, particularly of casualties, was reflected in the general lack of self-pride among the reinforcements, the lack of discipline, a high absent without leave rate, and in the other outward manifestations of an unfavorable psychological condition. Among the corrective measures taken were the following: The Theater changed the name "Replacement System" to "Reinforcement System", and the designation of the personnel from "replacements" to "reinforcements" in an effort to avoid any connotation which would indicate that personnel were considered as "cannon fodder".<sup>42</sup> The reinforcement

system strove to improve living conditions, and were making constant and unremitting efforts to obtain additional special services, unit service organizations, and Red Cross facilities.<sup>43</sup> In the final analysis, however, none of these corrective measures could be considered entirely successful. In particular, the casualties, most of whom were returning from the hospitals and were regarded by the new reinforcements as veterans, and who should have been a source of strength to new reinforcements, presented the greatest morale problem. Many of them assumed the viewpoint that in having fought the enemy and been wounded they had accomplished their share of the work in defeating the enemy. The will to close with the enemy again was largely absent. These men frequently passed out a tremendous amount of malicious misinformation to the new reinforcements, and not only exhibited the lowest of morale themselves, but made every effort to lower that of all with whom they came in contact. These men did not constitute a large percentage of the returning casualties, but through their very domineering nature they were the ones most often heard. The conditions of life in a reinforcement system unit in the forward areas do not tend to increase morale. An army depot, calling as it does for a large concentration of men who are assigned there on a temporary basis and itself subject to long moves with little warning, can only be improved so much. It is usually located ahead of the line where utilities have been re-established in the zone of unprepared battlefield destruction and away from any social outlet. The men's lives are strictly regulated both for security reasons and in order to have them immediately available upon call. The depots are far enough behind the lines to receive the full impact of all the rumors that are constantly alert in the Army zone, and the personnel have little opportunity to check the truth of these rumors, while they have much time in which to discuss and expand on them. Casual living under these conditions and facing a stay of undetermined length while awaiting a requisition from his old units, was particularly susceptible to these influences. Furthermore, those who had already been wounded frequently felt that they should have been given special consideration and, when this was impossible, became disgruntled and worked out these grievances by constant complaints. They circulated exaggerated tales among the new reinforcements who constantly surrounded them, because they were eager to learn first hand of conditions on the front. In general, the Reinforcement System adopted a first in, first out policy, but were handicapped by two classes of personnel:

- a. Casuals who possessed a priority on filling requisitions.
- b. Personnel who possessed certain specialized skills.

74. One other cause of low morale among reinforcements, which was not considered above, was that engendered by the retraining of service type personnel as combat soldiers. It was noted by unit commanders that personnel originally assigned to units that were not normally expected to be in direct contact with the enemy, when reclassified and retrained as combat soldiers, were "not happy".<sup>45</sup>

75. State of training. There was considerable conflict in the reports of units concerning the state of training of the reinforcements furnished. For example: An Army Ground Forces observer and member of the War Department Observer's Board reported that in anti-aircraft units about half of the units visited reported that reinforcements unsatisfactorily trained.<sup>46</sup> The complaints varied from statements that reinforcements appeared to be "cast off" to the claim that they were improperly classified, the personnel not being qualified according to their Specification Serial Number's. The fault of improper classification was apparently generalized, and it is mentioned with bitterness by several armored divisions.<sup>45</sup> This appears to be less the fault of

the training given them the result of the necessity for filling requisitions even though there was an insufficient number of qualified personnel in the Reinforcement System. The armored divisions also pointed to the fact that their reinforcements were spending far too long a period in the Reinforcement System, with the result that the personnel who had entered the system reasonably well trained became stale and lost much of their skill before they reached their final unit. The 3d Armored Division was the source of the statement that some men were six months or more in the system in spite of War Department directives which limit the maximum time that personnel can remain in the depots.<sup>45</sup> The 2d Armored Division pointed out that many officers were designated as platoon officers whose previous experience had been as special services officer, post exchange officer, or a minor staff officer, and that these officers were totally unsatisfactory as combat commanders.<sup>46</sup> This undoubtedly was also the result of efforts to supply personnel to fill requisitions when the Reinforcement System did not possess the requisite number of properly qualified personnel. Most infantry reinforcements were found to be reasonably satisfactory with the exception of crew members of crew-served weapons.

76. Physical condition. The receiving units were generally satisfied with the physical condition of the reinforcements provided them with the exception of the armored division, who, as was noted in preceding paragraphs, complained of the length of time that reinforcements remained in the system and claimed that the personnel went out of condition.<sup>45</sup> The happy general condition was the result of intensive efforts on the part of the Reinforcement System depots to keep their men in condition. Lacking facilities and equipment to train a large number of specialists, the depots could and did physically condition men by hikes, calisthenics, and obstacle courses at every available opportunity.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, if such efforts are made, it is likely that reinforcements arriving at a static front will be in better condition than the personnel of units in the line.

77. Orientetion and indoctrination. Without exception, all receiving units made strenuous efforts to ensure that reinforcements were oriented as to the local situation and conditions before they were sent to the front.<sup>48</sup> There were any number of systems used, depending upon local improvisations as to methods and materials. Units in contact with the enemy made special efforts to show the local situation and to stress the history of the unit, with emphasis on its past combat record, in an effort to inspire the unit pride; and whenever time permitted they conducted a brief training course lasting from a few hours to several days to review the reinforcement's training and to indoctrinate him with local methods used by both our own forces and the enemy. This vital indoctrination period had often to be cut short because of the necessity of immediately sending reinforcements to depleted units, and, during periods of heavy fighting, caused a far too severe cut in orientation and indoctrination periods. The value of such an orientation period extending over a day or more is incalculable both to the reinforcement and the unit, but, under the system existing in this Theater during the past operations, its duration was uncertain. This period can be insured and formal schedules drawn up and complied with if reinforcements are in reinforcement units that are actually present with a division (See par 76 and 77), and this is an important additional reason for attaching such units to a division.

78. Separation of casualties from reinforcements. As already observed, it was found in the Reinforcement System that casualties returning to duty often exerted a bad influence upon the new reinforcements, and consideration was given to the establishment of a battlefield separating the casualties from the new reinforcements. In some cases it was attempted.<sup>49</sup> It is the opinion of the Board that this is not only unnecessary but undesirable. If the policy of returning casualties directly through the

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the units without requisition is adopted (see Part Three, Chapter 1, Section 11), the casuals will move straight through the Reinforcement System with a minimum of delay. This system, it is believed, will shorten their cutback on life as to make them valuable personnel in the Reinforcement System. Their morale high, knowing that they will rejoin their unit in a short time, their stay with the new reinforcements should be a period of instruction rather than "a ripe session". They should naturally serve as the best type of instructors during off-duty hours in respects in passing out their combat knowledge and experiences.

## SECTION 4

### TRAINING BY USING UNITS

79. As stated in Section 3, Chapter 4, receiving units made strenuous efforts to ensure that reinforcements were oriented as to the local situations and conditions before they were sent to the front.<sup>48</sup> The program adopted by various units differed considerably, and very often the tactical situation was such, and the need for reinforcements so acute, that insufficient time was allowed in the division rear area for proper indoctrination of the reinforcements. This became such a matter of concern to the Theater Commander that, on 11 March 1945, The Chief of Staff, European Theater of Operations, wrote a letter to the army group commanders directing that provisional indoctrination units be formed in each division.<sup>49</sup> The Standing Operating Procedures for training of reinforcements adopted by the 36th Infantry Division, and the schedule for indoctrination training of the same division, were enclosed as a suggested guide.<sup>50, 51</sup>

80. It is the considered opinion of this Board that provision for a reinforcement company in the table of organization and equipment of the infantry division and armored division will be a long way toward eliminating the possibility of reinforcements reaching front line units without being properly indoctrinated and oriented. This reinforcement company should in no way be considered a tactical reserve in the sense of being employed as a unit. Its value lies in offering the reinforcements most valuable indoctrination training, conducted in their own division area, by commissioned and enlisted personnel from their own division who have had combat experience.

CHAPTER 5EQUIPMENT AND ARMS OF REINFORCEMENTSSECTION 1UPON ARRIVAL IN COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

81. The reinforcement normally arrive in the Communications Zone depots with complete clothing and individual weapons and individual equipment other than intrenching tools as prescribed for overseas shipments. During the "package" phase of supplying of reinforcements to the Army (D-Day to D plus 14) each man was given individual weapons as prescribed by his MOS, and intrenching tools were issued on the basis of one axe, intrenching, two pick mattocks, intrenching, and seven shovels, intrenching for each ten men.<sup>70</sup> After D plus 14, it was estimated that Army supplies and battlefield recovered stocks would be sufficient on the Continent to supply arms in the Communications Zone on the Continent. Prior to D plus 14, the Commanding General of the First U.S. Army reported that stockage of arms was not available on the Continent and that it was desired that reinforcements continue to be forwarded from the United Kingdom fully armed.<sup>71</sup> The continued equipping of reinforcements with arms in the United Kingdom developed an extreme shortage of the supply of M-1 rifles, bayonets, and trench knives. This shortage was somewhat relieved by the arrival of shipments of reinforcements from the United States who carried individual weapons during the month of August, but became acute again during the late Fall of 1944, when the problem of retreating of men for duty as infantry riflemen developed into major proportions. The number of serviceable arms recovered from the battlefields did not at any time approach the estimated total requirements. While the problem became acute during certain phases of the operations, especially during January and February of 1945, there was never an overall shortage of individual weapons, and no reinforcement left an Army depot who was not equipped with an individual weapon.

82. The amount of clothing prescribed by the European Theater of Operations was usually in excess of that required by division commanders. This discrepancy was recognized by Army and Ground Force Reinforcement System commanders, but due to the fact that the net result was the forwarding of a bulk supply of clothing to the Army area by the individual soldier rather than by an already overburdened transportation system, no change was made in the prescribed allowances.

SECTION 2UPON DELIVERY TO USING UNITS

82. A reinforcement usually reported to his unit completely equipped with individual arms and equipment, such shortages as existed usually occurring through loss or damage en route. At certain times, owing to shortages in the rear areas, large numbers of reinforcements arrived short some particular item of equipment. The more common trouble with the arms and equipment of the new arrivals was that they had a surplus, and most divisions found it necessary to take up the excesses and retain them as exchange clothing at the divisional base unit, or return them to the supply agencies.<sup>15</sup> For this and other purposes, all units who received reinforcements in any strength established a provisional receiving unit in their rear areas to process and to handle reinforcements. The procedure in general was as follows: Each receiving unit had a list of the equipment that men of that particular organization were required to have at the front. They also established a small stock

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of the required items at the reception point so that shortages could be immediately filled. The required items in an infantry unit were usually few in number, a typical list being given here as an example: Individual weapon, web equipment, ammunition, spoon, canteen and cup, first aid pocket, trenching tool, one blanket, and any special winter clothing.<sup>16</sup> After the reinforcements had been checked, shortages filled and overages removed, they were then ready for the orientation and indoctrination, and eventually were assigned to their units. At times, there existed shortages of equipment in certain critical items which could not be drawn from the supply agencies, as occurred in the first week of August in Normandy when there was a shortage of trenching tools. When this situation existed, reinforcements were usually not forwarded until the equipment could be drawn, or salvage parties had recovered the required items from the battlefield. There was a rifle shortage after the opening phases of the Ardennes battle, and the Ground Force Reinforcement Command was authorized to forward reinforcements without individual weapons.<sup>17</sup> However, army and division stocks were able to make up these shortages, and the net result was that men were held in the army depot long enough to fire a familiarization course with their new weapons.

CHAPTER 6CVE LENGTH IN UNITSSECTION 1AUTOMATIC AND NON-AUTOMATIC LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZED PERSONNEL

83. Policy. The general policy in effect during the major part of the first campaign in Europe with respect to the return to duty of hospitalized personnel may be summed up as follows:

a. It was general policy to return all hospitalized general service personnel to their units when vacancies existed and no outstanding requisition from the unit was at hand.<sup>1</sup>

b. General service enlisted personnel of the first three grades were returned directly to their units without requisition for non-divisional units only.<sup>2</sup>

c. Field officers qualified for general service were returned directly to armies, where they were normally reassigned to their original units. Limited assignment field grade officers were reported to their army headquarters for disposition, but were returned to army control upon specific requisition.<sup>3</sup>

d. Limited assignment company grade officers and enlisted men of all grades were not returned to combat, but were utilized to replace physically qualified personnel in non-combatant units, releasing such physically qualified personnel for retraining as combatant soldiers.

e. All company grade officers and enlisted men qualified for general assignment were, upon release from the hospital, placed in the reinforcement system and sent to the army depot serving their unit (exception, see sub-paragraph b, above).<sup>4</sup> When this personnel had arrived in the army depot, they were held there awaiting requisition from the parent unit for as long a period of time as the replacement situation permitted.<sup>5</sup> This policy was modified only in the closing days of the fighting in Europe when the numbers of reinforcements on hand were so great that the entire reinforcement system was badly over-crowded.<sup>6</sup>

84. Result of Policy. It is evident from a study of the policies described in paragraph 1, above, that unless a unit constantly had a personnel requisition outstanding, a delay of unknown length was encountered before a man returning from the hospital rejoined his unit. Even with such an outstanding requisition there was a good chance that a returnee would remain for an indefinite period of time in the reinforcement depot while such requisitions as were at hand were at least partly filled by new reinforcements. A man recently discharged from the hospital normally has the single and whole-hearted desire to rejoin his unit with as little delay as possible, and it was not unusual for one to go absent without leave and report to his parent unit as a means of circumventing these encumbering delays. Furthermore, the conditions of life in a reinforcement depot: i.e., constant alert, overcrowding, friendlessness, poor housing facilities, and a feeling of being an orphan, have a very depressing morale effect upon the persons awaiting shipment. These personnel who are just returning to their units often newly recovered from a wound, and who should be deserving of every facility possible, were, instead, held for an indefinite period of time under very trying conditions, sinking deeper into a miasma

of low morale and self-pity. Furthermore, these people, having been in combat, were looked upon as a source of all knowledge by the new reinforcements and their state of mind exerted a definitely bad effect upon the new reinforcements, since they worked out their disgust and low morale upon the new men with a series of complaints and wild-eyed stories of the front. The peculiar part of this whole set of conditions was that while this was taking place, the parent units of the hospital returnees were probably moving heaven and earth to secure their quick return.<sup>14</sup>

85. Overstrength. The principle behind the failure to return personnel without delay was that of conservation of manpower, with a desire to prevent units from becoming overstrength. While a unit was engaged in combat it was impossible for it to become overstrength, and, as a result it was almost constantly understrength.<sup>90</sup> While it is theoretically easy to demonstrate how a unit occupying a quiet sector after having been engaged in heavy fighting could have enough personnel returned to duty to make it overstrength, this would not have occurred in many cases even if all general service personnel were promptly returned. Even if overstrength did occur, a very short period in combat would reduce that overstrength before the theoretical loss of manpower became sufficiently great to hinder the operation of a theater within its assigned strength.

## SECTION 2

### REGULATIONS BASED ON ESTIMATED LOSSES 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE

86. When it became apparent that the three-day lag in the receipt of reinforcements following their requisition was causing serious shortages in combat elements in contact with the enemy, tentative permission was granted them to requisition on the basis of their estimated losses for the succeeding 48 hour period.<sup>9</sup> This plan had two important disadvantages.

a. Replacements were not always received even though requisitioned.

b. The 48 hour period was not long enough, there normally being a three day period between requisition and the receipt of reinforcements.

87. The policy was not a complete success, and in general, was not considered a satisfactory solution.<sup>10</sup>

## SECTION 3

### ALLOWED OVERSTRENGTH

88. Policy. The manpower conservation program in effect in the European Theater prohibited the assignment of overstrength to units in the theater during the greater part of the campaign.<sup>11</sup> However, if the experience of operations in this theater is any guide, there will never be enough men in future wars to produce overstrength except for short periods of time and in unimportant numbers.

89. Assault Divisions. When planning for the assault of the Normandy beaches, it was recognized that normal reinforcement policies could not be applied, and the plan was therefore adopted to supply each assault division with 2500 men overstrength to be pre-trained as replacements in these divisions and carried to the beaches as part of these divisions. This policy worked, inasmuch as it permitted the replacement of initial

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losses expectfully, but it had the great disadvantage of being based upon estimates. The personnel were received and trained in certain predetermined numbers by branch. When actual casualties occurred, it developed at once that the actual casualties did not square with the advance estimates, which resulted in certain units, notably the division special troops and the artillery, remaining overstrength in most cases to the end of the fighting in Europe.<sup>13</sup> This must inevitably be the case, as only by an impossible combination of skill and luck would it ever be possible to accurately forecast losses by branch.

CHAPTER 7RECORDS AND REPORTS PERTAINING TO REINFORCEMENTS WHICH WERE IN-TEIVED BY VARIOUS ECHELONS OF COMMANDSECTION 1IN DIVISIONS

90. Based upon reports from subordinate units, the classification and assignment section of division headquarters prepares requisitions for reinforcements.<sup>14</sup> The following sources of information as to losses are used:

- a. Morning report remarks
- b. Casualty reports
- c. Hospitalizations
- d. Evacuation records
- e. Graves registration records.

91. Inventory of specialists were kept current. The forms 20 of all men listed in any of the above mentioned reports were pulled and from these Form 20's the break-down as to arm/branch and Military Occupation Specialty for the requisitions were determined.

92. In different divisions and armies there was considerable lack of uniformity in the matter of G-1 Period Reports, Weekly strength reports, and Daily Summaries (See General Board Study No. 9, G-1 Reports and Reporting Procedures in the ETO). In the above mentioned study it was recommended that the G-1 Daily Summary be the only G-1 report submitted, as it embraces all the information formerly contained in the other reports.

SECTION 2ARMY

93. The following reports and records were maintained in Army Headquarters:

- a. G-1 Daily Summary.
- b. Machine Records Unit Casualty reports.
- c. Evacuation and hospitalization reports.
- d. Daily stockage reports from Army GFRC depots.
- e. Daily reinforcements assignment reports from Army GFRC depot.
- f. Summary of personnel reinforcements requisitioned.
- g. Summary of reinforcements assigned.

SECTION 3ARMY GROUPS

94. The following reports pertaining to reinforcements were maintained by army group headquarters:<sup>106</sup>

- a. G-1 Daily Summary.
- b. Machine Records Unit, European Theater of Operation, United States Army Casualty Reports.
- c. Army monthly summary of personnel reinforcements requisitioned.
- d. Army monthly report of reinforcements assigned.
- e. Daily and weekly GFRC reinforcement assignments reports.
- f. Weekly Ground Force Reinforcement Command reinforcement assignments reports.
- g. Daily Ground Force Reinforcement Command stockage reports in reinforcement battalions supporting corps.
- h. Daily report from Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command covering all reinforcements on hand on the continent.
- i. Daily status of patients and evacuation of personnel, U.S. Army (Shows number of patients each Army and advance Section, Communications Zone ready for return in next 24 hours).
- j. Copy of each monthly requisition for requisition for reinforcements submitted to War Department by European Theater of Operations, United States Army.

95. The following verbal reports were received daily by the Reinforcements Branch, G-1, 12th Army Group.<sup>106</sup>

- a. Daily verbal report from armies, showing general assignment infantry reinforcements and casualties (combined, on hand).
- b. Daily verbal report direct from army depots, showing general assignment reinforcements and casualties (separately) on hand.
- c. Daily verbal report from Headquarters Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, showing general assignment infantry and armored reinforcements and casualties on hand.

96. The Reinforcements Branch G-1, Headquarters 12th Army Group, maintained the following records and charts:<sup>106</sup>

- a. Battle and non-battle casualties, showing total estimated and actual casualties, daily and cumulative.
- b. Tables showing composition by arm or service of losses based on monthly analysis of requisitions submitted by armies.

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- c. Tables showing percentage composition by arm or service of battle casualties as reported to Central Machine Records Unit, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.
- d. Graph showing infantry reinforcements (including casualties) on hand and available for assignment, and replacements in training for conversion to infantry riflemen. In addition to those on hand, graph showed estimated replacements to be available in one week, two weeks, and three weeks hence.
- e. Similar graph for armored reinforcements.
- f. Graph showing daily and cumulative armored losses for each army and total.
- g. Chart showing strength of Field Forces and strength of Communications Zone on continent. Table showing build-up on continent by divisions. Table included data showing daily those divisions engaged in combat (This data used to determine battle and non-battle loss rates to be used in estimating further losses).
- h. Tables showing wounded returns, estimated versus actual.
- i. Chart showing daily and cumulative casualties, estimated versus actual.

97. A continuous study and evaluation of Ground Forces Reinforcements Command reports was made to determine:<sup>106</sup>

- a. Types of reinforcements where there was a shortage or where shortage was likely to occur.
- b. Number of reinforcements available in the UK, number available on the continent, estimated numbers to be available in one week, two weeks, and three weeks.
- c. Returned to duty through Ground Forces Reinforcements Command.
- d. Reinforcements in conversion training to infantry riflemen.

98. A continuous study of casualty data, analyses of Army requisitions, and Machine Records Unit reports for data leading to:<sup>108</sup>

- a. Revised branch break-down of Field Force reinforcements to be secured from the US for Ground Forces Reinforcement Command stockage.
- b. Revised casualty factors.

SECTION 4

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99. In addition to the G-1 Daily Summary, army group also submitted monthly reports to Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, based upon their study of casualty data and Ground Forces Reinforcement Command reports, on their estimated monthly combat losses for the six succeeding months to include:

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- a. Troop build-up for basis of estimate.
- b. Total battle casualties.
- c. Wounded returns to duty.
- d. New battle replacements required.

100. The monthly army group estimates, plus reports from Communications Zone, were the basis on which Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army submitted monthly requisitions for reinforcements to the War Department.

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CHAPTER 8SPECIAL PROBLEMS FERULIAR TO VARIOUS ARMS, SERVICES OR FORCESSECTION 1FOREIGN UNITS

**101. Units involved.** The principal foreign units with which the US Forces in the European Theater were concerned was the 2nd French Armored Division, and the First French Army. The division which was organized and given its initial training in North Africa, was transported to England where it formed a part of the build-up forces for the invasion of the Continent.

**102. Reinforcement Procedures.** The initial personnel was obtained from among the French population in the North African Colonies, and from that source, also, initial loss reinforcements were drawn. The 2nd French Armored Division, while in general organized according to T/O similar to that of an American armored division, possessed certain unit installations not part of an American division. Among these units was a reinforcement and training battalion which was an integral part of the division. With this advantage, plans were made and executed which called for the trans-channel crossing of the reinforcement battalion of the French 2nd Armored Division to France as soon as operations permitted. There recruits were secured from local French population, trained by the division's reinforcement battalion, and held there subject to requisitioning from the division. This training was under Communications Zone direction. This system continued until the French division passed under the control of the First French Army.

SECTION 2RANGER BATTALIONS

**103. Qualifications.** Like parachute troops, ranger personnel are drawn from selected volunteers. They possess above average physique and great endurance, and, in view of the many varied tasks to which they may find themselves assigned which often require dangerous and exhausting work in small groups, their initiative and courage must be exceptional. The securing of this type of personnel requires, as in the case of paratroopers, unusual methods.

**104. Methods of Procurement.** In the European Theater, the senior officer of the rangers was charged with coordinating the procurement of ranger reinforcements.<sup>21</sup> Recognizing the special problems involved in obtaining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel, full authority was given the ranger commander to select personnel from all reinforcement depots, and, when the battalions were attached to armies, he also could select personnel from the combat units of the army.<sup>22</sup> This was a workable solution, and sufficient reinforcements could always be obtained for training and incorporated in the ranger battalions.

SECTION 3AIR-BORNE FORCES

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105. General. Under the present tables of organization, there are two types of air-borne forces for which reinforcements are required, paratroopers and glider-borne elements. The paratrooper must be a selected volunteer. This is important not only from the viewpoint of the hazards of his means of transportation and delivery to the battle-field, but primarily from a psychological angle. The slightest hesitation in jumping on the part of a paratrooper may well result in fatal dispersion in the drop zone. The necessity for instantaneous, almost reflex action, at a time of great physical danger, rules out the use of any other type of personnel. The use of either volunteers or carefully selected personnel for glider-borne elements is not necessary, inasmuch as, to all intents and purposes, glider borne personnel are simply normal line soldiers utilizing a somewhat unusual means of transportation to battle. The presence of these two contrasting requirements for reinforcements for air-borne units requires separate procedures in replacing casualties.

106. Parachute Reinforcements. The difficult and time consuming training required to turn out qualified parachutists, coupled with unusually high non-battle casualties often found in both air-borne training and operations, result in an almost continuous shortage of trained reinforcements for parachute units. Only the most rigorous economics in the assignment and use of parachute replacements can be allowed if the supply is to approach the demand. Furthermore, parachute units should be withdrawn from ground action at the earliest practicable date to prevent unnecessary expenditure of personnel. Strict allocation of available reinforcements, coupled with continuous and aggressive exploitation in all sources of supply, is a vital necessity. In the European Theater paratroop reinforcements were allocated to units by the European Theater of Operations 29 which procedure varied only when all paratroop elements were under the 12th Army Group, in which case that headquarters was responsible for the allocation.<sup>30</sup> In general, the XVIII Air-borne Corps was charged with the responsibility of originating requisitions for paratroopers and assigning them to units according to the allocation of higher headquarters.<sup>31</sup>

107. Glider Reinforcements. The glider reinforcement not being subject to the same demands upon his mental and physical system as is a paratrooper, need not of necessity be either a volunteer nor carefully selected. It is self-evident that the more thorough his training, particularly with regard to landing of aircraft, the more efficient soldier he will be, but this is not of primary importance. While originally efforts were made to provide specially trained and experienced glider-borne reinforcements, and while the air-borne units always desired this type of personnel, the Theater policy throughout the campaign was to utilize line personnel as glider reinforcements.<sup>32</sup> Under this system it is necessary only to provide training facilities to train glider personnel after they have been earmarked as air-borne reinforcements, and holding facilities to serve as a depot for this type of personnel after completion of training, to prevent their being lost in the reinforcement system.

SECTION 4

SPECIALISTS

108. General. Military specialists of various degrees of skill are found in all branches and arms of the service in such numbers that the only true solution to the problem of replacing their losses lies in the Replacement and School command in the Zone of the Interior. There, they must be inducted, classified and trained in such numbers as is found necessary to supply the Army as a whole, and it is thus a War Department problem. Such a procedure will undoubtedly result in local shortages occurring from time to time in all active theaters of operation. When such a local shortage occurs, it can in general be remedied by reclassification of other specialists and by on-the-job training within the using unit. This was the procedure followed in this Theater. For example, following its withdrawal from the Ardennes Battle, the 110th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division, was short almost every specialist in the regiment including the entire regimental headquarters company. All replacements received for infantry were classified as 74S riflemen. However, a careful check of the records of these personnel disclosed sufficient previous skills so that all critical shortages of specialist personnel were met by reclassification and a minor amount of unit training.<sup>37</sup> There were, however, two specialist pools established within the European Theater which will be separately considered, these being the Staff Officers pool and the Intelligence Specialist Team pool.

109. Staff Officers Pool. In order to provide a reserve of trained and indoctrinated staff officers, a special pool of this type of personnel was established in European Theater of Operations just prior to D-Day. Its original size was set at 315 officers which number was later reduced to 150, of whom 73 were earmarked for the field forces, the remainder being for the dual purpose of providing additional personnel for higher headquarters and to activate new headquarters.<sup>38</sup> In practice, these officers were either rapidly absorbed by expanding headquarters or were attached unassigned to units as overstrength and naturally used by those units in battle. It was soon apparent that almost every unit preferred to fill vacancies which occurred in combat by transferring or promoting personnel already assigned to the organization and known to the commander. For augmenting or expanding higher headquarters, the additional staff personnel were usually obtained by resuscitation by name or by specific qualifications. As a result a considerable number of officers in the Staff Officers Pool remained unassigned for long periods of time and the pool itself was dissolved in the early Spring of 1945.<sup>39</sup>

110. Intelligence Specialist Teams. The personnel for intelligence specialist teams (order of battle, photointerpreter, etc.) require special and intensive indoctrination and training, which was provided by the Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. The control of this personnel was vested in Military Intelligence Service, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. In April 1944 First US Army Group requested that this personnel be assigned as overstrength to units, and charged against future casualties, but this request was disapproved and the personnel continued under the direct control of the European Theater of Operations Headquarters.<sup>40</sup> Under the conditions prevailing during the campaigns of Europe, this was a satisfactory arrangement and probably resulted in obtaining the maximum benefit out of a limited number of personnel. However, when shortages developed, as they did in the summer of 1944, special measures had to be taken to insure that teams in corps, army and divisions were not too depleted to perform

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their work.<sup>41</sup> Another drawback to the centralized control coupled with the policy of attaching specialist teams to divisions and other headquarters, was that the attached teams and the personnel therein were too often regarded as strangers and not as an integral part of the headquarters.

SECTION 5

MEDICAL CORPS REINFORCEMENTS

111. General. The Reinforcement Command received 1,096 officer and 10,785 enlisted Medical Department reinforcements from the Zone of the Interior between 1 January 1944 and 30 June 1945.<sup>5</sup> These were, to a large extent, always collected together in one or two depots. This made for easier and better carrying out of a training program. The training of Medical Department reinforcements was conducted by a medical collecting company. The 462nd Medical Collecting Company (Sep) was at first furnished for this purpose, and when it was relieved on 19 June 1944 and sent forward, it was replaced by the 507th Medical Collecting Company (Sup). This unit, as such, remained with the Reinforcement Command, though most of its personnel were exchanged by a rotation scheme which was devised with the First Army, by which this personnel were forwarded to army assignments, and experienced personnel were returned from the army to this training assignment.<sup>5</sup>

112. Medical Officers and Nurses. The chronic shortage of Medical officers in the theater necessitated their quick assignment to units. However, during such time as they were available to the Reinforcement Command, they were used as instructors or assistants in the Medical Reinforcement Training Program. Nurses received suitable training in the depots, usually by being attached to a nearby hospital where they lived and worked until their assignments were indicated.<sup>5</sup>

113. Company Aid Men. The program for training enlisted Medical Department reinforcements was designed primarily to train and condition company aid men for their battlefield duties. There were several reasons for designing this program for the company aid men. The bulk of the casualties in Medical Department personnel were among the company aid men. Furthermore, the company aid man is the individual who more than any other in the Medical Department is thrown upon his own resources in performing his duties. He is not a member of a special team or group where when he first joins a unit he can be guided by other men. When he joins his company, he is immediately on his own, and there is no one to break him in or guide and assist him.<sup>100</sup>

SECTION 6

WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS

114. General. Prior to April 1945, ground force Women's Army Corps reinforcements were processed through the 10th Reinforcement Depot in the United Kingdom. Early in 1945, in conformity with a directive issued by G-1, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, plans were made to process all Women's Army Corps personnel entering or leaving the theater as reinforcements, redeployed as individuals, returnees to the Zone of the Interior as surplus, or for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery, insofar as possible in the same manner as male military personnel.<sup>5</sup> Ground Force Reinforcement Command maintained two ports of entry; namely, Depot No. 15, Le Havre, and 54th Battalion, Marseille. In order to avoid preparation of two supply areas for the reception of Women's Army Corps personnel, it was believed that they should be confined to one port of entry. Le Havre was accordingly

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selected, and a camp for Women's Army Corps personnel was prepared adjacent to the 15th Replacement Depot. The 490th Reinforcement Company was selected as the company to arrange for the housekeeping and processing of all female military personnel entering the theater. Authority was granted to replace the male personnel of this reinforcement company with female personnel, with grades and ratings corresponding to those provided for the male personnel. The first contingent of Women's Army Corps processed through this company arrived at the depot on 20 April 1945.

115. Housekeeping and Supply. The principal problems in connection with the processing of Women's Army Corps reinforcements were those of provision for proper housekeeping facilities and supply of clothing. These factors were paramount in the decision to confine the processing of Women's Army Corps personnel to one depot.

SECTION 7

COLORED REINFORCEMENTS

116. General. Colored units assigned to the European Theater were primarily service type units, and the reinforcement problems presented by these units did not differ to any great extent from the problems general throughout the system as a whole. However, there were a limited number of combat type units, and in quite a number of these cases several difficult problems were presented. Artillery and engineer battalions, colored, did not present grave problems due primarily to the fact that they had limited numbers of losses and ample reinforcements could be secured. There were definite shortages, with all the difficulties arising therefrom, in other colored combat elements.

117. Infantry. There were no colored infantry units as such assigned to the European Theater. On 26 December 1944 a call was made to all service elements in the Communications Zone for volunteers for training and assignment as combat reinforcements.<sup>23</sup> This specifically provided that reinforcements for training would be accepted without regard to race in the grade of private and private first class only. Non-commissioned officers could request reduction for this purpose. As a result of this call, 37 infantry platoons of colored infantry were formed and forwarded to the armies, each with a 10% overstrength. Reinforcements were not expected, and the units were notified that they would not be provided.<sup>24</sup> At a later date, enough volunteers were secured to provide some reinforcements and also to raise 12 additional platoons of Negro infantry in March 1945.<sup>25</sup> At no time did plans contemplate a continued flow of reinforcements to these colored platoons. When casualties had so reduced them as to destroy their identity, the platoons were to be inactivated.

118. Tank Battalions. From the time the colored tank battalions were committed until the end of the war, there were never enough reinforcements trained as armored personnel to make up their losses. In an effort to meet this shortage, reinforcements were obtained by the reclassification and reassignment of general service personnel. This was not satisfactory, and on 17 July 1945, the commanding officer of one of these tank battalions stated that unless such reinforcements could be provided in required numbers, colored tank battalions should not be used in combat.<sup>26</sup> A similar situation existed and the same solution was adopted with regard to colored tank destroyer units,<sup>27</sup> and on 3 March 1945, the 12th Army Group reported that they needed 975 colored reinforcements for their combat units alone.<sup>28</sup>

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SECTION 8

ARMED FORCES

119. The Army Air Force Reinforcement Command in the European Theater was responsible only to a small extent for the training of personnel, this being limited to training of six weeks for those individuals who were transferred from allies such as Royal Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force and in some instances the Polish Air Force, to the United States Air Forces. No technical or flying training was undertaken within Air Force Reinforcement installations.<sup>18</sup>

120. Requisitions for filler or replacement non-flying personnel from Air Force units were submitted to, and approved by, the highest Air Force Headquarters in the European Theater prior to forwarding to Air Force Reinforcement establishments for processing.<sup>18</sup>

121. Assignment of combat crew reinforcements was coordinated directly between the commands concerned and the Reinforcement Command. This system required continuous supervision by the highest Air Force Headquarters in order to provide the minimum reinforcements required to maintain the operational status of combat units.<sup>18</sup>

122. Requisitions for reinforcements for the Army Air Forces in the Theater were based on attrition rates and forwarded through the Theater Commander to the War Department at monthly intervals. Requisitions for combat crew reinforcements were forwarded through tri-monthly reports to Army Air Force Headquarters. These reports indicated the number of crews required, the combat crew strength of this command by various types, and the losses by types within the period covered.

123. Air Force reinforcements upon arrival in this Theater were moved directly from the ports to the various stations of the Air Forces Reinforcement establishments. Minimum use was made of Ground Force Reinforcement installations. Although the Theater Commander maintained technical control over all reinforcement depots within this Theater, the Air Force Reinforcement Command was operated directly under the highest Air Force headquarters with slight relations, if any, with Ground Forces Reinforcement Command.<sup>18</sup>

124. Hospitalized Air Force personnel (when released from hospitals to Air Force reinforcement establishments) were returned from the hospital concerned directly to a station of the Air Force Reinforcement Command, and automatically returned therefrom to the proper Air Force units.<sup>18</sup>

125. With the exception of a policy pertaining only to combat crews, no rotation policy existed in the Air Forces of this Theater. Combat crew personnel were returned to the Zone of Interior according to a rotation policy when it was determined by competent authority that the individual or crew was so fatigued from combat that further operational duty would prove so detrimental to the individual as to prevent rehabilitation and recovery to a combat or a non-combat status.<sup>18</sup>

CHAPTER 9MISCELLANEOUSSECTION 1TROUBLE CAUSING FACTORS

126. Miscellaneous subjects pertaining to the reinforcement system which caused difficulties were:

- a. Factors to consider in handling reinforcements.
  - (1) Combat veterans, sound discipline, intelligent training plan, rapid movement, divisional groups, Red Cross activities, movies, shows, athletics, dances, passes, food, billets, heat, hunting, fishing, souvenirs, talks with and by fox-hole-fresh instructors, orientation, and progressive indoctrination.
- b. Stragglers
- c. Prisoners
- d. Courts
- e. Chain of command
- f. Reports
- g. Relationship between army and communications zone installations
- h. Where you got supplies, and how?
- i. Rations
  - (1) At the ports
  - (2) During movement by train or truck
  - (3) In depots or battalions
  - (4) Extra rations for reinforcements who have had a long train ride requiring C or K type rations.
  - (5) Absolute necessity for the finest of cooking in reinforcement units.
- j. Selection of billets
  - (1) Selection of bivouac areas.
  - (2) Organization of depot installations
  - (3) Battalion installations
  - (4) Company installations
  - (5) Camouflaged considerations.

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k. Problems peculiar to army depot:

- (1) Relationship with army and units of the army
- (2) The supply problem with the army zone
- (3) Necessity for moving reinforcements as covered by the technical situation.
- (4) Forward movements of units
- (5) Transportation problems
- (6) Local security
- (7) A training program integrated with the divisional programs. Should be coordinated through army G-3.
- (8) The handling of requisitions
- (9) Methods for delivery of reinforcements
- (10) Military Occupational Specialty substitutions.
- (11) Selection of personnel for certain specific duties.
- (12) Obtaining enemy clothing and equipment for training for the depot and the system as a whole.
- (13) Relationship with the local medical installations
- (14) Communications and bathing.
- (15) Laundry and bathing

**SECTION 2**

**DIVISIONS NEED PERSONNEL CENTER**

127. a. A division requires a personnel center to process in and out of the division. The functions of this center are to receive, orient, adjust the supply, indoctrinate, train, classify, and forward to the units of the division, replacements and casualties requisitioned by the divisions or returning automatically from hospitals. It also collects those personnel being transferred to other units or going back for a rest or leave, supplies them with fresh, clean clothing, takes care of their records and pay, and assures their rapid movement on their journey. This need was so fully recognized by divisions in the army that it was organized in all units by selecting a man here and an officer there to do this work. In many cases this resulted in a shortage of officers and men in positions of importance. However, the priority and need of such a center were so acutely recognized that such an organization was present in practically all the divisions.

b. Coordinated with this group were the leave centers established by many divisions who had been in actual contact with the enemy so long that they had to give relief to some of their men to prevent combat exhaustion.

c. Some form of organization should be provided the division to perform these functions.

PART THREECONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSSECTION 1CONCLUSIONS

The Board concludes that:

128. During Theater Planning. a. (1) The importance of the theater reinforcement system to the successful conduct of operations is so great as to make it one of the major commands.

(1) The importance of proper assignment and allotment of the theater reinforcements is such as to require that this control be placed directly under the theater commander.

b. The importance of the reinforcement system warrants the same care with respect to the selection of a capable commander and staff of proper ranks, as the other important commands. Continuity of command within the reinforcement system is also essential.

c. Failure to provide by proper organizations activated and trained in the zone of interior, and local facilities, for a reinforcement system adequate to handle the reinforcement and casual problems of the theater, prior to the operation, will inevitably result in the unsatisfactory functioning of the reinforcement system for an extended period.

d. (1) Organizational needs for handling the theater reinforcement and casual flow having been completed, the planning group for the theater should consider all possible additional functions which the reinforcement system may be required to perform. If it is decided to assign additional functions, such as training, additional means in the way of personnel and facilities will be required to avoid overloading the system.

(2) Improvisation of an organization for the handling of reinforcements, after the operation within a theater is under way, is an unsatisfactory solution.

(3) The original flow chart for the theater should assure the arrival of reinforcement units prior to the arrival of reinforcements.

(4) The reinforcement system, both during the planning stage prior to operations, and during all phases of the operation itself, should be closely coordinated with the War Department. (Reference: Part One, Section 5)

129. Field Manual. The importance of, and need for, clearly defined policies, methods, and procedures in the operation of the reinforcement system are such as to require the preparation and issuance of a separate field manual on the subject. This field manual should cover the following subjects:

a. Operating methods and procedures.

b. Relationship of the reinforcement system and its units to the other commands and units of the theater.

c. Supplies within the reinforcement system.

- d. Training in the reinforcement system.
- e. Detailed instructions on exactly the duty of each individual in each Table of Organization.
- f. Proper use of each item of equipment in the Tables of Organization and Equipment.
- g. Use of limited service personnel to replace general service personnel, the ultimate ideal being a reinforcement system composed of 100% combat veterans.
- h. Miscellaneous subjects:
  - (1) Factors to consider in handling personnel passing through the system.
    - a. Combat veterans, discipline, training plan, rapid movement, divisional groups, Red Cross activities, movies, shows, athletics, dances, passes, food, billets, heat, hunting and fishing, souvenirs, talks with and by fox-hole-fresh instructors, orientation, and progressive indoctrination.
    - b. Stragglers.
    - c. Prisoners.
    - d. Courts.
    - e. Chain of Command.
    - f. Reports.
    - g. Relationship between army and communications zone installations.
    - h. Where you get supplies, and how.
    - i. Rations: at the ports; during movement by train or truck; in depots or battalions; extra rations for reinforcements who have had a long train ride requiring C or K type rations; absolute necessity for the finest of cooking in reinforcement units.
  - i. Selection of Billets:
    - (1) Selection of bivouac areas.
    - (2) Organization of depot installations.
    - (3) Battalion installations.
    - (4) Company installations.
    - (5) Camouflage considerations.
    - (6) Road net.
    - (7) Mine fields.
  - j. Problems peculiar to army depots:
    - (1) Relationship with army and units of the army.
    - (2) The supply problem within the army zone.
    - (3) Necessity for keeping reinforcements forward as far as possible.
    - (4) Forward movement of units.
    - (5) Transportation problems.
    - (6) Local security.

- (7) A training program integrated with the divisional programs, to be coordinated through army G-3.
- (8) The handling of requisitions.
- (9) Methods for delivery of reinforcements.
- (10) Military occupational specialty substitutions.
- (11) Selection of personnel for certain specific duties.
- (12) Obtaining enemy clothing and equipment for training within the depot, and for the system as a whole.
- (13) Relationship with the local medical installations.
- (14) Communications.
- (15) Laundry and bathing.

(Reference: Paragraph 126)

130. Tables of Organization and Equipment. a. (1) The current Tables of Organization and Equipment are inadequate for efficient operation.

(2) The reinforcement battalion is the basic operational unit, and should be so organized as to be self-sufficient. (Reference: Appendices 22, 23, and 24).

131. Theater Reinforcement Zones. a. Augmentation of reinforcement depots with an army, by the attachment of service units, is necessary for efficient operation. Due to the lack of railroad facilities, depots of supply conveniently located, the disruption of civil communications, and the absence of services found in the communications zone, it is essential that vital services be attached to army reinforcement depots.

b. Army reinforcement depots should be attached to the army they support. This is necessary to assure the army commander the proper distribution of his reinforcements. It will also assure the depot of its supplies, and the use of the other army facilities.

c. Reinforcement battalions should constantly support the same corps throughout the operation. The reinforcement battalion should be attached to the depot of the army they support. In case the corps is transferred from one army to another, the battalion should remain with the corps and be then attached to the depot of the new army.

(Reference: Paragraph 126)

132. Division Reinforcement Company. The problem of properly processing personnel in and out of a combat division is such as to justify augmenting the division by some form of unit. A reinforcement company is a proper type unit for this purpose. (Reference: Paragraph 127).

133. Requisitions for Reinforcements. Requisitions for reinforcements, based on estimated losses, need to reach the zone of interior at least ten months in advance, in order to allow for the time lag factors involved in the zone of interior for the selection, training, equipping, and processing personnel; the shipping to the communications zone; and the delivery to the army depots. (Reference: Part Two, Chapter 1).

134. Stockage. Based on combat experience the following stockage levels have proven adequate:

a. Within the theater - 60 day requirements.

b. Within the army areas:

- (1) Depot rear battalion - 1600 per battalion.
- (2) Forward (corps) battalion - 1200 per battalion
- (3) Division companies - three days estimated losses.

(Reference: Part Two, Chapter 2).

135. Advance Requisitions. Divisions in combat should be allowed to requisition in advance their estimated losses for the succeeding three days, in order to allow for the time lag between a divisional requisition for reinforcements and the receipt of those reinforcements, and the resulting perpetual understrength of divisions in combat. The receipt of reinforcements at divisional rear does not mean those reinforcements are available for front line units, as they must be first processed, oriented, indoctrinated, have their excess equipment removed, be furnished any vital shortages, and assigned to their proper unit. (Reference: Part Two, Chapter 6)

136. Return of Casuals to their Units. a. The return of general service personnel from hospitals to their units should be automatic, and, for the sake of morale, with the minimum delay.

b. Overstrengths resulting from the automatic return of personnel to their units should be charged against the allowed requisition for three days estimated losses, and the return flow stopped should the divisional overstrength exceed three days estimated losses. (Reference: Part Two, Chapter 6)

137. Specialist Personnel Depot. In order to avoid improper assignment of highly specialized personnel, this personnel should be held in a single location, where their allocation and assignment can be closely supervised, instruction maintained to preserve their training, and the facilities for recreation to uphold their morale are available. (Reference Part Two, Chapter 8, Section 4)

138. Miscellaneous Reinforcements. a. So long as paratroops are required, the problem of replacing their casualties can best be solved by calling for volunteers from the reinforcement system and the other units within the theater.

b. Ranger reinforcements should be drawn from selected volunteers, recruited by ranger personnel, and trained under the senior officer of the rangers.

c. The system utilized by the 2nd French Armored Division, embracing a special recruiting and training battalion for each division, and modified to meet local conditions, should be used as the method of obtaining foreign replacements. This system contemplated that recruits be secured from the local French population, trained by the division's reinforcement battalion, and held there subject to requisition.

d. Adequate provision should be assured for the supply of colored reinforcements to colored combat units, based on anticipated losses in such units. (Reference: Part Two, Chapter 8)

139. Individual Arms of Reinforcements. All reinforcements from the zone of interior should be equipped with individual arms prior to their being shipped to a theater of operations. (Reference Part Two, Chapter 5)

140. Training. a. Reinforcements while passing through the reinforcement system should benefit from a training program emphasizing: physical conditioning, orientation, indoctrination, and individual weapons instruction.

b. In army areas instructors should be provided from combat division, those personnel to be rotated frequently. (Reference: Part Two Chapter 4; Appendix 17)

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141. Basic Infantry Training. To provide the highest caliber reinforcements obtained by retraining selected personnel from services and replaced by limited service personnel, it is necessary that all general service men be basically trained for infantry. This infantry training should be given prior to any specialist training, and all personnel should be indoctrinated to expect ultimate assignment to combat duty. (Reference: Paragraph 58)

142. Augmentation of Reinforcement Units. The following units should be normally attached to a reinforcement depot operating with an army:

- a. Army postal unit, type A, Table of Organization and Equipment 12-501, with one second lieutenant and cook 060, T/5 deleted, and four clerks, mail, (2 T/4 and 2 T/5) added.
- b. Quartermaster truck company (troop) Table of Organization and Equipment 10-57.
- c. Finance disbursing section, Table of Organization and Equipment 14-500 (headquarters unit AB, and pay and allowance unit BJ)
- d. Military policy company, type C, Table of Organization and Equipment 19-217.
- e. Signal service organization, Table of Organization and Equipment 11-400, DA-EB, GB, GI, and 5 GG teams.
- f. Engineer service organization, utilities, type EE, Table of Organization and Equipment 5-500.
- g. Band, 28 man, Table of Organization and Equipment 20-107.
- g. Quartermaster laundry platoon, Table of Organization and Equipment 10-167. (Reference: Appendix 2)

PART THREE

SECTION 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board recommends that:

143. During Theater Planning. a. Theater commanders consider their reinforcement system as one of their major commands.

- (1) The system operate directly under the theater commander.
  - (2) In no case the reinforcement system be placed under the commander of the communications zone.
- b. (1) The theater commander assign one of his most capable general officers to command the system.  
(2) Rank commensurate with a major command be allotted to the system.
- c. Prior planning include careful coordination with the War Department.

d. (1) Organization having been completed for handling reinforcement and casual flow, further means of implementation be provided for additional functions, such as training, which the reinforcement system may be required to perform.

(2) The system be implemented by units trained in the zone of interior.

(3) Arrival of reinforcement units in the theater be assured prior to the arrival of reinforcements.

(4) Local activation and improvisation be avoided.

144. Field Manual. A field manual be prepared and published covering the theater reinforcement system, and that in such manual, the subjects listed under Conclusions - "Field Manual" (Paragraph 129) be included.

145. New Tables of Organization and Equipment. Changes in the Tables of Organization and Equipment for reinforcement units submitted by Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater, to the Commanding General, U S Forces, European Theater on 4 January 1946 (3rd endorsement, Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command 4 January 1946 file AG 320.3 GCT-40) "Recommendation for Changes in the Table of Organization and Equipment of Reinforcement Units" be approved. See Appendices Nos. 22, 23, and 24.

146. Theater Reinforcement System Zones. a. Provision be made for the difference in organization and equipment required for communications zone reinforcement units and for the army area reinforcement units.

b. Army reinforcement depots be attached to the army they support.

c. A reinforcement battalion supporting a corps be attached to the depot of the army under which the corps is serving.

d. Reinforcement battalions be moved as a matter of policy to accompany the same corps at all times.

147. Division Reinforcement Company. Each division in combat have as part of its organic strength a reinforcement company.

148. Requisitions for Reinforcements, based on estimated losses, reach the zone of interior at least ten months in advance.

149. Stockage. Reinforcement stockage within the theater be:

a. For the theater - 60 day requirements.

b. Within the army area:

- (1) Depot rear battalion - 1600 per battalion
- (2) Forward (corps) battalion - 1200 per battalion.
- (3) Division companies - three days estimated losses.

150. Advance Requisitions. Divisions in combat be allowed to requisition, in advance, estimated losses for three days.

151. Return of Casuals to their Units. a. The return of general service personnel from hospitals to their units be automatic, and with the minimum delay.

b. Overages resulting from automatic assignment of returnees, be charged against the division reinforcement company.

152. Specialized Personnel Depot. A special depot of limited size, located well to the rear in the communications zone, be established for the handling of highly specialized personnel.

153. Miscellaneous Reinforcements. a. The volunteer system as used in the European Theater for obtaining paratroop and ranger reinforcements be followed in the future.

b. The system utilized for the 2nd French Armored Division, embracing a recruiting and training battalion with each division, and modified to meet local conditions, be used as the method of obtaining forcing replacements.

c. Provision be made for furnishing reinforcements for colored combat units on the basis of anticipated losses in such units.

154. Individual Arms of Reinforcements. All reinforcements from the zone of the interior be equipped with individual arms prior to their departure from the zone of the interior.

155. Training. The training given reinforcements while passing through the system emphasize physical conditioning, orientation, indoctrination, and individual weapons instruction.

156. Basic Infantry Training. a. All general service men be basically trained for infantry.

b. The infantry training be given prior to specialist training.

c. Reinforcements be indoctrinated to expect reassessments from noncombat to combat duty.

157. Augmentation of Reinforcement Units. The following units be normally attached to a reinforcement depot operating with an army.

a. Army postal unit, type A, Tables of Organization and Equipment 12-601, with one second lieutenant and cook 060, T/5 deleted, and four clerks, mail (2 T/4 and 2 T/5) added.

b. Quartermaster truck company (troop) Tables of Organization and Equipment 10-57.

c. Finance disbursing section, Tables of Organization and Equipment 14-500 (headquarters unit AB, and pay and allowance unit BJ)

d. Military police company, type C, Tables of Organization and Equipment 19-217.

e. Signal service organization, Tables of Organization and Equipment 11-500 (message center team DA, mobile radio team EB, 1-position switchboard team DB, teletype team GI, and 5 switchboard operating teams GG)

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- f. Engineer service organization, utilities, type EE,  
Tables of Organization and Equipment 5-500.
- g. Brad, 28 man, Tables of Organization and Equipment 20-107.
- h. Quartermaster laundry platoon, Tables of Organization and  
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AFTER COMBAT REPORTS

2nd Reinforcement Depot

3rd Reinforcement Depot

10th Reinforcement Depot

12th Reinforcement Depot

14th Reinforcement Depot

16th Reinforcement Depot

19th Reinforcement Depot

54th Reinforcement Battalion

Appendix 1

HEADQUARTERS  
GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENT COMMAND  
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

AG 319.1

APO 887

SUBJECT: After Combat Report.

TO: Commanding Officers, All Reinforcement Depots.  
Commanding Officer, 54th Reinforcement Bn, APO 772.

1. With the cessation of hostilities in the European Theater of Operations, it is desired that the commanding officers of the reinforcement depots submit to Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, an "After Combat Report". This report will stress the principal problems encountered in the operation of the depots in the accomplishment of assigned missions.

2. Comments are requested from depot commanders concerning these problems, together with recommended solutions based on the experiences gained in actual operations.

3. A suggested outline for the report follows

a. Problem of Transportation, with reference to:

- (1) Adequacy of vehicles.
- (2) Displacement of depots and subordinate units.
- (3) Shipping of reinforcements and casualties.
- (4) Transportation of supplies.

b. Problem of Supply, with reference to:

- (1) Procurement of supplies.
- (2) Distribution of supplies.
- (3) Adequacy of T/E for reinforcement depot, battalion, company.
- (4) Laundry and shower facilities.
- (5) Portable water purification units.

c. Problem of Billeting, with reference to:

- (1) Priority system of availability.
- (2) Correct type and size of billets and bivouac areas.
- (3) Procurement of suitable billets and bivouac areas.
- (4) Location of billets and bivouac areas.

d. Problem of Administrative Procedures:

- (1) Procurement and distribution of publications.
- (2) Replacement of lost personnel records.

- (3) Clearly defined administrative channels and administrative jurisdiction.
  - (4) Simplification and streamlining of administrative procedures to bring them into line with training centers and reception centers.
- e. Problem of Signal Communications, with reference to:
- (1) Courier service.
  - (2) Telephone and TWX facilities.
  - (3) Cryptographic code system.
  - (4) T/O & E of Depot Signal Section.
  - (5) Use of radio as substitute for inadequate wire communication.
- f. Problem of Diversified Recreation Facilities, with reference to:
- (1) Theaters and Red Cross Clubs.
  - (2) Entertainment teams and groups.
  - (3) Special Service facilities.
  - (4) Army Exchange Service facilities.
- g. Problem of Medical Service, with reference to:
- (1) Hospital and ambulance facilities.
  - (2) Hospitalization of stockage and permanent personnel.
  - (3) Dental laboratory and eye refraction equipment.
  - (4) Physical classification by screening and examination.
- h. Problem of Training, with reference to:
- (1) Procurement of combat experienced officers and enlisted men as instructors.
    - (a) Troop Movement personnel.
    - (b) Special Service personnel.
    - (c) Postal personnel.
    - (d) I & E personnel.
    - (e) Training personnel.
  - (2) Special T/O for each type depot.
  - (3) Adequacy or inadequacy of T/O personnel furnished for administrative use.

i. Problem of Operations:

- (1) Troop movements in and out of depots.
- (2) Notification of all troop movements.
- (3) Inter-Army movements of units.

j. Problem of Status of Reinforcement Command among Major Commands, with reference to:

- (1) Knowledge of functions of GFRC among major commands.
- (2) Understanding by major commands of the capabilities and limitations of Ground Force Reinforcement Command.
- (3) Personal liaison between reinforcement depots and the Armies and Communications Zone Sections.

4. These "After Combat Reports" will be submitted to Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, with least practicable delay.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DAWLEY:

J. L. TAYLOR  
1st Lt, AGD  
Asst Adj Gen

HQ 2D REINF DEPOT  
APO 776

AG 319.1

30 June 1945

SUBJECT: After Combat Report.

TO: CG, GFRC.

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E X T R A C T

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in letter Hq GFRC dtd 21 June 1945, file and subject as above, the following report is submitted:

a. Problem of Transportation.

(1) The present T/E allows vehicles for housekeeping purposes only. This includes the normal policing, ration breakdown, building of areas and supply functions. It is recommended that two truck companies or their equivalent be assigned to each Depot Headquarters for troop movement, depot movement, and problems of supply.

(2) It has been a great handicap to this depot not to have more passenger vehicles available for staff functions. Three vehicles for thirty headquarters officers is by no means adequate. Repeatedly staff officers have had to go to Army Hqs, Corps Hqs, and the forward battalions, and transportation has not been available. It is recommended that each section chief be allowed a truck  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton, 4x4, in order to facilitate their staff functions.

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b. Problem of Supply.

(3) The T/E for the reinforcement company as now compiled is based on the premise that a company would handle not more than 300 reinforcements. As the strength of a company fluctuates from that amount to as high as 1200, a fixed T/E is not adequate or workable. Housekeeping items especially should be on the basis of manpower and not a fixed amount.

(4) Laundry facilities have not been available to the reinforcements due to the fact that a laundry unit has never been allocated for the exclusive use of the Depot and owing to the rapid turnover of reinforcements adjacent laundries were either not able to handle the laundry at all or to do it in sufficient time to enable the men to get their laundry back prior to shipment. To insure adequate service, a laundry unit should be permanently attached to each reinforcement depot.

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d. Problem of Administrative Procedures.

(2) The only problem involved in the replacement of lost personnel records was the necessity of maintaining a large staff of qualified specialists whose sole function was to make up these records. In a large proportion of cases these records were not actually lost but

merely retained in former units awaiting return of personnel. The amount of manpower involved was enormous whereas in probably 90% of the cases, these temporary records were destroyed as soon as soldier reached this unit. Recommend that in case of casualties returning to former units that complete re-interview for purpose of development of new WD AGO Forms 20 be considered unnecessary and that new Service Records be made up only as much as is necessary for pay purposes.

(4) Two recommendations in connection with simplification of administrative procedures would be (a) to reduce the number of requests for individual special assignments for enlisted men and (b) to require reports be such they they could be used as a basis for information for all staff sections rather than requesting the submission of separate reports for each situation without considering that substantially the same information has been already furnished based on another request from another section; the purpose being a reduction in number of reports.

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f. Problem of Medical Service.

(3) On 21 April 1945 a Dental Officer was attached to the Depot for prosthetic work. Because LA dental technicians of the type required have been difficult to obtain, it has for the most part been necessary to use reinforcements only while they were available before shipment, which has caused a constant turnover of men in the dental laboratory. The laboratory is centrally located, and all patients requiring platemaking or partials, etc., are sent in by the Battalion Dental Surgeons. This service has been a great benefit to the Depot in many ways; it has given the Battalion Dental Surgeons good cooperation; it has saved transportation; it has done work which could not have been done otherwise if dependent on hospitals; it has hastened such repair and treatment to better facilitate the speed with which reinforcement personnel could be made ready for assignment. Eye refraction equipment has not been available for use here, so that such cases have had to be referred to hospitals.

(5) One ambulance should be available to each Reinforcement Battalion when acting as a forward separate battalion. Station Hospital facilities should be available to a Reinforcement Depot. There should be a better means of having all records, including profile number, etc., arrive at the proper destination with incoming troops from hospitals to avoid rescreening and reprofiling.

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h. Problem of Training.

(3) The 2d Reinforcement Depot training section brought from MATOUSKA a T/E based on ten (10) of each infantry weapon with sufficient accessories to maintain them. Training thousands of troops with so few weapons was a real problem which was solved by breaking down the number of troops training into small groups which rotated through the days of the training week. This mechanism of scheduling meant close supervision by battalion training officers and repetition of each centralized subject daily, but resulted in the maximum use of not only weapons, but all training equipment and aids. In April 1945 the allowance of weapons was increased almost five fold, and the problem was completely solved.

\* \* \* \*

3. Voluntary participation:

(3) In accordance with recommendations made by the Depot I & E Officer, the following personnel requirements are submitted for consideration:

Reinf Depot Pg

Depot I & E Officer	Captain	(Full time)
Depot Orientation Officer	Captain	(Full time)
Depot Education Officer	1st Lt	(Full time)
Depot Clerk-Typist	T/4	(Full time)
Education Assistant	T/5	(Full time)
Supply	T/5	(Full time)
News Writer	T/5	(Full time)

Reinf Bn Hq

Bn I & E Officer	Captain	(Full time)
Clerk-Typist	T/5	(Full time)
Basic	Pvt	(Full time)

Reinf Co and Depot Hq Co

I & E Officer	1st Lt	(Part time)
Assistant	T/5	(Full time)

J. Problem of Mail Service.

(2) The large volume of mail resulting from the turnover of reinforcements requires sufficient manpower for the necessary distribution work. The APO distributes and makes up mail for Army units in as fine a distribution as is justified by the mail. The preponderance of the mail received is redispached after it has been individually addressed and distributed for units.

Present T/E does not provide sufficient distributing cases or mail bag racks for suitable handling of outgoing mail distribution and for incoming mail sorting and alphabetizing.

A control section is maintained to coordinate information from theater headquarters, from depot coordinating office, and from other sources, to the end that the incoming mail section is apprised, by daily scheme information of the particular temporary APO numbers (shipment number, company, & platoons) which can be spot delivered, and of those temporary APO numbers which require directory service or rescheming. Similar work is carried on in connection with maintaining daily changes in distribution (troop location) scheme.

(3) Experience has indicated that the present Table of Organization, T/O & E 12-605, Col J, is insufficient for the work of this unit. The directory searching should be done by skilled clerks with suitable civilian or Army background. The present practice of detailing from 75 to 150 men from the reinforcement pool daily, has resulted in inefficient directory output and ultimately in delayed delivery of mail and unnecessary supplementary directory work.

Under the present system of handling mail, a T/O & E of three officers and seventy-five enlisted men with appropriate distribution of grades, is recommended. If the need should arise, such a postal unit could be supplemented by casual personnel drawn from the reinforcement pool.

A corresponding increase in Table of Equipment should also be authorized. Emphasis should be placed on light and portable construction so that fixtures can be readily folded, unhinged, or otherwise disassembled for movement.

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### 1. Problem of Supplying Reinforcements Against Requisitions.

(3) The experience of this depot has indicated that during periods of normal operation a broad policy of "first in - first out" as pertains to reinforcements having very common SSNs is quite satisfactory. However, during the period 1 Nov 1944 to 12 May 1945, Infantry-trained general reinforcements handled by this depot were both basically-trained Infantrymen and personnel of other branches who had been retrained as Infantry. Inasmuch as the preference of the Infantry divisions in combat was almost always for the basically-trained Infantryman, and since any particular group received at this station was, in practically all cases, either all basic Infantry or all re-trained Infantry, strict adherence to a "first in - first out" policy would have resulted in many cases in an inequitable distribution of both types between divisions authorized to draw personnel at that time. Therefore, this depot tempered a strict "first in - first out" policy to the extent of keeping records of the number and percentage of each type of the personnel assigned to each division and thereby endeavoring to make as equitable distribution of the personnel as possible, consistent with the allocation of personnel allowed by the Army.

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### n. Problem of Operations.

(1) The SOP should include, that on outgoing shipments to other depots, at least three corrected copies of all orders be placed in a separate envelope for the receiving depot. This must be accurate and clearly redlined and in the personal possession of the commander of troops. This would greatly simplify and speed up the handling of incoming troops. The procedure with the receiving depot, too often, is to get orders out of the records and redline them while the troops wait.

Additional emphasis should be placed on the following: Detailed briefing of commander of troops, additional accuracy on all outgoing shipments. Using trucks both ways on inter-depot movements. Taking better care of billeting and messing of truck drivers. Special billets should be set up in each depot along with messing facilities to accommodate drivers at all hours. Substantial boxes for records.

(2) Phone communications should be such that GFRC troop movement can be informed of all troop movements between depots by phone daily.

(3) Units moving from one army to another, and the lack of prompt notification to Reinforcement Depots concerned, was the cause of many personnel moving from depot to depot and not getting to their unit. This resulted in wasted transportation and loss of personnel efficiency to the unit. GFRC should be promptly notified by Army of all these changes and in turn should keep the troop movement and C & A sections of the depots informed. The quickest communication channel should be used to relay this information.

\* \* \* \* \*

o. Problem of Status of Reinforcement Command among Major Commands.

(1) It is believed that insofar as the Seventh Army was concerned, a fairly clear knowledge of the functions of GFRC was possessed. This was based on intimate personal contacts, conferences, etc. However, from our point of view, the base sections, on the other hand, did not seem to understand the general picture. Due to the fact that this depot serviced a base section for only a short period, correction of this situation was not attempted here. An initial orientation and subsequent conferences between GFRC and representatives of major commands would have been beneficial to all concerned.

(2) Understanding of GFRC capabilities and limitations by major commands could have been improved by the above (initial orientation and conferences) and by publication of statements of policies and plans.

(3) This depot was fortunate in personal liaison between it and the Army since a former member of the depot staff was the head of G-1 Reinforcement Division at Seventh Army. Consequently no problem existed in this respect.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

L. R. BLAIR  
Lt Col, AGD  
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD REINFORCEMENT DEPOT  
APO 153

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: After Combat Report.

TO: Commanding General, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, APO 887; U.S. Army.

Transportation difficulties resolve themselves into the following facts:

(1) When the Army was in need of reinforcements, it readily assisted the depot in moving forward; when the advance of the Army was rapid and with relatively few casualties, it was very reluctant to give the depot any assistance in moving forward. This resulted in an accumulation of casuals and reinforcements in depot stockage. The depot was even at some times unable to deliver the casuals reporting from hospitals to their units within the desirable minimum of time.

d. Several problems relative to administrative procedures were largely solved prior to the cessation of hostilities:

(3) The problem of securing lost identification cards, WD AGO Forms 65 and WD AGO Forms 65-10, was never solved satisfactorily. The process has been too long, and the personnel involved very often had moved on to a unit of assignment before the card could be secured. Recommend that these cards be made available from Army sources.

e. (2) Telephonic communication was complicated by inadequate T/O and E provisions for both personnel and equipment. Improvisation and ingenuity succeeded in providing service, which was inadequate except for two or three locations. Lack of repeater equipment prevented the provision of adequate service when this headquarters was not located in close proximity to Army Headquarters.

f. (1) Realization of maximum Special Service potentialities has been hampered by: (a) Lack of adequate assigned enlisted personnel. This resulted in constant shifting of special duty men utilized in the projects. Better results could have been obtained and fewer men had been permanently assigned. (b) Lack of transportation, which curtailed the full use of such facilities and entertainment as were available. (c) Shortage of projectors, radios, and athletic equipment.

g. Problems of Medical Section.

(b) Spectacles and dental appliances are lost or willfully destroyed by a small percentage of men to delay the time when they will be required to go to combat duty. If these men know that prompt repair or replacement is available in the depot, this malingering is reduced. If refraction equipment and dental laboratory are not available under depot control, the time is materially increased (one officer was held more than two months during the Ardennes battle because he had not dentures).

(3) A reinforcement battalion serving 1500 to 4000 men requires an ambulance. The service of one ambulance per battalion have been obtained from nearby collecting units, but there have been interruptions when units moved from the vicinity of the depot. Ambulances should be provided.

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(1) The basic problem in training has been lack of adequately trained personnel for instructional purposes. The training in Army depots should be conducted by combat experienced officers and enlisted men. Recommend that each division in the Army being served furnish four officers and eight enlisted men as instructors for periods of from four to eight weeks. This system was used on a smaller scale by this depot with superior results.

\* \* \* \*

(3) This depot has had considerable difficulty in securing required training equipment and aids. This problem would be solved by the drawing of training supplies from Army sources with the approval of the Army G-3.

\* \* \* \*

1. The Army Postal Unit has been constantly encumbered by the handling of a tremendous volume of mail requiring directory service. At times, as many as three hundred men working in two shifts of one hundred and fifty men each were required to keep abreast with the volume of mail. The late ETOUSA order prescribing that casualties returning from hospitals use their permanent unit's APO number and that reinforcements submit cards only after they have been in the Reinforcement Command fifteen days should have been adopted initially. The average date of delivery of mail would have been speeded by at least ten days by this system.

\* \* \* \*

(b) The tables of organization and equipment are intended to provide a framework of highly trained key specialists and minimum equipment. As the size of the depot increases and as the mission of the depot changes, the depot should be expected to augment the various sections of the depot upon which the mission places the greatest strain, utilizing suitable officers and men from stockage. Additional equipment must be made available as required. It requires more typewriters to prepare payrolls for fifteen thousand men than for five thousand, more stoves to cook for a company of 750 men than for one of 400. More passenger transportation is required for general work and for courier service in an Army depot operating several hundred miles from Ground Force Reinforcement Command Headquarters than a stockage depot operating in a compound near Headquarters.

4. All of these difficulties encountered seem to center around a lack of fixed and accepted position of the Reinforcement Command among the other major elements of the theater. There has been a general lack of knowledge of the functions of the Reinforcement Command among senior officers of the theater. The undersigned has constantly visited corps and division headquarters and orally explained the capabilities and limitations of the Reinforcement System to senior officers who had made requests for blocks of reinforcements for labor details and special duty details which would have interfered with training and made reinforcements unavailable for prompt assignment. A great part of the success this depot has had in securing necessary Class II supplies, Class III supplies, billets, and bivouac space, assistance in transportation of reinforcements, laundry and bath units, prosthetic laboratories, hospital units, and Special Service entertainment, has been the result of personal persuasion on the part of staff officers of the depot, rather than a general acceptance among Advance Section, the base sections, Communications Zone, and the Armies of the importance of the functions being carried on by the Reinforcement Command units.

5. Recommendations:

a. That the Reinforcement Command be given full and adequate recognition by the War Department, and all lesser commands, as a major element of each theater of operations.

b. That Army reinforcement depots be attached to the Armies which they support, and

(1) That reinforcement battalions be attached to the depots serving Armies at the rate of three stockage or rear battalions for an Army and one forward (Column 10) battalion per corps.

(2) That corps (Column 10) battalions be moved as a matter of policy to accompany corps, should that unit change Armies.

(3) That Ground Force Reinforcement Command maintain technical supervision over Army depots through appropriate command agencies and through control of allotment of stockage and, in special situations, by requiring a certain reserve to be held in stockage.

c. That the present complicated system of accounting for men in stockage by MOS numbers be greatly simplified. The normal stockage of an Army depot augmented by special requisitions on Ground Force Reinforcement Command will allow filling of requisitions in exact MOS numbers with a much more simplified system of accounting.

d. That the following-listed units be attached to each Army reinforcement depot prior to active operations:

- (1) One (1) Quartermaster Truck Company, plus one Quartermaster Truck Platoon (2½-ton, cargo).
- (2) One (1) Quartermaster Laundry platoon.
- (3) One (1) Quartermaster Sterilization and Bath platoon.
- (4) Two (2) Engineer waterpoint units.
- (5) One (1) mobile dental prosthetic laboratory.
- (6) One (1) field hospital, 100-bed.
- (7) One (1) Army band, 28-piece.
- (8) Two (2) Red Cross mobile units.

e. That personnel be added to the Tables of Organization as follows:

- (1) Courts-Martial Section  
Staff Judge Advocate, Major, 1  
Stenographer (213), Tec 4, 2 (court reporters)  
Clerk, general (055), Tec 5, 2
- (2) Signal Section  
Signal Officer, Captain, 1  
Switchboard Operator, Pfc, 3 per battalion  
Wireman, Tec 5, 1 per battalion
- (3) Army Exchange  
Salesman (321), 7 per battalion
- (4) Special Service  
Eight enlisted men in headquarters and headquarters company of the depot.  
Three (3) enlisted men in each battalion
- (5) Medical Section  
One (1) Mess Sergeant (824) to assist Sanitation Officer in mess inspections.  
One (1) Clerk-typist (405) for each battalion.

- (6) Supply  
One (1) Captain, Assistant Supply Officer  
One (1) Captain, Ordnance Officer
- (7) Training  
One (1) Tec 4, Draftsman, Headquarters and Headquarters Company  
One (1) Tec 5, Clerk-typist, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (for Information & Education)  
One (1) Information & Education Officer, First Lieutenant, each battalion  
One (1) Tec 5, Orientation NCO, each battalion  
One (1) First Lieutenant and six (6) enlisted men per battalion Training Section  
One (1) Captain, Billeting Officer  
Following enlisted personnel for billeting:  
    One (1) S/Sgt, Billeting NCO  
    Two (2) Tec 4, Billeting NCO  
    One (1) Tec 5, Clerk-typist
- (8) Coordination  
Two (2) Captains, Troop Movement  
Nine (9) enlisted men, Troop Movement NCOs
- (9) Military Police Platoon  
One (1) Captain, CMP  
One (1) Lieutenant, CMP  
One (1) Master Sergeant (1st Sergeant)  
Five (5) Staff Sergeants  
Six (6) Sergeants  
Eighteen (18) Pfc and Privates

JAMES J. PIRTLE  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS  
10TH REINFORCEMENT DEPOT

E X T R A C T

\* \* \* \* \*  
PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION

(1) Adequacy of Vehicles.

This depot would have been handicapped to a considerable extent if vehicles in excess of T/E allowances had not been available. Existing Tables of Equipment contain enough light vehicles, i.e., 4 x 4 and 3/4 ton W/C's, but more heavy vehicles are needed to transport large numbers of personnel and large quantities of baggage, rations, and Quartermaster supplies. The 1½ ton P/C (T/O & E 12-46) should be replaced with a heavier type of vehicle.

For the greater part of three years, the nearest ordnance maintenance depot was 70 miles distant. Permission was obtained from the Chief Ordnance Officer to do third and fourth echelon maintenance at this installation, and ultimately a thirty-seven man maintenance platoon was authorized by Hq GFRC to carry on this work. There have been only a few occasions when more than one vehicle was deadlined because of unserviceability. If the facilities of G-25 had been the only maintenance available, it is probable that at least 25 per cent of the depot vehicles would have been out of our control at times.

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PROBLEM OF SUPPLY

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(3) Adequacy of T/E for Reinforcement Depot, Battalion, Company.

Office machines and equipment: Allowances are inadequate to efficiently operate various sections.

Warehouse equipment: Provision should be made for warehouse handling equipment for Supply Section.

(4) Laundry and Shower Facilities.

No particular difficulty was experienced with these facilities. However, it would be practical to attach a QM Laundry Company to a depot. With these facilities, a large amount of excess clothing that has been discarded by troops could be laundered and then re-sized and re-issued by the depot.

The issue of new shoes could be greatly decreased if a mobile shoe repair platoon was attached to the depot. Existing conditions require a one week waiting period for shoes to be returned from civilian shoe contractor. Reinforcements could not take advantage of this service due to their short stay at the depot. Therefore, it is necessary to replace those shoes that require repairing, whereas a shoe repair unit could repair and keep these shoes in service.

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## PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

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It is recommended that units whose records have been destroyed or lost during combat operations be required to notify the Adjutant General of the theater listing the personnel for whom supplemental records are needed and that the Theater Adjutant General immediately initiate requests to the War Department for supplemental records. Pending the arrival of such records, the units should prepare temporary records and enter on the administrative page the notation that supplemental records had been requested of the War Department. The Theater Central Records Bureau, upon receipt of the supplemental record, would be able to expedite forwarding the supplemental record to the individual concerned.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. Prior to the establishing of GFRC, this depot operated under a number of commands, each claiming immediate jurisdiction and authority. Conflicting directives were received from each of these commands which constantly impaired efficient operation.

\* \* \* \* \*

### (4) Simplification and Streamlining of Administrative Procedures to Bring Them into Line with Training Centers and Reception Centers.

a. Since replacement depot headquarters are only administrative headquarters for replacement battalions, there is always the problem of which organization, the depot or the battalion, will perform the administration for the casual personnel. The most satisfactory administrative system has been to concentrate all records in the depot headquarters and draw part of the administrative personnel from the battalions to work in depot headquarters with the depot headquarters personnel. Such a system permitted: (1) training men to be specialists in certain fields such as Service Records, Classification, correspondence; (2) centralization of records and locators resulting in smoother and faster operations; (3) more efficient coordination of all sections. Experience has taught that the geography of the camp, whether located over a large area or concentrated in a small area, has no effect on the centralized administrative system which has proved most efficient under all conditions.

b. The following suggestions are made:

1. Full payment only be made by Replacement Depot to troops not immediately available for reassignment.

2. Extracts of service records and formal indorsements be made only on the transfer of permanent personnel.

3. All records and allied papers and routine correspondence be handled by some central control and directory center within a command.

4. The placing of casuals on D/S be prohibited.

5. All personnel going absent sick be automatically transferred out of a depot and be returned as new arrivals.

6. No individual's pay account be settled on the basis of a temporary record or affidavit unless it has been definitely determined that the original service record is permanently lost or destroyed.

## PROBLEM OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

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### (4) T/O & E of Depot Signal Section.

Shortage of personnel in Message Center Team.

Shortage of telephone operators, especially when battalions are operating away from the Depot Headquarters. An allotment of operators in each battalion would solve this problem.

Telephone and teletype communication equipment should be included in the T/O & E.

\* \* \* \*

## PROBLEM OF DIVERSIFIED RECREATION FACILITIES

\* \* \* \*

### (3) Special Service Facilities.

Special Service facilities have been hampered at times by the lack of necessary equipment and personnel to successfully take care of each and every man. Usually the unavailability of items at the time needed has been the big factor. Inasmuch as morale of the men plays such a big factor in the accomplishment of any mission, Special Service, and what it stands for, should not be under-rated in the final analysis of what goes to make up a "good team".

\* \* \* \*

Recommendation: Since the replacement system had to assume the responsibility of assuring that every man returned to duty was ready for duty, and also the responsibility of putting every man in his proper physical classification, a sufficient allowance of personnel to accomplish this should be made. The authorized T/O personnel is adequate for routine sick call, preventative medicine, sanitation, and other usual functions of a replacement unit. To process each 1,000 hospital returnees per day, an allowance should be made over and above the T/O of 10 medical officers (one neuropsychiatrist, one orthopedist, one E.E.N. & T. man, one X-Ray man, and six medical officers general), 2 dental officers, one MAC officer, and 12 enlisted men (one optician, one optometrist, 2 dental technicians) to accomplish this.

Equipment over and above T/O for processing up to 2,000 hospital returnees a day should be the T/O equipment of a general dispensary, portable X-Ray unit, and mobile optical unit.

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## PROBLEM OF TRAINING

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In addition to the above, the primary mission of the Depot should determine the extent of the training to be conducted. In a processing depot such as the Tenth Reinforcement Depot, training must be integrated with processing and should consist primarily of conditioning training. Training personnel should be made available upon activation of the depot in sufficient numbers to carry on and supervise the training to be accomplished.

## PROBLEM OF SOUND ORIENTATION PROGRAM

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Premature releases of news, statements of half truths and generalizations based upon limited experiences by newspapers aggravate the problem of orientation. Suggest a more discreet screening of the news.

\* \* \* \*

### (2) I & E Personnel Requirements.

Recommend T/O assignments for all I & E personnel with ratings commensurate with the importance of the job they perform.

Two officers and four enlisted men at Depot Headquarters. One officer and two enlisted men at battalion level. One officer at company level.

I & E personnel should be carefully screened before assignment. An understanding of troops and the ability to talk with them is essential. If possible, the I & E Officer talking to troops should be ex-combat.

\* \* \* \*

## PROBLEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE

\* \* \* \*

### (2) Personnel Requirements.

There have been no adequate T/O vacancies for Reinforcement Depots, particularly for those of comparable size to the 10th Reinforcement Depot. For example, as many as one thousand court-martial cases were required to be handled without any authorized personnel to prepare, try, and to offer advice to the Commanding Officer. The minimum personnel, where charges are prepared and forwarded from battalions to the Depot Commander, and assuming a strength of five battalions, would be an advisory and supervisory allotment of two officers, one of field grade, and six enlisted men. This group would furnish the legal aid for the depot, serve as legal advisors to the Commanding Officer of the depot, review cases and advise the Commanding Officer on all court-martial charges, suggest appointment of investigating officers, constantly expedite all court-martial charges, offer advice to unit and battalion commanders under the supervision of the Depot Commander on matters pertaining to military justice, and supervise the trials of all court-martial cases. The enlisted men concerned, under the supervision of the officers above outlined, would make a final check of each and every set of court-martial charges prior to leaving the depot for higher headquarters, prepare advisory opinions for the Commanding Officer, and assist in the orientation of battalion and smaller units in the proper investigation and expeditious forwarding of court-martial charges.

\* \* \* \*

## PROBLEM OF T/O OPERATING PERSONNEL

### (1) Augmentation.

One of the major problems of operating the 10th Reinforcement Depot has been the lack of sufficient permanent personnel. For a long

period a depot was expected to operate in accordance with a set T/O, disregarding a depot's peculiar function or type of primary mission. In its earliest phase of operation, the 10th Reinforcement Depot found it impossible to operate solely on T/O personnel. To solve this problem, the depot, of necessity, held casual and reinforcement personnel for duties within its command, meanwhile applying to higher headquarters for permission either to revise the T/O or to be authorized sufficient augmentation.

This situation was solved in part by Hq ETOUSA and Hq GFRC, allowing a certain personnel augmentation to the various depots. However, this was merely an augmentation staffed by unassigned personnel for whom there was no hope of possible promotion or advancement, with the result that this personnel did not expend the best possible effort in accomplishing their particular jobs. In addition, this personnel was subject to shipment on a 90-day rotational basis, and by the time they were sufficiently trained to efficiently perform their duties, it was necessary that they be shipped. This naturally caused the depot to use a larger number of personnel than would be used had the personnel been permanently assigned. A possible solution for this would have been an expandable T/O with particular sections of the T/O to be utilized by depots having unusual or particular missions. As an example, some depots had unusually large stockages, extensive special service programs, or peculiar training missions.

It is suggested that, if in the future, augmentations for Reinforcement Depots are planned, they should be of grades and ratings rather than a mere augmentation of unassigned personnel. The work of certain sections of a depot fluctuates according to the particular functions of the sections for different periods of time. For example, the Postal Section requires many additional personnel during the Christmas holiday season, while in the summer months their work lessens.

The attention of higher headquarters was often directed to these discrepancies and corrective orders published, but this was not entirely satisfactory. The best results were obtained by the laborious process of contacting each individual unit on discrepancies of personnel in that unit. Few cases were found where personal liaison and an explanation of the problems involved did not yield results.

#### PROBLEM OF STATUS OF REINFORCEMENT COMMAND AMONG MAJOR COMMANDS

##### (1) Knowledge of Functions of GFRC among Major Commands.

Numerous instances have made it apparent that there is not sufficient knowledge of GFRC among the various other commands. Various letters of instructions and pamphlets from GFRC to other major commands and to subordinate units are often not followed or else ignored completely. This is evidenced by the condition casuals and replacements often reach the depot. Proper necessary documentary material, proper supply and other necessary administrative functions have not been carried out by other major commands as requested by GFRC. Inasmuch as a smooth and efficient functioning of GFRC is dependent upon other headquarters following their requests, the return of individuals to their units, to the ZI, or to available assignments, is often needlessly delayed.

##### (2) Understanding by Major Commands of the Capabilities and Limitations of Ground Force Reinforcement Command.

In many instances, other major commands are not aware of the capacities and limitations of the GFRC. The GFRC operates in accordance with instructions from ETOUSA and by such is rigidly bound

down as to what can and what cannot be accomplished. For instance, numerous letters are received from organizations requesting return of individuals when their return is precluded not by GFRC, but by the policies of ETOUSA and of the Armies. A more efficient liaison system could be set up between the depots and the Armies and Communications Zone Sections to overcome these difficulties if all directives and letters of instructions from ETOUSA, Armies, and GFRC were circulated not only throughout the major commands, but also through the subordinate units with frequent recapitulations of existing instructions.

(3) Personal Liaison between Reinforcement Depots and the Armies and Communications Zone Section.

The major activity of this depot was to receive and process personnel being discharged from hospitals for return to former units and reassignment. Secondary mission included handling any and all type personnel for which no other place could be found. The shortcomings exhibited in the records of such personnel were such that it became easy to believe that the very existence of the GFRC excused other organizations from doing their share of this work. It seemed that many organizations assumed that a reinforcement depot was geared to handle any number of men on short notice, and that existing discrepancies should wait to be corrected by the reinforcement command.

HEADQUARTERS  
12TH REINFORCEMENT DEPOT  
APO 518-B

AG 319.1

5 July 1945

SUBJECT: After Combat Report.

TO: Commanding General, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, APO 887, U.S. Army.

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a. Problem of Transportation. Basically, the T/O & E of a replacement depot transportation section is wholly inadequate for troop movement, training, supply, and general housekeeping. Recommend the assignment of a truck company which, in addition to supplying the need for transportation throughout the depot, will also do away with the turnover of new drivers. This will in turn eliminate the tremendous need for second, or even higher, echelon maintenance caused by lack of care for their vehicles on the part of inexperienced drivers.

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(4) Laundry and shower facilities: This depot operated for approximately one month only under field conditions, but it was quite evident that shower and laundry facilities were required to insure the cleanliness of the troops themselves and of their clothing. While men can bathe and wash clothing in helmets, it was found practically impossible with the equipment then on hand to heat sufficient water for the purpose. Then, too, with climatic conditions such as exist in the UK clothing would not dry for many days. The net result is eventually a lack of cleanliness. Adequate laundry and shower units should be attached to a depot and be under the direct control of the depot.

(5) Portable water purification units: While this depot operated in the field it had considerable difficulty obtaining water from the engineer watering points due to the fact that they always were being moved about to meet the demands of other troops. Eventually it became necessary to obtain a mobile water purification unit for the depot to insure the water supply. One of these units plus the necessary tank trucks should be included in the T/O & E of a reinforcement depot (together with qualified personnel to operate it).

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(3) It is felt that no comment is necessary on the subject of clearly defined administrative channels and administrative jurisdiction. This was firmly established at the time GFRC came under control of the Army Ground Forces. Prior to that time there was considerable confusion as to whether specific correspondence should be forwarded through District, Base, or other headquarters.

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(c) The two (2) ambulances authorized this depot under T/O & E 12-42 were inadequate. Five (5) additional vehicles were obtained from UK Base on loan and trucks were utilized as auxiliary ambulances. Such vehicles are not satisfactory for transporting certain types of cases, those with pneumonia for example. It is recommended that ambulances be authorized each reinforcement battalion, particularly when the battalions are located in different camps.

\* \* \* \* \*

a. The procurement of suitable instructors from combat experienced officers and enlisted men was made difficult by certain factors, chiefly:

(1) Men were not physically able to withstand long hours of hard work required in training.

(2) Personnel lacked previous experience in mass production training.

(3) Prevalent attitude of--"I have done my part, etc."

Recommended solution: Use about 70% general assignment and about 30% limited assignment personnel with a monthly rotation policy set up so as to move personnel out at end of 6 months.

\* \* \* \* \*

i. Problem of Sound Orientation Program, with reference to:

(1) Satisfactory I & E Program for troops: The  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour daily news discussion period is considered satisfactory. Company bulletin boards should also be kept, and up to date.

(2) I & E personnel requirements: Full time I & E personnel was found inadequate to effectively put on this program.

Recommended solution: That each company have a full time I & E Officer and one NCO at platoon level in addition to present depot and battalion I & E personnel.

\* \* \* \* \*

(3) Personnel for postal activities: The army post office serving a depot is not adequately manned under existing tables of organization to give the maximum trained supervision to all men on special duty. To a great extent, the activation of a provisional postal company, with trained postal officer personnel and competent clerically trained enlisted men would insure speedier and more accurate distribution and directorizing of mail.

k. Problem of Military Justice, with reference to:

(1) General court-martial jurisdiction and procedure. If general court-martial jurisdiction was given to reinforcement depot commanders, it is believed that general court-martial cases could be disposed of in a much speedier manner than possible when handled as in the depot by the Southern Base Section and subsequently by UK Base. It is strongly recommended that depot commanders be given general court-martial jurisdiction in future operations.

(2) Personnel requirements. A staff Judge Advocate and an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate in the grades of Major and Captain respectively, and six (6) well trained and qualified clerks, all preferably with some legal experience, should be allotted to each depot to take care of summary, special, and general courts-martial of the depot.

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m. Problem of T/O Operating Personnel.

(1) It was found at this depot that the T/O for a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Replacement Depot, was inadequate to perform the duties made necessary by the administration, quartering, and feeding

of approximately 6,000 static personnel, and the receipt, processing, training, and shipment of approximately 18,000 free reinforcements every 6 weeks.

(2) Where Augmentation was Needed: The mission to be performed by a unit in large part determines those functions which must be augmented or initiated over and above that allowed by the T/O. This fact is best shown by a comparison between the replacement depot T/O and numbers used as augmentation.

\* \* \* \*

(b) The replacement depot T/O includes no personnel for the following functions. It will be noted that these services were supplied either by other T/O units, T/A units, or depot augmentation:

Finance  
Postal  
Signal  
American Red Cross  
Judge Advocate  
Utilities  
Chemical Warfare Service  
Ordnance  
Army Exchange Service (1 officer on T/O 12-42)  
Information & Education (1 officer on T/O 12-42)

(c) Sections of this depot using the largest number of augmentation personnel were as follows:

Transportation: Truck drivers and maintenance.  
Provost Marshal: Prison chasers and guards.  
A.E.S.: Sales clerks and barbers.  
Postal: Postal clerks.  
Supply & Utilities: Supply clerks, stock record clerks, electricians, plumbers, carpenters.

\* \* \* \*

(e) T/O 12-42 provides for the receipt, housing, and processing of reinforcements, but is not designed for an Infantry conversion training program. To accomplish this mission, each T/O company (36 companies) was augmented by 15 non-commissioned officers and 5 officers with combat Infantry experience. Generally this personnel did a good job. A screening process was inaugurated and unqualified personnel eliminated. It was also necessary to make continuous adjustments within this group insofar as individuals often had physical or mental disabilities which prevented them from performing all tasks necessary in completely training an Infantry rifleman.

\* \* \* \*

#### n. Problem of Operations:

(1) The chief problem encountered in movement of troops was that of control and discipline while enroute. It was noted at this depot that most officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of troops (free reinforcements) enroute were either:

- (a) Incompetent
- (b) Irresponsible
- (c) Inadequately instructed in their duties

This criticism applies equally to shipments from the United States and shipments within this theater. The deficiency was

manifested by the condition in which men, their equipment and records arrived at this depot. Untold time and money was lost in replacing or extemporizing lost or inadequate records and in re-equipping men, some for the fourth and fifth time, simply because the men themselves had not had necessary sense of discipline instilled in them, and the officer in charge failed to require such action of them.

(2) It was noted, when Hq GFRC announced that immediate effective disciplinary action would be taken against escort officers who failed to discharge their duties, and this information was passed on to such officers, that a sharp decrease in deficiencies was effected. It is recommended that this policy be adhered to in future operations.

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HEADQUARTERS  
14TH REPLACEMENT DEPOT  
USFET  
APO 583, US Army

14 September 1945

AFTER COMBAT REPORT

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3. Basic Principles.

a. Because of the different missions to which a depot may be assigned, and because of the possibility of change from one mission to another in the same depot, a fixed total T/O cannot provide elasticity to meet changing conditions and emergencies. It is believed that the present T/O with the minor modifications included herein, and augmented as at present, is the best solution.

b. It is further believed that operation is most economical with 4-company battalions, and with a maximum of 500 personnel per company.

c. Present basis T/E's are, in general, satisfactory, but, as in the case of T/O's, require augmentation to meet specific missions. The theater of operations and the standards of housing prescribed will largely determine the amount of property and equipment necessary. If, as has been the case in GFRC units in the Com Z of this theater, a garrison standard is required, considerable garrison equipment is necessary. The latter is not provided by present T/E's. However, it has been largely available in this theater from "resources of the country", e.g., French and captured items. In any case, to maintain garrison standards and to meet the requirements of morale and other activities determined by the missions, such as Special Service, Army Exchange Service, ARC, etc., a definite increase in personnel and equipment is necessary.

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b. Recommended solutions:

(1) It is believed that the T/O & E of a depot or battalion should include only those vehicles required for maintenance of the depot. This is a relatively stable figure, and recommendations are included in Annex #2. Personnel required to operate and maintain the additional vehicles is shown in Annex #1. The number of vehicles takes into account the fact that maintenance schedules of higher headquarters will deadline six trucks per day in addition to those deadlined for normal repairs.

(2) For the movement of personnel, trucks should be authorized on an "attached" basis, using the T/O truck company as a basic unit, and adding or withdrawing these units in accordance with the requirements of the situation. The addition of vehicles without the allotment of maintenance personnel and equipment is not recommended.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. Recommended solutions:

In all cases of personnel being admitted to hospitals, records should be sent at once to a central records bureau, thereby being

available to a depot or other agency upon discharge from hospital.

\* \* \* \* \*

(1) Replacement depots require special consideration in the allotment of personnel and equipment for all recreational and athletic activities. Difficult problems occur when large numbers of casual personnel are grouped in a unit without assigned duties. The personnel being transient, a far greater number of men receive the benefit of the recreational program than average strength figures indicate. Recommended addition to basic T/O & E's for depot headquarters and battalions is shown in Annex #1 and #2. Additional special service unit to include a 28-piece band and an entertainment unit should be attached as the situation demands.

\* \* \* \* \*

(1) Each battalion should have two surgeons, one dental officer, two surgical technicians, two medical technicians, one dental technician, one medical NCO, one clerk, one ambulance driver, and one 3/4 ton truck driver (see Annex #1).

(2) One ambulance and one 3/4 ton weapons carrier should be allotted each battalion medical detachment; one ambulance, and one jeep for the depot headquarters, headquarters medical section (see Annex #2).

\* \* \* \* \*

(4) A dental chest #61 and #62 should be furnished each depot headquarters and the necessary personnel consisting of one dental officer and three dental laboratory technicians be attached to depot headquarters to set up a prosthetic laboratory.

(5) Two enlisted men trained in the repair and adjustment of GI glasses should be attached to depot headquarters to service all battalions.

\* \* \* \* \*

(1) Initially considerable difficulty was encountered in securing combat-experienced officers and enlisted men suitable for instructors. The problem was solved by the authorization of a training augmentation of sufficient size to service three battalions.

\* \* \* \* \*

(1) The delegation of general court-martial jurisdiction to the Commanding General, GFRC, would have expedited trial of GCM cases. Provisions should be made for the establishment of definite and lasting GCM jurisdiction over reinforcement units which are mobile and therefore change from one communications zone section to another.

(2) A Judge Advocate's Section similar to that on an Infantry Division Special Staff should be provided in the T/O of a depot headquarters. Specific increases in personnel assigned to a depot are suggested in Annex #1.

\* \* \* \* \*

(b) Of all stockage, casualties were the least amenable to discipline unless control measures were taken immediately upon departure from hospital. The policy of Hq GFRC in segregating casualties from reinforcements was effective. The use of limited assignment battle veterans as cadre reduced the problem of control. A thorough and factual orientation cut down the AWOL rate.

\* \* \* \* \*

(3) Stagnation of personnel occurred more from excessive grade than from MOS. MOS's in some instances were not justified when applied to a combat unit, as in the case of 1st Sgts and Platoon Sgts from replacement training centers. Although individuals were frequently qualified for military duties (such as rifleman, MOS 745), their assignment as such was often precluded by their grades. The "first in - first out" policy could be applied only within MOS. Forms 20 were filed within Branch and MOS according to date of arrival in the depot, thus making selection of the "first in" automatic.

\* \* \* \* \*

(1) A well-organized, flexible reinforcement unit, e.g., a battalion, should be established within the debarkation area. Pre-debarkation orientation is vital. From the moment of landing until assignment to a unit, a reinforcement should be under the control and jurisdiction of reinforcement units. Disinterested personnel such as RTO's and base section personnel should not be permitted to exercise direct control over reinforcements.

\* \* \* \* \*

(b) The line of supply for personnel reinforcements should approximate that of other types of supply, since logistic problems are similar. For example, stockage must be maintained at different levels in various echelons. The forward stockage must be fluid and must contain the most urgent items, e.g., rifleman, machine gunners, tank crewmen, etc. This personnel must be stocked on the basis of the contemplated operations and should include the total number and proportion by branch and MOS. However, in considering personnel reinforcements as a form of supply, it must be recognized that inseparably bound with the effectiveness of the individual is morale--and morale is a perishable item. In establishing lines of supply, great care must be taken to prevent undue delay in shipment of stockage between depots. The impetus should be from the rear forward; lateral or rearward movements are wasteful of transportation, time, and manpower, and are harmful to the morale of the men involved. Specialization of depots, while successful in the rear areas, should not be carried forward into or beyond the Advance Section, Communications Zone.

\* \* \* \* \*

(1) The T/O's (without augmentation) of all reinforcement units as they were employed during operations were inadequate. The T/O was established to service 300 men in a company. However, this depot never operated with so small a load expectancy. At times over 4000 men were present in a 4-company battalion. In general, it was necessary to be prepared for peak loads of 750 men.

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HEADQUARTERS  
16TH REINFORCEMENT DEPOT  
APO 129

27 July 1945

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Recommendations.

a. Maximum Use of Rail Transportation for troop movements and recreation. The railroads in England were of great assistance in this respect. In France, due to the unsatisfactory condition of rail transportation, an unnecessary burden was placed on truck transportation for the handling of troops, recreational parties, and large shipments of supplies.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. Personnel. The personnel provided by T/O 12-42 for a 6000-men depot has been entirely inadequate, because the strength of this depot has averaged 12,000 - 18,000. A proportionate augmentation in personnel is required when the depot is called upon to operate beyond its capacity. This would be accomplished by:

(1) A lump augmentation given to the depot as a whole, to augment each unit separately.

(2) Attachment of provisional companies and battalions, maintaining the capacities of companies within the limits set by T/O & E 12-47.

c. Equipment. Proportionate augmentation of equipment should be provided whenever the depot must operate above its capacity.

\* \* \* \* \*

f. Utilities Section. This depot has unsuccessfully tried to obtain a Utilities Section under T/O & E 5-500 as described in the remarks column of T/O & E 12-42. Due to the lack of station complements in the ETO, it has been found that a Utilities Section is absolutely essential.

\* \* \* \* \*

2. The 16th Reinforcement Depot has had three missions since its activation in February 1944. All have presented different problems in the replacement of lost personnel records. From early April until mid-November, 1944, the depot handled reinforcements arriving from the US and from other depots in the UK. They were being trans-shipped from England to the continent. Because of missing or temporary personnel records, correspondence was initiated requesting the original records from former units. The average reinforcement had already left by the time records were received through normal channels. From late November 1944 until the end of May 1945, the depot had the mission of retraining personnel to be basic riflemen, MOS 745. The troops were here for approximately seven weeks, thereby giving sufficient time for records to arrive or for new ones to be initiated. This depot is now returning to the ZI personnel who have adjusted service rating scores in excess of 85. They are here for approximately one week. Every effort is being made to locate lost personnel records. The majority of the records do not arrive until after the candidate's departure from the theater. Those that do not arrive on time are forwarded to the ZI.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The following suggestions are offered as a basis for handling more efficiently personnel records and prompt recovery of mission records:

a. Set up a central hospital records branch operated by personnel technicians.

b. When any officer or EM is sent to any hospital, all records to be forwarded to the central hospital records branch.

c. All correspondence concerning the officer or EM also to be forwarded to the central hospital records branch.

d. The central hospital records branch to keep all records current.

e. When the officer or EM is transferred from detachment of patients to any other organization, copies of orders to be sent to central hospital records branch, and all records to be forwarded within 24 hours, thereby assuring the arrival of records to be forwarded while the soldier is at the station cited in the order.

f. At no time are temporary records to be initiated.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. Instructors for the training program were combat experienced limited assignment personnel procured according to allotments made by GFRU. Officer and enlisted personnel that had been through a training cycle with an organization did an excellent job. Some of the instructors could not be used on ranges or firing problems because they were instrumental cases. A few were unable to do a great deal of walking due to physical incapacities.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. The problem of making the reinforcement see the necessity for his being converted was a big one. Many of the troops felt that they had not been treated fairly and resented the fact that they had been trained for one job and were now being converted to another. To meet this problem, the depot commander talked to all incoming troops as soon as they arrived in the depot. The various reasons for conversion were explained to the reinforcements. By pointing out that the most important rule of the reinforcement was as strategic reserve for the front, each man was shown his part in the "big picture". This talk was supplemented by a discussion hour dealing with the "why's" of conversion and stressing the importance of the reinforcements getting the most out of their training. Another problem was getting the reinforcement, who possibly had been sitting behind a typewriter for months, mentally prepared to go into combat. A program of combat orientation was given during the orientation hours of the training cycle by combat experienced officers and NCO's. These talks not only showed the reinforcement the great job facing him, but also did much to lessen his fear of the unknown. Several of the required subjects were Combat Medicine, the Background of the German Soldier, and the German Soldier as a Fighter.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The T/O for a Reinforcement Depot and Reinforcement Battalion makes no provisions for personnel to process courts-martial cases. A reinforcement depot with four (4) or more battalions requires a courts-martial section consisting of a JAG officer and at least one assistant

two file clerks, and four typists with appropriate grades for such qualified personnel. The personnel problems were solved by utilizing T/O personnel from the AG Office, placing battalion personnel on DS with Depot Headquarters, and depot augmentation personnel authorized by Headquarters, GFRC. The processing of general courts cases was only a small part of the problem of military justice. The summary and special court cases placed a tremendous burden on all units of the command and especially Depot Headquarters. For the period 1 December 1944 to 1 June 1945, 804 summary court and 1,233 special court trials were accomplished by this depot. Other than problems inherent in the administration of military justice, shortage of personnel was the only major problem encountered.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. To maintain an accurate current stockage inventory, it was found necessary to receive a Daily Change of Status Report from each unit. The main problems encountered were in keeping track of the status of disciplinary cases (whether awaiting trial or in confinement) and of short-term hospitalizations.

\* \* \* \* \*

3. "First in - first out" has only been used to a limited extent by this depot. It has been found practical as a guiding principle, but not as a rigid rule, inasmuch as certain specialist personnel are frequently required regardless of time of arrival. However, this policy allows a more uniform and regular distribution of the troop load among companies and battalions of the depot.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Considerable difficulty was experienced filling requisitions by means of substitutions when specialists were not available. This was caused by the absence of a clear-cut policy concerning the extent of substitution permissible for various types of shipments. It is suggested that all requisitions by MOS sent to the depots from GFRC include information as to type of substitution permissible, i.e., "Substitute by MOS early, or substitute by Branch as necessary, or no substitution permissible".

#### M. PROBLEM OF T/O OPERATING PERSONNEL.

1. It was found that the number and allocation of augmentation personnel varied with the mission and physical location of the depot. For example, while handling reinforcements in the U.K. shipment to the continent shortly before D-Day, it was found that a large stockage and an increased guard augmentation was necessary to handle the AWOL's. However, very few guards are needed to handle disciplinary cases among candidates returning to the Zone of Interior.

\* \* \* \* \*

HEADQUARTERS 19TH REINFORCEMENT DEPOT  
USFET, APO 176, US ARMY

319.1

22 August 1945

SUBJECT: After Combat Report.

1. Adequacy of Vehicles. a. The T/O allotment of vehicles, tools, and equipment has been inadequate during the entire operation of the depot on the continent. The depot has been so situated that all water for troops, during operations in Normandy, both for cooking and drinking, was required to be transported. This was in addition to the burden placed upon transportation in hauling rations, supplies, etc., as well as maintaining a courier service between Headquarters and the battalions, and also to echelons of the Replacement System. A schedule of 24 hour operation was necessary to meet the essentials of supply. The truck companies assigned to GFRC Hq did not operate to move the troops for this depot at a scheduled set-up, which gave rise to a situation where troops remained alerted for 2 or 3 days prior to the arrival of transportation. This situation caused an added burden of hauling water and rations for this backlog of overload in personnel. Since depot began operations on the continent, its motor transportation traveled on an average of 307,447 miles per month.

b. The T/O transportation later was supplemented by 40 6x6 trucks, with inexperienced drivers. No provision was made for increased repair facilities in the way of spare parts, tools, or maintenance equipment. These trucks remained for 2 months, and then were recalled to form a truck battalion. Thereafter the minimum of use was made by other than T/O trucks, except for movements to forward depots.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Adequacy of Personnel. a. The T/O allotment of personnel was at all times inadequate. Augmentation by use of special duty personnel was unsatisfactory, mainly due to their lack of training. This was a situation the solution of which was attempted by means of the establishment of schools in maintenance and driving. By reason of the heavy demand for drivers and mechanics, this proved only a partial answer to the problem. Such schools never reached the number of personnel actually required to carry on the work. The flow of inexperienced personnel through the Depot Motor Pool was continuous from the time the depot started operations on the beaches until augmentation was authorized in March, 1945.

b. It is believed that any depot operating with a load comparable to that of the 19th Reinforcement Depot, and so situated that the services of truck companies are not available, should have attached two (2) trucking companies for effective operations.

\* \* \* \* \*

3. Adequacy of T/E for Reinforcement Battalions and Reinforcement Companies. a. The organizational equipment was wholly inadequate, even for the servicing of the personnel originally planned. It was definitely inadequate for the overload which confronted the depot at all times. Especially was it critical in regard to kitchen equipment and mess kit laundry facilities. The depot had only a fraction of the necessities. This was likewise true of many other items, such as mimeographs, typewriters, office equipment, motor transportation, tools, and almost all critical items. The T/E provides for one litter bag per company, in the planned strength of 300 casualties. Actually, a litter bag will serve only

100 casualties under the conditions facing the depot, and since most companies served 1200 to 1500 men, the issue was only 1/10 to 1/15 of actual requirements.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Laundry and Shower Facilities. There were practically no shower facilities in this vicinity when the depot arrived. There were no laundry facilities of any kind. After the depot had been here for about 3 months, some facilities were made available for laundry, but since these arrangements were in Paris, they were never available to the fast moving casual personnel. In November 1944 a Quartermaster Portable shower unit arrived and remained until 8 June 1945. Without warning, it was removed, but by that time field shower units were made available and with their installation, the problem was reasonably answered. There has never been an adequate solution for the laundry problem.

5. Water Purification Units. All water for drinking and cooking must be chlorinated under the conditions in which this depot operates; there is no alternative. Although not authorized by the T/E, this depot has procured portable hypochlorinators; also, it was necessary to create water storage tanks.

\* \* \* \* \*

d. T/O & E 12-42 authorizes the attachment of a utilities detachment. Had this been available and attached, the billeting problem could have been simplified.

\* \* \* \* \*

3. Clearly Defined Administrative Channels and Administrative Jurisdiction. Channels of communications, spheres of authority, channels of supply, and courts martial jurisdiction were not initially clearly defined. This resulted in considerable confusion and therefore in a tremendous loss of efficiency. In addition, many oral and conflicting instructions were issued by various higher headquarters and by individual staff officers within the same headquarters. Furthermore, directives of higher headquarters are written to fit static organizations and are not always readily applicable to units of GFRC. Such directives, it is believed, should always be interpreted and amplified by GFRC, before they become effective, to insure uniform application throughout the units of GFRC rather than require each unit to make the best of a situation with its own interpretations. Most of these delinquencies were later corrected, but much time, effort, and manpower could have been better utilized had such corrections been made earlier.

9. a. T/O & E of Depot Signal Section. The original T/O & E of the Signal Section proved entirely inadequate in both personnel and equipment. Special duty men were added to the section until its present strength is 52 men and one officer. The suggested T/O & E enclosed is patterned from the section as it is now operated, with the addition of a platoon sergeant. Necessary flexibility is provided by allotting one switchboard operating team (three men CG) per battalion.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. Medical Transport.

(1) The need for ambulances varied with the patient load and location of hospitals servicing the depot. In October, 1944, GFRC

allocated two ambulances to the depot, and one battalion managed to procure another ambulance. Ambulances belonging to the 507th Collecting Company were also most helpful in the medical evacuation. Weapons carriers, ostensibly "ambulances", part of battalion T/O & E equipment, were used by battalions for other purposes occasionally. Until the 302d Station Hospital was assigned to Etampes, transportation available to the depot for medical purposes was strained beyond the limit of efficiency. Upon the arrival of the 302d Station Hospital, a shuttle system was inaugurated which, since its inception, has saved approximately 900 gallons of gasoline monthly in addition to lessening the wear and tear on the vehicles. Medical transport is fully sufficient now to care for the needs of the depot.

(2) It is recommended that all medical transportation be under control of the Office of Depot Surgeon, with an MAC motor officer responsible for all vehicles. A separate ambulance company or a detachment thereof should be attached to the Office of Depot Surgeon whenever a depot, functioning under conditions similar to those which prevailed at the 19th Reinforcement Depot.

\* \* \* \*

(2) It is considered that a fully equipped station hospital with an adequate lens grinding unit can satisfactorily meet eye refraction requirements at a reinforcement depot. It is essential, however, that an optometrist be a part of the medical processing section in a depot similar in mission to that of the 19th Reinforcement Depot.

\* \* \* \*

b. The question may be raised as to the right or justification that a medical officer has, in glancing over an individual for a minute or two in a Medical Processing Center, to change the physical classification of an individual recently discharged from a general hospital. Superficially, it appears to be wasteful and unwarranted. Actually, it is indeed necessary because:

(1) Hospital returnees, due to tactical situation, i.e., the need for hospitals to empty their beds suddenly, not infrequently were "dumped" into the Reinforcement System. These individuals required re-evaluation and re-hospitalization.

(2) Hospital returnees treated for non-psychiatric causes, upon being processed, were found to be sick psychiatrically and had to be re-hospitalized.

(3) Limited assignment personnel discharged from hospitals were not further classified by Hospital Boards according to MR 1-9 regulations. This confused status persisted until March - April, 1945, when hospital disposition sheets began to differentiate LA personnel above or below MR 1-9. Approximately 3% of all personnel processed through the Medical Processing Section, January 1945 to May 1945, discharged from hospitals in General Assignment status, had to be downgraded to LA (below MR 1-9) because of their physical or mental limitations.

\* \* \* \*

d. It has been demonstrated by experience that whenever a hospital makes frequent contact with the Reinforcement Depot, problems are reduced to a minimum. It is believed that there should be regular conferences at which a Depot Surgeon can call the attention of Hospital

Commanders to the various factors which necessitate changes of diagnosis or classification. Such informal discussions would be naturally beneficial and would obviate necessity for criticism.

\* \* \* \*

4. Recommendations. In the light of experience gained from operations as outlined above, the following recommendations are submitted:

a. That training personnel be allotted to the Training & Security Section over and above T/O & T/E as follows:

(1) In the training section, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Depot Headquarters, four (4) additional enlisted men to include a draftaman, range supervisor, carpenter, and sign painter.

(2) In each battalion, a training team consisting of 2 officers and 5 enlisted men.

(3) In each company, an officer and one enlisted man to supervise and control training as their primary duty.

(4) That advance planning include facilities for conducting classes indoors.

(5) That adequate transportation be allocated to the Training and Security Section to facilitate supervision and control.

\* \* \* \*

5. Experience has shown that a satisfactory I & E Program should include the following:

a. Adequate orientation of incoming troops, i.e., local ground rules; local civilian customs; reasons for being here.

b. Daily news period of one-half hour duration covering the latest news, and interpretation of the news.

c. Three (3) one (1) hour Group Discussion Periods each week on subjects that are important and interesting.

d. Attractive and informative orientation displays placed where every man has access to them.

e. Proper distribution of all information media, such as: Stars and Stripes, Yank, and Army Talks.

6. In order to properly carry out the I & E Program, the following personnel are needed:

Depot Headquarters:	2 officers and 3 enlisted men
Battalion Hq:	1 officer and 2 enlisted men
Each Company:	1 officer and 1 enlisted man

\* \* \* \*

1. Personnel. The unit originally consisted of eleven men and one officer. Upon its arrival in Normandy, it was confronted with an accumulation of mail on the beaches due to the failure to provide facilities for distributing mail to the men in packets alerted for shipment to France. As a result, Army Postal Unit 176 did not have sufficient

personnel to handle the task assigned it. Casuals were placed on special duty, the number depending on the volume of mail. The number of men on special duty reached a peak of 500 in December 1944 and January 1945. The unit T/O itself was enlarged to provide the officers and twenty-seven men, supplemented by augmentation of one officer and one hundred enlisted men, which is considered to be satisfactory for the present.

\* \* \* \* \*

b. In the interest of military justice and the efficient and expeditious processing of court martials, it is recommended that a Staff Judge Advocate Section to consist of the following personnel, be authorized a depot whose mission is that of this depot's:

- (1) Two officers of the JAGD; 19 EM
- (2) Four officers, BI, to conduct investigations; 2 stenographers for a General Court
- (3) Sufficient personnel and a Special Court (to include a Law Member), TJA, Def C, and 2 court reporters.

\* \* \* \* \*

## 2. Stagnation of Infrequently Requisitioned MOS in Depots.

a. Up to a few months ago, two types of enlisted personnel became quite stagnant; M.I.S. trained personnel and key type personnel. Both categories remained in the depot for months. M.I.S. personnel could only be assigned by M.I.S., ETOUSA, and therefore was frozen as far as other assignments were concerned. These EM were utilized by the Depot Training Section, while available, as instructors. However, when the representatives of M.I.S., ETOUSA, visited the depot to select men for requisitions, very seldom did they select M.I.S. trained men even though they were available in the MOS required. Several times it was suggested that they be assigned as authorized overstrength to M.I.S. teams or units so as to gain field experience. Finally after several months, they were absorbed by M.I.S., ETOUSA. Many of these men came from the Zone of Interior to the 19th Reinforcement Depot in England, and later on shipped to the depot in France. In addition, many remained in a status of reinforcements for a year or more.

b. Key type personnel theory was sound planning; however, it is felt that this category should not have been earmarked for such long periods. Depots should have, from the instigation of KTP, been allowed to assign these men on assignment directives after one month in the KTP file. KTP were always of a high caliber, and months of inactivity had definite detrimental reactions.

\* \* \* \* \*

3. Application of "First in - First out" Policy. a. This policy must be applied on a Branch and MOS basis for GA personnel. Promiscuous misuse would disrupt personnel requisitioning procedures of the theater from the Zone of Interior. Also, for fullest utilization of manpower, personnel trained by an arm or service should be assigned to that arm or service by MOS training.

b. One situation that will arise is that in event an excessive stockage of any particular arm or service develops, that they be applied to MOS in closely related arm or service, whenever possible.

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## PROBLEM OF T/O OPERATING PERSONNEL

1. Augmentation. As a result of many staff studies and recommendations, the following operating personnel is now authorized in sections indicated and is considered sufficient to carry on present mission:

a. Stockade Personnel			
Officer	10		
EM	247		
b. Troop Movement	Hq	Bn	
Officer	1	0	
EM	5	1	
c. Special Service	Hq	Bn	Co
Officer	2	1	0
EM	34	1	1
d. Postal			
Officer	1		
EM	100		
e. I & E	Hq	Bn	Co
Officer	2	1	1
EM	3	2	1
f. Training Personnel	Hq	Bn	Co
Officer	0	2	1
EM	4	5	1

However, should the present mission change or the capacity be considerably increased, such as is anticipated in the stockage, additional personnel will be required. No definite recommendation for augmentation can be made because so much depends on the mission, capacity, and flow through the depot. However, a definite recommendation is made that the T/O for a reinforcement depot of this type include a section of the IGD to provide for one Lieutenant Colonel and three Captains, IGD, and four EM. Because of the great number of troops passing through the depot and the nature thereof, i.e., hospital returnees, a combat wounded man, psychoneurotics, stragglers, etc., the need for such a section became apparent, and such was created in or about March, 1945, with one Lieutenant Colonel and one EM initially; the section was subsequently gradually increased, as the need arose, by the addition of three Captains. These officers were not of the IGD but were removed from other positions in the T/O and augmentation which consequently strained the activities of the sections from which these officers were removed and did not provide an adequate section of the IGD, inasmuch as certain investigations can only be conducted by officers of the IGD. The section did, however, render invaluable service to the commanding officer in that many irregular practices and conditions in the depot were brought to light and promptly corrected, which might not otherwise have been possible in a command of this size, without this section.

## UNDERSTANDING BY MAJOR COMMANDS OF THE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF GFRC

1. The combinations and limitations of reinforcement depots are not understood by major commands, as evidenced by:

- a. A major command requesting Headquarters, Ground Force

Reinforcement Command, for personnel in the latter part of the day, with the idea of receiving that personnel early the next morning. This shows the lack of understanding of the time required to select EM, to issue the necessary orders, to collect the EM for shipment, and to process both EM and records.

b. The priorities given to requests for personnel. A request is given top priority and is in the process of being completed when a different request for the same type of personnel is received, with a priority that takes priority over all other requests, which causes cancellation of previous instructions and increased work results.

c. Requisitioning units at first expected to receive only the highest type and fully qualified personnel. Units failed to realize that the majority of reinforcements are not trained army specialists, but require a certain amount of training on the job.

d. Major commands that request that all personnel be interviewed prior to assignment, do not realize that reinforcement depots do not have sufficient personnel and transportation to re-interview EM prior to assignment.

e. Many units feel that a reinforcement depot can fill, with well trained personnel, any requisition that is submitted. They do not realize that it is impossible for any depot and even the Reinforcement Command to maintain at all times a supply of all types of personnel that might be called for by all units.

f. Many of the above misunderstandings were corrected by personal liaison between the depot and units concerned.

\* \* \* \*

3. Adequacy or Inadequacy of T/O Personnel Furnished for Administrative Use. There has been an inadequacy of personnel for administrative use. From the inception of the depot up to the present time, administration of the depot has constantly been in need of and has raised a constant hue and cry for more augmentation. At first this was accomplished by the use of special duty personnel and later by augmentation. However, neither of these were ever deemed completely satisfactory since such personnel do not derive the same advantages of security and promotional advantages as are made available to T/O personnel. It is believed that instead of augmentation, a T/O should be made up as in subparagraph 2, above, that will care for the administrative as well as other needs of the depot. The T/O for administrative purposes at this depot has been augmented by 9 officers and 278 enlisted men. In addition, two records checking teams are attached consisting of 2 officers and 30 enlisted men each.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS

Headquarters, Third Reinforcement Depot,  
APO 153, U. S. Army.

Proceedings of a board of officers convened at Headquarters, Third Reinforcement Depot, pursuant to paragraph 6, Special Orders No. 58, Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, dated 1 March 1945, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

The board met pursuant to the foregoing order at Headquarters, Third Reinforcement Depot at 1500 hours on 7 March 1945.

Members present:

Colonel James J. Pirtle, 07624, Infantry,  
Headquarters, Third Reinforcement Depot.

Colonel Wilbur G. Dockum, 05652, FA,  
Headquarters, Second Reinforcement Depot.

Colonel Lorin Solon, 0190917, FA,  
Headquarters, 18th Reinforcement Depot.

Members absent:

Colonel Leslie V. Brown, 98228, Infantry,  
Headquarters, 17th Reinforcement Depot,  
on official business.

PURPOSE: To study the administrative and technical organization and operations of an Army Reinforcement Depot; based upon this study, to prepare a recommendation for a concise and simple organization and Standard Operating Procedure for the organization and operation of Reinforcement Depots in support of Armies; and to recommend any additional personnel by grade, ratings, and MOS, required over and the Table of Organization, allocating such additional personnel to sections and sub-sections of component parts of a Depot.

DISCUSSION:

1. The members of the board discussed the provisions of the order appointing the board and the conditions under which army depots operate.

2. Certain assumptions appeared to be in order and, after consultation with Brigadier General Henry J. Hatchett, Deputy Commander, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, the following assumptions were agreed upon:

a. The elements of the army depots would be considered in the following order: companies, battalions, depot headquarters, and attached units.

b. Companies should be set up to house and process, as a normal stockage, five hundred men and should be so equipped as to expand to a capacity of six hundred men.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The board, having carefully considered the evidence before it, finds:

1. That the present Tables of Organization and Equipment, though

basically sound, are inadequate for the operation of an Army Depot due to the fact that the load of personnel processed by the depot has, at all times, been in considerable excess of that provided for the Tables of Organization and Equipment.

2. That it is not only desirable, but absolutely necessary to augment the operating personnel of all echelons of a depot in order to function properly in the situation existing in this theater.

3. That, in the operation of a depot in the field, certain activities necessary to the functioning of a headquarters and component units are not provided for at all in the Table of Organization, i.e., utilities, an adequate police force, adequate training personnel, special service activities, etc.

4. That depots are performing a number of necessary functions and services which were not contemplated in the original plans for the organization of a depot; that those functions and services logically follow within the sphere of the operation of a depot and contribute to the smoother operation of an Army and are therefore, highly desirable; and that those services and functions require additional personnel, and sometimes equipment. Examples are processing of rotational personnel; insuring that every record and Form 20 reaches the unit of final destination of the man in perfect order; completion of disciplinary cases and records prior to the assignment of men.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** In view of the above findings, the board recommends:

1. That Army Depots operate on the basis of the use of one augmented reinforcement battalion in close support of each Army Corps; and that depot headquarters, with stockage battalions, be located in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Army which it supports.

2. That forward battalions be held to a minimum stockage where possible; and that the maximum personnel stocked per company should be between three and four hundred men. This organization is intended to allow a surplus capacity so that shipments earmarked for forward units may be held overnight when necessary and that such battalions may move readily in order to maintain proper position in relation to their Corps.

3. That the major part of stockage be maintained in the rear battalions in close proximity to the depot headquarters; that processing of casualties and reinforcements be accomplished in the rear battalions; and that record processing, classification and assignment, pay, medical screening, and supply processing be accomplished on a centralized basis by depot headquarters personnel.

4. That the augmentation recommended apply equally to companies and battalions whether they are operating as forward or rear units, and, in the case of battalions, whether or not they were allowed T/O & E column 10 augmentation. If this recommendation is approved, any battalion can be used as a corps support battalion. The column 10 personnel of rear battalions, operating in close proximity to the depot headquarters, will normally be used to augment depot headquarters personnel.

5. That, in addition to the augmentation recommended for each battalion, it is recommended that all battalions assigned to a forward depot be augmented by Column 10, T/O & E.

6. That the following additional personnel be authorized over and above the Reinforcement Company Table of Organization and Equipment No. 12-47, dated 25 September 1944, in order to provide for a unit which will normally house and process five hundred men:

a. Personnel: The officer personnel, and the line NCO's are needed to properly manage the added personnel involved in raising the capacity of the company to five hundred. It is contemplated that reinforcement officers be utilized on the basis of one per platoon in addition to the augmentation required. The other overhead personnel is required to augment clerical, supply and mess functions:

- (1) 2 Lieutenants, platoon leaders, 2136
- (2) 3 Staff Sergeants, platoon sergeants, 566
- (3) 6 Sergeants, squad leaders, 566
- (4) 1 Corporal, clerk-typists, 405
- (5) 1 Tec 5, armoror, 511
- (6) 2 Tec 5, cook, 060
- (7) 2 Tec 5, cook, 060
- (8) Total: 2 Officers, 15 enlisted Men.

b. Equipment: The following equipment is required to augment mess equipment now allowed by the T/O & I. Almost all of this equipment, except the typewriter, is now in the possession of each company.

- (1) 1 Typewriter, portable w/carrying case
- (2) 1 Ration, fld, M-1937, 4 unit
- (3) 7 Heaters, immersion type, for cane-corrigated
- (4) 2 cans, corrugated, galv, w/cover, 10 gal.
- (5) 2 cans, corrugated, galv, w/cover, 16 gal.
- (6) 2 cans, corrugated, galv, w/cover, 24 gal.
- (7) 2 cans, corrugated, galv, w/cover, 32 gal.
- (8) 2 Kits, barber, w/case
- (9) 3 Lanterns, gasoline, leaded fuel

7. That the following additional personnel be authorized over and above the Reinforcement Battalion Table of Organization and Equipment No. 12-46, dated 12 October 1944, in order to provide for a unit which will house and process 2000 men:

PERSONNEL

EQUIPMENT

a. Administrative: A sizeable detachment headquarters requires an acting first sergeant and one clerk for proper administrative control.

- 1 S/Sgt (acting Det 1st/Sgt), 566
- 1 Tec 5, Clerk-General, 055

- Typewriter, standard
- 2 Staplers, wire fastening

PERSONNELEQUIPMENT

1 perforator, 2 hole

2 pencil sharpeners

b. Mess Section: No provision is made for the messing of the headquarters detachment enlisted or officer personnel. In addition, there is usually a sizeable excess of officers over the number needed for assignment to platoons. These officers can be trained and utilized to a better advantage if held in a central excess officers' group. In the forward battalions, officers and men from combat units who have come to the battalion on business must be messed. A small headquarters mess is very necessary.

1 S/Sgt, mess sergeant, 824

1 Range, fld, 4 unit

2 Tec 4, cooks, 060

4 Immersion type heaters

2 Pvt, cooks helpers, 590

3 Lanterns, gasoline

1 Pvt, dining room orderly, 590

c. Training Section: A captain, Training Officer, who was formerly allocated to battalions augmented by Column 10 has been omitted in the latest T/O & E. It is believed that this is a typographical error. The other two officers are already proscribed and allowed by Ground Force Reinforcement Command. The enlisted augmentation asked for is needed to carry on the training, special services, and information and education activities prescribed.

1 Capt, Training Officer, 2520

1 typewriter, standard

1 1st Lt, Special Service Officer, 5000 2 gasoline lanterns

1 1st Lt, Information and Education, 5004 1 sign painters set plus  
essential carpenters

1 Sgt, duty sergeant, 566 tools

1 Tec 5, clerk-typist, 405

1 projector and portable generator

1 Tec 5, draftsmen and sign painter, 070 1 screen

1 Sgt, Special Services NCO, 502

d. Police and Security Section: Each unit operating in the Army areas is required to provide a sizeable security guard. In an enemy country, or in newly occupied territory, guard must be doubled. In order to be effective, a certain percentage of this personnel must be semi-permanent. The augmentation requested below is considered a minimum of permanent personnel required to form a nucleus of the guard required for supply, mess and headquarters establishments.

1 1st Lt, Military Police Officer, 9100 Necessary brassards

1 Sgt, military policeman, 677 Clubs

21 Pvt, military policeman, 677

e. Signal Section: The T/O and E of the entire reinforcement system contemplates that those units will be attached to a major tactical unit which will supply Signal Service. Since no unit is so attached,

Army and Corps Signal units provide no service. Each forward battalion has considerable long-distance phone traffic through two or more switchboards in making arrangements for delivery of reinforcements. Phones are used to each company, motor pool, troop movement, supply, and the headquarters:

1 Sgt, Signal FCO, 764	Switchboard BG-72, and 15 fld phones.
1 Tec 4, Chief operator, 650	
2 Tec 5, Switchboard operator, 650	
1 Pvt, lineman, 841	

f. Troop Movement Section: No troop movement personnel is provided for by the Table of Organization. Recommended personnel is needed to co-ordinate with depot in movement of troops, to arrange the movements in and out of the battalion, and to process the necessary records incident to their movement.

1 Sgt, Troop Movement FCO, 816	None
1 Tec 5, Clerk-General, 055	

g. Supply and Utilities Section: An officer is needed to act as battalion supply and utilities officer, which latter position is not presently provided for in the Table of Organization. Additional enlisted personnel are needed for processing the ration breakdown within the battalion to the companies. The clerk-typist is needed for maintaining and processing requisitions, reports, and correspondence pertaining to battalion supply. Trained personnel are needed for a small utilities section with the battalion headquarters to make the minor necessary repairs constantly encountered. They are needed to construct numerous items of furniture, etc., which increase the efficiency of the battalion, or add to the comfort of the casuals and reinforcements. Tools and equipment are needed to enable the utility men to do their job.

1 1st Lt, supply officer, 4000	1 chest tools, wheelwright
1 Tec 4, ration breakdown, 186	1 set electrician's tools
1 Tec 5, asst ration breakdown, 186	1 set plumbing tools
1 Tec 5, clerk-typist, 405	1 sign painter's equipment
1 Tec 5, carpenter, construction, 050	
1 Pvt, carpenter's asst and sign painter, 145	
1 Tec 5, electrician, 078	
1 Tec 5, plumber, 164	

h. Medical Section: An additional medical officer and an additional dental officer, together with appropriate assistants, are necessary in order for the battalion to care for the greater number of men which will be housed and processed by each battalion and, more important, to make it possible to do the processing and provide the medical and dental care in the manner in which it should be done. Each battalion needs an ambulance in order to properly care for personnel evacuated to hospitals. Drivers are needed for the ambulance.

PERSONNELEQUIPMENT

1 Capt or 1st Lt, Medical Officer, 3100	1 ambulance
1 Capt or 1st Lt, Dental Officer, 3170	
1 Tec 5, Dental technician, 885	
1 Tec 4, Surgical technician, 861	
1 Tec 5, Surgical technician, 861	
2 Tec 5, truck driver, light, 345	

8. That the following additional personnel be authorized over and above the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Reinforcement Depot, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 12-42, dated 14 October 1944:

a. Administrative Section: The recommended augmentation is based upon an average daily flow of 1000 reinforcements and casualties through the depot. The present T/O & E provides personnel based upon a capacity of 6000, and the requested augmentation would provide for a present and recon capacity of 12,000. The volume of court-martial cases and the processing of sentenced prisoners necessitates additional qualified personnel.

1 Capt, BI, Judge Advocate General, 8103	
1 1st Lt, BI, Troop Movement Officer, 2640	
1 1st Lt, BI Personnel Officer, 2200	
1 T/Sgt, Administrative NCO, 502	
1 S/Sgt, " 502	
1 Tec 3, " 502	
3 Sgt, " 502	
5 Tec 4, " 502	
2 Tec 4, Personnel Technician, 290	
2 Cpl, Administrative NCO, 502	
7 Tec 5, Clerk-Typist, 405	
1 Tec 5, File Clerk, 355	
10 Tec 5, Clerk-General, 055	
1 Tec 5, Statistical Clerk, 212	
20 Pfc or Pvt, Clerk-Typist, 405	
32 Pfc or Pvt, Clerk-General, 055	

90

b. Training Section:

PERSONNELEQUIPMENT

2 Pvt, Clerk-Typist, 405

c. Special Services Section: No T/O provision has been made for this function, which is very important in a forward depot.

1 Capt, BI, Special Services Officer, 5000  
1

1 Sgt, Entertainment Director, 442

1 Tec 5, Projectionist, 137

1 Tec 5, Public Relations man, 274

2 Pfc or Pvt, Clerk-Typist, 405  
5

d. Medical Section: The strength of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, particularly as augmented, warrants the use of a medical officer for sick call. The volume of services now required of battalion surgeons will not permit the use of one for the depot headquarters and station complement personnel. Dental personnel provides prosthetic experts for the operation of a prosthetic unit.

1 Capt, MC, Medical Officer, Duty, 3100

1 Capt, DC, Dental Officer, 3170  
2

1 Tec 3, Dental Laboratory Technician, 067

1 Tec 4, " 067

1 Tec 5, " 067

1 Tec 5, Medical NCO 673

e. Signal Section: Although recent additions to the T/O & Z add a Signal Section, no Signal Officer was provided. A Signal Officer is necessary for the operation of depot communications.

1 Capt, SC, Signal Officer, 0210  
1

f. Headquarters Company: T/O allowance for headquarters personnel does not provide for adequate mess personnel, nor does it make provision for duty noncommissioned officers required to properly supervise the policing of the extensive areas covered by the depot headquarters proper.

1 S/Sgt, Mess Sergeant, 824

2 Sgt, Duty NCO, 566

4 Tec 4, Cco't, 060

1 Cpl, Duty NCO, 566

4 Tec 5, Cook, 060

4 Pfc or Pvt, Laborer, 590  
16

g. Guard Platoon: Under present conditions, operating in enemy or recently occupied territory, it is deemed necessary to maintain double guards. Further, it is deemed undesirable to use transient reinforcements or casualties alone for this purpose.

54 Pfc or Pvt, Military Police, 677  
54

h. Ordnance: Weapons furnished by Army include battlefield recovery weapons. Gasoline must be removed and weapons conditioned prior to issue.

1 1st Lt, Ordnance, Ordnance Supply Officer, 4530

11 Pfc or Pvt, Armorer, 511  
11

i. Chemical Warfare Service:

1 Tec 4, Chemical NCO, 870

1 Pfc or Pvt, Clerk-General, 055  
2

j. Army Exchange Service: The augmentation recommended will provide a small exchange cadre for each battalion and tailoring, watch repair, and other special services at the central exchange.

1 Capt or Lt, BI, Army Exchange Officer, 4210

1 Lt, BI, Army Exchange Officer, 4210  
2

1 Tec 3, Administrative NCO, 502

1 Tec 3, Clerk-General, 055

5 Tec 4, Cashier, 269

1 Tec 5, Supply Clerk, 835

4 Tec 5, Sales Clerk, 373

9 Pfc, " 373

10 Pvt, " 373

1 Pvt, Tailor, 234

1 Pvt, Watchmaker, 381

2 Pvt, Foreman, Whse, 252  
35

k. Utilities: Personnel requested are a substitute for the utilities detachment listed in T/O & E, but not currently provided. The specialists requested are necessarily for a depot operating in enemy or recently occupied territory. Past experience has clearly established the necessity for such a unit.

1 1st Lt, C3, Utilities Maintenance, Officer, 7120

1 T/Sgt, Construction Foreman, 059  
1 S/Sgt, Construction Foreman, 059  
1 Spt, Carpenter, Construction, 050  
1 Sgt, Electrician, 078  
1 Sgt, Plumber, 164  
1 Sgt, Utility Repairman, 121  
1 Tec 5, Welder, Acetylene, 257  
2 Tec 5, Blacksmith, 024  
2 Tec 5, Carpenter, Construction, 050  
1 Tec 5, Supply Clerk, 835  
1 Tec 5, Clerk-Typist, 405  
4 Pfc, Carpenter, Construction, 050  
1 Tec 5, Painter, Sign, 145  
2 Tec 5, Electrician, 078  
10 Pvt, Basic, 521  
30

1. Red Cross:

1 Tec 5, Clerk-Typist, 405  
1 Pvt, Truck driver, light, 345

m. Stockade: Adequate provision must be made for care of prisoners received by the depot from many sources including those from rear depots under sentence, and stragglers from the Reinforcement Command. Stockade accommodations must be provided for upwards of one hundred prisoners.

1 1st Lt, Prison Officer, 9121  
1  
1 S/Sgt, Provost Sergeant, 730  
3 Sgt, Military Police, 677  
6 Cpl, Military Police, 677  
2 Tec 5, Clerk-Typist, 405  
38 Pfc or Pvt, Military Police, 677  
50

n. Training Detachment: Necessary for developing training facilities, caring for training equipment, and the carrying out of current training directives as directed by higher authority.

3 Capt, Inf, Training Officer, 2520

3 1st Lt, Inf, Unit Commander, 1542  
6

3 T/Sgt, Platoon Sergeant, 651

9 S/Sgt, Section Leader, 652

18 Sgt, Squad Leader, 653

30 Cpl, Squad Leader, 653

20 Pfc or Pvt, Rifleman, 745

40 Pfc or Pvt, Basic, 521

120

c. Transportation: A stated augmentation of transportation section is not included in above recommendation; it is, however, deemed necessary that Army depots be provided with two drivers for each vehicle over and above those authorized by T/O & E.

p. Postal Unit: An augmentation of 25 to 130 men will be required. The exact augmentation will vary depending upon the number of men who have gone through the depot as shown by postal locator cards and on the portion of the burden taken from the depots by the 14th Base Post Office.

9. A Standard Operating Procedure for Army depots is attached as Exhibit "B".

The board adjourned at 1700, on 10 March 1945.

JAMES J. PIRTE  
Colonel, Infantry  
(President)

LORIN SOLON  
Colonel, Field Artillery  
(Member and Recorder)

WILBUR G. DOCKUM  
Colonel, Field Artillery  
(Member)

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE  
FOR REINFORCEMENT DEPOT  
OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF AN ARMY

MISSION

1. The mission of a reinforcement depot operating in support of an Army is to supply personnel to the Army which it supports.
2. In accomplishing this mission, the Depot will:
  - a. Receive, process and supply Army reinforcements direct from the port of debarkation and assign as expeditiously as possible upon requisitions approved by the Army.
  - b. Receive, classify, process, supply and reassign, automatically, casualties from hospitals to their former units.
  - c. Insure that all casual and/or reinforcement personnel shipped forward are completely outfitted with all items of clothing and equipment, including an appropriate arm which has been zeroed and fired.
  - d. Forward through Reinforcement Command channels limited assignment personnel not meeting MR 1-9 requirements, as directed by Ground Force Reinforcement Command.
  - e. Receive, administer, and assist in arranging transportation for rotational personnel of the Army served, as directed by Ground Force Reinforcement Command, and higher headquarters.
  - f. Operate a training program as prescribed by Ground Force Reinforcement Command, the Army served, and higher headquarters.

METHOD OF OPERATION

1. An Army depot is operated in direct support of an Army. The depot maintains a stockage element of one or more battalions and places a battalion in support of each active Corps.
  - a. In each of the Corps battalions, a stockage consisting of fully processed reinforcements of fast-moving MCB numbers of infantry rifle, heavy weapons, cannon company, and Armored Force is maintained. Corps battalions act as forwarding agencies of the depots in the forwarding of casualties returning to their units. Supply, administration and classification activities of forward battalions are maintained at a minimum level. These battalions are normally located well forward to be convenient to Corps headquarters, division rear echelons and Corps troops headquarters.
  - b. (1) Rear elements of the depot consist of the depot headquarters, station complement, and such reinforcement battalions as are required for maintenance of stockage. The depot is located in the Army area at a position which will be near the Army headquarters, Army troops, a usable road net, within easy marching distance of a railhead with suitable sidings, and within easy Signal communications of the Army.
  - b. (2) The operations involved in processing of records, medical processing, classification and assignment, personnel procedures, correspondence, payment, supply, and training will be accomplished primarily by depot headquarters and rear battalions. Training is continued and such processing as is not accomplished in the rear battalions is completed in the forward battalions.

c. The Reinforcement Depot reports available stockage to the army daily. Divisions, Corps and Army troops submit requisitions by MOS numbers to the Army Command who allocates the reinforcements available in the Depot and its forward battalions to the units of the Army based on tactical and other considerations and issues directives to the Depot prescribing the assignment of reinforcements. Casual officer and enlisted men are returned to units under prevailing instructions. Upon receipt of an approved requisition, the depot fills as much of its requisition as possible by allocating reinforcements then in stockage in the forward battalions to that unit, and fills the balance of the requisition by forwarding men from the depot rear battalions to the Corps battalion for delivery to that unit. MOS numbers requisitioned which are not available in any part of the depot are extracted to Ground Force Reinforcement Command and forwarded to the requisitioning unit upon arrival in the depot.

#### DEPOT HEADQUARTERS

##### Administrative Section

The administration of reinforcements and casualties is accomplished by the administrative section, which includes personnel to perform the functions of classification and assignment, processing of records, preparation of payrolls, strength reports and statistics and to move reinforcements and casualties in and out of the depot, from depot to forward battalions, or direct to units, by all available means of transportation.

##### Supply Section

1. The prescribed items of clothing and equipment will normally be in the possession of reinforcements when they arrive at an Army Depot. However, all reinforcements, as well as casualties, are given a showdown inspection for shortages and such shortages corrected. All personnel forwarded from the depot are completely clothed and equipped in accordance with existing directives upon departure.

2. Where it is evident that shortages are due to the negligence or culpability of personnel, statements of charges are instituted and, when indicated, necessary disciplinary action taken.

3. Where at all possible, battalions will operate central supply processing rooms. Whenever the rear battalions are operating in a close group, one central supply processing room will be operated by the depot. Forward battalions will normally operate a central battalion supply processing room.

##### Training Section

The primary mission of a forward depot is processing and forwarding troops to the Army which it serves. However, during the period in which stockage, slow-moving personnel, or other troops remain in the depot, they will engage in training as proscribed by current Ground Force Reinforcement Command Directives, implemented and supervised by the Depot Director of Training and a training detachment. The Depot Director of Training will formulate and maintain a local security plan.

##### Guard Platoon

The depot guard platoon comprises personnel for enforcement of military regulations and guarding the installations of depot headquarters. It is in addition to the battalion security guard.

### Medical Section

The Medical Section comprises officer and enlisted personnel to conduct medical and sanitary inspections, to supervise the battalion medical and dental personnel, to conduct screening procedures and immunizations and to submit prescribed medical and sanitary reports.

### Headquarters Company

The headquarters company accomplishes the routine administrative and housekeeping functions relating to Depot Headquarters and Headquarters Company, including the operation of an officers' and enlisted men's mess.

### Transportation Section

The function of the depot transportation section is to maintain a pool of motor vehicles for the purpose of transporting reinforcements and casualties to forward battalions, or direct to units. Hauling of supplies and normal camp housekeeping requirements are accomplished with vehicles from the depot pool, which normally consists of organic vehicles of the depot and rear battalions. This pool will be supplemented by such organic transportation of forward battalions as the situation permits, and from other sources.

### Signal Section

The Depot Signal Officer is responsible for supervision of all communications, for cryptographic service and the maintenance of all communications and a courier system between the depot and Army headquarters, between the depot and forward battalions, and with Headquarters, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, either direct or through another depot.

### Chaplains

The Chaplains' Section comprises the officer and enlisted personnel necessary for the maintenance of the spiritual and moral welfare of the depot. The Depot Chaplain is responsible for supervision of religious activities among all elements of the command.

### Special Service Section

Special Services is a vital activity of an Army depot. It is the responsibility of the Special Services Officer to provide entertainment and other activities conducive to preservation and improvement of the morale of all personnel, reinforcement, casual and assigned.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP  
APO 655

12 November 1944

Major General Ernest N. Harmon  
Commanding General, 2d Armored Division  
APO 252.

My dear General Harmon:

General Eisenhower has asked me to write to you personally for the purpose of clarifying replacement problems that might be bothering you.

I realize that one of your biggest problems is getting your hospitalized personnel returned to you. Both General Eisenhower and General Bradley are most sympathetic to your desires in this connection and have told me to do everything possible to accomplish the desired results. You want all your old men back, especially your junior officers and key noncommissioned officers, and they want to come back to you. I wish we could send them all back to you directly from the hospital. That would be an ideal situation, but to do this would usually create an overstrength and the manpower situation just won't permit it. We can't permit an overstrength, no matter how much we would like to see all hospitalized personnel go back to their former units.

We have been able, however, to get some concessions for you, and I want you to know that we will continue to do everything possible to get your soldiers back to you. We have been able to get your field grade officers who are general service returned to you automatically, and you can get those who are marked limited service by requesting them. The return of field grade officers has been given a high priority and whenever possible they will be returned to you by air lift. Your limited service enlisted men other than Infantry are returned to you without requisition. General service personnel other than field grade officers are returned automatically to the depot which supports the army, of which your division is a part, where they are held as long as the supply of replacements will permit in order that they may be applied against requisitions from your organization. In order to get as many as possible of these old men back to you we have established priorities so that preference is given the soldier who has served with your outfit the greatest length of time. I think you will be interested in these priorities which we were able to get put into operation some time ago. They are:

Priority one: Any personnel who originally came over with a particular organization, either in a T/O position or as part of the original authorized overstrength for assault divisions. This group will be held in the Replacement System pending assignment to their former organization as long as supply and demand will permit.

Priority two: Any personnel who became members of an organization on the continent and remained with that organization for a minimum of thirty days. This group will be held in the Replacement System pending assignment to their former units for a period of at least thirty days, supply and demand permitting.

Priority three: All other personnel not covered by priorities one and two above. This group will be held in the Replacement System pending assignment to their former units for a period of at least fifteen days, supply and demand permitting.

If you now have in your division junior officers or noncommissioned officers who were formerly members of another division, or if former members of your division have been sent as replacements to some other organization, I believe that mutually agreed transfers can be arranged so that a number of these soldiers can get back to their old outfits. I am writing to the Army G-1s regarding such transfers.

If you have an acute problem concerning the return of any of your key personnel I am anxious to be of any assistance possible.

Sincerely yours,

J. J. O'HARE  
Colonel, GSC  
AC of S, G-1

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP  
APO 655

12 November 1944

Colonel Frederick S. Matthews  
G-1 Section  
Third U.S. Army, APO 403

My dear Colonel Matthews:

General Eisenhower asked me to write a personal letter to the Commanding General of each Division regarding the return of hospitalized personnel to their former units. I am inclosing a copy of the letter sent to each Division Commander.

Please note that a liberal policy of transfers between divisions is suggested. General Eisenhower felt that this would expedite the return of personnel to their former units.

I realize that a liberal policy of transfers will not solve all the problems in connection with the return of personnel to their former organization, but it will get some personnel back to their old outfits.

Please let me know how this works out in your Army.

Sincerely yours,

J. J. O'HARE  
Colonel, GSC  
AC of S, G-1

1 Incl

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
APO 403

25 November 1944

Colonel J. J. O'Hare  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
Twelfth Army Group  
APO 655, U. S. Army

My dear Colonel O'Hare:

I have read with interest your letter to the Division Commanders dated 12 November.

At the present time none of the divisions of this army have a problem with reference to the return of hospitalized personnel. All divisions are under strength and consequently requisitions on file with the Replacement System more than cover any personnel of the divisions returning to duty.

I feel that it is extremely important that all personnel be returned to former units and if possible this should certainly be done.

With our present shortage of personnel, I do not believe that the return of personnel will present a problem at any time in the near future.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK S. MATTHEWS  
Colonel, G.S.C.  
AC of S, G-1

HEADQUARTERS 26TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 26, U.S. Army  
21 November 1944

Colonel J. J. O'Hare  
Headquarters Twelfth Army Group  
APO 655, U.S. Army

Dear Red:

I was very pleased to receive your recent letter concerning the return of hospitalized personnel to my division, in addition to hearing from you personally.

It would be difficult for me to secure the return of field grade officers who are marked limited service simply by request, unless I had some means of knowing that they had been marked limited service, and this information is not available to me.

There are many key enlisted infantrymen who may be marked limited service, but provision should be made so that Division Commanders could be informed of their category, and in cases where the capabilities and experience of such a man can be utilized in a limited service position, the man could be returned to his former unit and serve a useful purpose.

Under combat conditions, personnel who originally came over with a unit should be channeled through the replacement system toward their parent Division and ear-marked for their former unit. The demands to fill combat losses then would insure their return.

The SSN and MOS of men who were formerly assigned to a unit will allow an absorption of them by their parent unit, normally, through the demands of combat, but they should be channeled toward their former unit and designated specifically for them.

Many thanks for your information concerning the return of hospitalized personnel. The many difficulties concerning such a program are easily understandable. With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

W. S. PAUL  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP  
APO 655

27 November 1944

Major General W. A. Paul  
Commanding General, 26th Infantry Division  
APO 26, U. S. Army

My dear General Paul:

I have just received your letter of 21 November, and I was very glad to hear from you.

You mentioned in your letter that you were having difficulty in getting information regarding your hospitalized field grade officers who had been classified as limited service. Some time ago I took up the question of having divisions notified of the status of their officers who were to be discharged from hospitals as limited service. At that time I was informed that due to the fact that hospitals and replacement installations were overburdened with administrative work, it was not deemed advisable to place this additional administrative burden upon them. I believe that one solution to the problem is to advise field grade officers and other key personnel to notify the division of their status in the event they are hospitalized and are to be classified limited service. As you know, Infantry limited assignment enlisted personnel are not returned to divisions, but in the event you learn that there are limited assignment personnel in replacement installations who were former members of your Division and whom you wish to have returned, I shall be glad to help you get these people back.

I believe that most hospitalized personnel are now getting back to their former divisions without a great deal of delay. I am making every effort to see that such personnel are returned to you in the shortest possible time.

With kindest personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

J. J. O'HARE  
Colonel, USC  
AC of S, G-1

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO 254, US Army

21 November 1944

Colonel J. J. O'Hare  
Asst C/S, G-1  
Twelfth Army Group  
APO 655, U.S. Army

My dear O'Hare:

Thank you for your letter of 12 November describing the operation of the replacement system and the problems involved.

I fully realize the necessity of conserving manpower and can well understand your problem of trying to prevent combat units from going overstrength. However, in answer to a recent letter from General Matchett, I explained that in my opinion there may be factors outweighing the objective of holding combat units at Table of Organization strength. The morale factor involved in returning every soldier to his parent unit from the replacement system, not only to himself, but to the entire unit, is very great. I think you will find the experience tables will show that the cumulative effect of returning all men to their units promptly will not materially affect their total strength. The number of men returning from the hospital is not significant compared with the losses sustained by a combat division, but if each man is assured that he will return to his own organization, it will have a salutary effect on all concerned.

During the period prior to the present offensive it was impossible for us to receive any of our own men from the replacement system because we had no vacancies. It was obvious that the first two days of battle would bring us understrength, and since that time most of these men have been returned as substitutes on replacement requisitions. These men could have been very valuable in helping train recruits during the past month; and their presence prior to combat would have helped alleviate our present shortage of approximately 400 men. Due to the time lag involved in processing requisitions, it will not be possible to regain our Table of Organization strength until the next lull in operations.

During active operations the heavy casualties sustained by infantry divisions compared to our own losses place them in a more favorable position to receive priority on replacements. However, the high number of armored vehicles and crew served weapons which we must operate, necessitates a full complement of men, and the loss in combat efficiency when an armored battalion is even 100 men understrength is quite serious.

I appreciate hearing from you very much and hope that these observations based on our experience will be of some assistance. If there is anything further which we may do from this end, please let me know.

With best regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

JOHN WOOD,  
Major General, U.S. Army,  
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS 90TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
Office of the Division Commander  
APO 90, U. S. Army

21 November 1944

Colonel J. J. O'Hare, GSC,  
AC of S, G-1,  
Headquarters Twelfth Army Group,  
APO 655, U. S. Army.

Dear "Rod":

In answer to your letter of 12 November, 1944, regarding problems which this division may experience in getting replacements, I can briefly state them in two sentences.

- (1) We want all wounded men returned immediately.
- (2) We want requisitions for replacements filled quickly.

Regarding the first item, you state that to return all wounded "would usually create an overstrength". That happened only for a short time late in October when the division was occupying a quiet sector. The small overstrength even then was insufficient to make up for the men sick, on furlough or on special duty with communication units and military police units. The front line unit, that is, the rifle platoon, even then was understrength. At other times the rifle units are critically understrength. So much so that there is great reluctance in pulling them out of the line for a brief relaxation in some rest area. I do not believe that the immediate return of our wounded will create an overstrength problem. Surely these men should return to their own unit where they are of more value. Even when overstrength I should think it would be better to have them held in division rear areas rather than in replacement pools in the SOS.

With reference to the second item of filling requisitions faster, may I say that the lag appears so great that units are always far below strength. We entered the Metz operation below strength and as of today we have requisitions unfilled for 101 officers and 1081 men. Many of our rifle platoons are fighting with the strength of 17 men led by a non-commissioned officer. The severe fighting subsided on the 19th so during this present pause it would be the time to receive replacements, brief them properly and have them fully acquainted before entering the next fight. Therefore, the problem here is to time the arrival of replacements during pauses in the fight. To do this means planning along with the operation and the timely staging of replacements forward.

Please know that I appreciate your personal inquiry concerning these problems. From our point of view down front we say "Replace men faster on the firing line; not as overstrength but just somewhere near T/O." I know that you are doing everything to do it.

Since we are not far, hope you can come over soon for a day with us.

Sincerely,

J. A. VAN FLEET  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS 80TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO 80, US Army

19 November 1944

Colonel J. J. O'Hare  
AC of S, G-1  
Twelfth Army Group  
APO 655, US Army

My dear Red:

Your letter of 12 November received yesterday and I am replying immediately because I feel that the replacement problem is one of our most difficult problems. To me the personnel system of the Army during this war has functioned abominably. It has been the greatest single obstacle in the training and fighting of a combat division.

Until the replacements are considered as a class of supply, just like ammunition, gasoline or rations, and a reserve built up in the units prior to entry into combat the problem will never be satisfactorily solved. The first day of combat brings its casualties and replacements for these casualties, under the present system, do not become available to the unit until 3 or 4 days later. Consequently, the unit's effective strength decreases during the first, second and third day to a point where the fighting strength of the rifle units approaches zero. Furthermore, in order to keep these units going it is necessary to feed replacements in during actual combat with a resultant injustice to the individual concerned and a failure to raise the combat efficiency of the unit corresponding to the number of replacements absorbed. We have had occasions where squad and platoon leaders received replacements after dark and had to move forward in the attack before daylight, not even getting a chance to see their men to be able to recognize them.

I realize that the manpower shortage is critical in the rear, but it is even more critical in the front, particularly in the infantry units. I feel it is up to higher headquarters to solve the problem so that combat units do not suffer because of policies laid down by higher headquarters.

The return to the Division of previous members of the Division is of first importance. From my short experience during the past 4 months of combat, it is evident that normal attrition and battle casualties will provide a place for all RTDs without the unit going overstrength very often. The occasional overstrength that might result from unrestricted return of RTDs would exist only during those infrequent and short periods when the Division is preparing for its next operation. It is then that an overstrength is vital in order to take care of the losses that are bound to occur during the first few days of combat and prior to the time that replacements can be requisitioned and received under existing policies. One RTD is worth much more to the unit than a strange replacement without prior combat experience. We are now getting some infantry replacements who have hardly a speaking acquaintance with an M-1 rifle. We are also getting officer replacements who are infantrymen only by virtue of having been changed from CAC, AAA, or FA to Infantry as a result of a "get rich quick" course at the Infantry School.

When the Replacement System works on a policy to prevent units from becoming understrength rather than overstrength, I think the problem is on the way to a solution.

From the above you can see that you have touched on a very sore subject with me. If you can do anything about it, you will be doing a great service to the combat units.

Congratulations on your assignment, and I hope you will be able to get down to this Division shortly. I would be delighted to see you again.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. McBRIDE,  
Major General, United States Army,  
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP  
APO 655

26 November 1944

Major General H. L. McBride,  
Commanding General, 80th Infantry Division,  
APO 80, U.S. Army.

Dear Mac:

I received your letter of 19 November today, and I am replying immediately because I know that by the time you receive this answer, your division will be considerably understrength.

The thought expressed in your second paragraph about delay between the time a man becomes a casualty and his replacement actually arrives was realized here some time ago, and I was able to get European Theater of Operations to give you authority to requisition forty-eight hours in advance, based on anticipated casualties. This was actually the solution to the time delay. However, we now find ourselves totally out of Infantry rifle replacements because of the War Department's inability to ship the numbers that are necessary and were requisitioned. For example, 25,000 Infantrymen were requisitioned for November, but at the present date only 13,000 have arrived, and the remaining 12,000 of the November requisition will arrive some time in December. Further, the requisition of this category for December was for 67,000, but the War Department has stated that it will be able to furnish only 30,750, so you can see that when the supply is so small and the demand is as great as it is, we are forced to have necessary control measures.

It would be highly desirable, from both a morale and efficiency point of view, if all hospital returnees could always be returned to their units, but this cannot be done with the supply of replacements that is available to us, because the hospital returns are a considerable part of the overall replacement pool that is kept in the rear of armies.

If the supply of replacements ever again equals the demand, I can assure you that we will continue to let you requisition forty-eight hours in advance, based on your anticipated casualties.

As soon as I can possibly get away from here, I will be down to see you.

Sincerely,

J. J. O'HARE  
Colonel, GSC  
AC of S, G-1

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE  
APO 633

3 December 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Colonel T. A. Seely

1. In response to your memorandum of 25 November the following narrative history of the AAF Reinforcement Command in the ETO is submitted. This information is furnished from the personal knowledge of the undersigned and no records have been checked in the compilation of same.

a. The 70th Reinforcement Depot, later designated as Reinforcement Command, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and then AAF/ETO Reinforcement Command (Prov) was the outgrowth of 12th Reinforcement Depot, the original Air Force unit in this Theater, responsible for processing reinforcements arriving in the Theater and personnel returning to the Zone of Interior. The maximum capacity for processing such personnel within this command was approximately twenty-one thousand (21,000) individuals at any one given date. Unfortunately, these facilities were divided among several stations, the largest capacity of any one station being approximately seventy-five hundred (7,500) beds.

b. The Air Force Reinforcement Command in the European Theater was responsible only to a small extent for the training of personnel, this being limited to training of six weeks for those individuals who were transferred from co-allies such as Royal Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force and in some instances the Polish Air Force to the United States Air Forces. No technical nor flying training was undertaken within Air Force Reinforcement installations.

c. Requisitions for filler or replacement non-flying personnel from Air Force units were submitted to and approved by the highest Air Force Headquarters in the European Theater prior to forwarding to Air Force Reinforcement establishments for processing.

d. Assignment of combat crew reinforcements was coordinated directly between the commands concerned and the Reinforcement Command. This system required continuous supervision of the highest Air Force Headquarters in the Theater in order to provide reinforcements to cover normal attrition and combat losses on a basis whereby the various types of combat units were manned with crews so as to maintain these combat units at such a level as to permit proper operational status.

e. Requisitions for reinforcements for the Army Air Forces in the European Theater were based on attrition rates and forwarded through the Theater Commander to War Department at monthly intervals. Requisitions for combat crew reinforcements were forwarded through tri-monthly reports to Army Air Force Headquarters. These reports indicated the number of crews required, the combat crew strength of this command by various types, and the losses by type within the period covered.

f. Air Force reinforcements upon arrival in this Theater were moved directly from the ports to the various stations of the Air Forces Reinforcement establishments. Minimum use was made of Ground

Force Reinforcement installations. Although the Theater Commander maintained technical control over all reinforcement depots within this Theater, the Air Force Reinforcement Command was operated directly under the highest Air Force Headquarters with slight relations if any, to Ground Forces Reinforcement Commands.

g. Hospitalized Air Force personnel (when dismissed from hospitals to Air Force reinforcement establishments) were returned from the hospital concerned directly to a station of the Air Force Reinforcement Command and automatically returned therefrom to the proper Air Force unit.


h. With the exception of a policy pertaining only to combat crews, no rotation policy existed within this command. Combat crew personnel were returned to the Zone of Interior on a rotation policy when it was determined by competent authority that the individual or crew were so fatigued from combat that further operational duty would prove detrimental to the welfare of the individual to such an extent as to prohibit rehabilitation and recovery and return to a combat or non-combat status.

i. In addition to processing reinforcements, the Air Force Reinforcement Command, this Theater, was responsible for the operation of a maximum of ten (10) rest homes for the benefit of Air Force personnel (to a large extent combat crews) who were so fatigued operationally as to require rest, recuperation, and rehabilitation.

j. Shortly prior to D-Day two (?) reinforcement battalions were relieved of assignment to the Air Force Reinforcement Command and assigned to Ninth Air Force, the tactical Air Force operating in this Theater, for the purpose of processing individual reinforcements and replacements for the Ninth Air Force only. With these two (2) battalions reinforcements in numbers sufficient to replace initial losses during the first sixteen (16) days after the invasion were supplied. These initial losses were far less than anticipated and the operation of separate reinforcement battalions proved unnecessary; thus, after about four months service with the Ninth Air Force these battalions were reassigned to Reinforcement Command and all reinforcement establishments operated under the one headquarters directly under supervision of the highest Air Force Headquarters.

2. The above information is true to the best of my knowledge.

FRANK W. MAYO  
Colonel, AC  
Chief Military Personnel Division



IRV RADER  
COLONEL, AC

HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
Theater Manpower Section

APO #887  
21 February 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Theater Commander.

SUBJECT : Reinforcement Data.

1. Forwarded herewith is a study which has been prepared as a basis for the allocation of new reinforcements of critical categories becoming available in the Theater in March 1945.
2. The report has been prepared in coordination with G-1 representatives of the Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups. These representatives have concurred in the report.
3. It will be noted from paragraph 5 of the portion of the report pertaining to the period, 17-28 February, that 13,100 Infantry enlisted men not previously included in allocations by Supreme Headquarters have arrived or will presently arrive in the Theater. This headquarters has authorized the movement of this personnel to forward depots under the ratio which was established by Supreme Headquarters for the month of February.
4. The estimated strength status of Infantry and Armored Force enlisted men on 31 March 1945 is:

	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armored</u>
Requirements	127342	9313
Available	101116	5095
Estimated Shortages, 31 March 1945	26226	4218

5. Airborne requirements have been eliminated from this study. A recent survey, made by this section, of Airborne requirements indicates that approximately 1300 Infantry glider reinforcements will be needed to bring all Airborne units to authorized strength in March 1945. Parachutist requirements for Airborne units are being met through shipments from the Zone of Interior. If an allocation of Infantry reinforcements is made for Airborne, the estimated shortages indicated in paragraph 4, above, will be increased by the amount of the allocation.

L. T. SHANNON,  
Colonel, GSC,  
Chief of Section.

4 Incls:

- Incl 1 - Reinforcement Status, 28 Feb & 31 Mar.
- Incl 2 - Schedule of Reinforcement Shipments.
- Incl 3 - Reinforcement Data, 17-28 Feb.
- Incl 4 - Reinforcement Data, 1-31 Mar.

## CARRIER SHEET H, TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

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TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT: Allocation of Infantry Reinforcements to Armies.
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G-1 AG of S, 10Jan      1. G-3 feels that operational considerations  
 Thru G-3 45 dictate some modification in the recommended percentage  
 C/S allotments to Armies as indicated below:

a. The percentage allotted to the Fifteenth Army appears to be correct considering the high priority which must be accorded to divisions in SHAEF Reserve.

b. Percentage allotted to the Ninth Army appears to be high compared to First and Third Armies. Ninth Army should have small battle losses during the period under consideration. It is assumed that its non-battle losses will be roughly balanced by the returnees from hospitals. Therefore, if its allotment is as large a percentage as indicated by G-1, its losses should be almost fully replaced, which is not believed to be possible with other Armies. G-3 feels, therefore, the percentage allotted to the Ninth Army should be reduced to 5%.

c. In the case of the First and Third Armies, it is believed that each of these Armies will have approximately the same percentage of its divisions actively engaged; in other words, the activity factor of these two armies should be about equal. The allotments that these armies should have should be in proportion to their numbers of divisions with due consideration being given to percentage understrength. The ratio of divisions in First and Third Armies is 13 to 15, (not counting the 106th Division). The ratio of percentage understrength is roughly the same; therefore, it is believed that the percentage allotments to these two armies should be: First Army 40%; Third Army 45%.

d. Recapitulating, the percentages recommended by G-3 are:

First Army	40%
Third Army	45%
Ninth Army	5%
Fifteenth Army	<u>10%</u>
	100%

A. F. K.

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G-1	C/S	10Jan	Approved as follows:
		45	
			First Army      38%
			Third Army      47%
			Ninth Army      5%
			Fifteenth Army      10%

## CARRIER SHEET HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

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TO      FROM      DATE      SUBJECT: Reinforcements.

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1 G-3    G-1    3 Feb    1. Information received from Hq, GFRC, 2 February 1945 indicates that new Infantry reinforcements will become available to Armies of this command as indicated:

1 to 7 February,	10,000	Infantry Reinforcements
8 to 15        "	<u>13,000</u>	"
	TOTAL	23,000
	"	"

Allocation for the remainder of February has not yet been made by SHAEF.

2. Units of Twelfth Army Group presently attached to Sixth Army Group, and for whom, by SHAEF directive, this headquarters remains responsible for reinforcements, are:

10th Armored Division  
28th Infantry Division  
75th Infantry Division.

Information available at the present time indicates that these units are understrength in Infantry approximately 2,600. Third Army has been charged with the responsibility of furnishing reinforcements for 10th Armored Division. Fifteenth Army has been charged with the responsibility for furnishing reinforcements to the 28th Infantry Division. The responsibility for reinforcements for the 75th Infantry Division has not as yet been delegated to an army. The major portion of the understrength mentioned above is in the 75th Infantry Division, and estimates received from First Army indicate that this division is understrength approximately 2,060 in Infantry alone.

3. The table below shows the total understrength of divisions in armies and the percent of understrength for each army, and also shows the number and percent of divisions within each army that will be assigned or attached for operations in the next few days (based on information received from G-3 this date).

	TOTAL UNDERSTRENGTH OF OPERATIONAL DIVISIONS				
	DIVISIONS BY ARMIES		IN EACH ARMY		
	No.	%	No.	%	
First Army	3,161	35	351	9	28
Third Army	2,945	32	245	*12	38
Ninth Army	1,771	20	177	10	31
Fifteenth Army	1,196	13	1,196	1	3
	9,073	100%	--	32	100%

\*Includes 69th Infantry Division which is to relieve 17th Airborne Division.

Note: Units of Twelfth Army Group presently attached to Sixth Army Group, airborne units, 106th Infantry Division, 9th Armored Division (Reserve), and non-operational divisions of Fifteenth Army other than 69th Infantry Division, are not included in the above table.

4. Taking into consideration the above factors, and without reference to the future operational employment of First, Third, and Ninth Armies, the following recommendations are made:

a. That the 23,000 Infantry reinforcements be allocated as follows:

First Army,	35%	or approximately	7,000
Third Army,	38%	"	8,000
Ninth Army,	26%	"	5,500
Fifteenth Army,	35%	"	500
Sixth Army Group			2,000.

b. That other than the allocation of 500 reinforcements to Fifteenth Army for the 66th Infantry Division, no other allocation be made to this army at this time, but that Fifteenth Army's needs to rehabilitate divisions which may be pulled out of the line be made from over-all allocation as occasion arises and as directed by G-3.

c. That 2,000 Infantry reinforcements be made available to Sixth Army Group from Twelfth Army Group allocation, specifically earmarked for 10th Armored Division, 28th Infantry Division, and 75th Infantry Division.

J. J. O'HARE  
 Brigadier General, GSC,  
 AC of S, G-1.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP  
APO 655

5 February 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : General O'HARE.

1. On 20 January, GFRC requested an allocation on Armored reinforcements scheduled to arrive on the continent on or about 28 January. GFRC stated that it was necessary for them to have this allocation several days in advance of the arrival date in order to set up the necessary transportation, thus avoiding any delay in getting these reinforcements directly from the beaches to Army depots.

2. This section recommended allocation which was approved by the Armored Section and by G-3 on 21 January. The allocation as approved gave 482 Armored reinforcements to First Army, 446 to Third Army, none to Ninth Army, and 246 to Fifteenth Army. GFRC was notified on 21 January to ship Armored reinforcements in accordance with this allocation.

3. By 3 February all these Armored reinforcements were either in Army depots or enroute to Army depots.

4. The reinforcements allocated to Fifteenth Army were for the rehabilitation of the 707th Tank Bn and to replace losses of the 782d Tank Bn which was involved in a train wreck.

5. Based on the new order of battle and upon shortages as of midnight 3 February, the status of Armor is as indicated below:

	FIRST ARMY	THIRD ARMY	NINTH ARMY	FIFTEENTH ARMY	TOTAL
Understrength	804	850	284	320	2 258
Reinfs Available	482	446	None	246	1 174
NET SHORTAGE	322	404	284	74	1 084
No. Armd Divs	2	3	3	-	
Avg U/Str per Div	161	134	94	-	
Divs Included	3,7	4,6,11,(9*)	2,5,8	-	

\* For reinforcement purposes only.

6. GFRC states that there are no Armored reinforcements available in rear depots and that, except for a few sick, confined or AWOL's, no new Armored reinforcements will be available prior to the end of the month, at which time the next shipment from the ZI is due to arrive. Armored reinforcements in Army depots are being forwarded to units today.

7. Colonel Hundley, G-1 Ninth Army, has been informed that no Armored reinforcements are available to Ninth Army at the present time.

8. For your information.

J. A. W.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP  
APO 655

15 December 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : General O'HARE.

1. Total replacements received by units, D Day to D+190 (13 Dec), were 320,635. This figure includes an original overstrength of 9,942 in the assault divisions and 15,482 excess basics. The remainder, 295,211, were new replacements and hospital returnees. Total understrength in Twelfth Army Group as of 2400 hours 13 December was 32,047. Therefore, total replacements actually required D Day to 13 December was 352,682.
2. Total division days, D Day to D+190 (13 Dec), were 3,989. Therefore, replacement requirements during this period have averaged 89 per division per day. (352,682 divided by 3,989)
3. The Replacement System is now attempting to give us a figure on total hospital returnees that have been shipped to our units since D Day. Figures on hospital returnees are available for period 23 Sept to 2 Dec and indicate that approximately 28% of total replacements received by our units during this period were hospital returnees.
4. On the assumption (based on experienced figures 23 Sep to 2 Dec) that 72% of total replacement requirements D Day to D+190 (13 Dec) were for new replacements, the average new replacement requirements per division per day during period D Day to 13 December were 64. (72% of 89)

J. A. W.

Headquarters,  
First US Army - G-1  
Ninth US Army - G-1

1. Following the conference held to-day between Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 Branch, First US Army and Ninth US Army and DAG, Hq 21 Army Group, it is confirmed that the procedure which will be followed in deciding the allocation of US Rfts allotted to 21 Army Group will be carried out in accordance with the paragraphs set out below.
2. SHAEF will be requested to instruct the Ground Forces Replacement Command to notify REAR HQ 21 Group ('A' Branch), the allocation of US Rfts for 21 Army Group. A copy of this allocation is to be sent to HQs First US Army and Ninth US Army by Ground Forces Replacement Command.
3. On receipt of the copy of the allocation, HQs first US Army and Ninth US Army will make allocation as between themselves of the available Rfts and HQ First Army will be responsible for co-ordinating the allocation and will notify Ground Forces Replacement Command of the allocation made and of the Replacement Depots to which Rfts will be dispatched. A copy of this allocation will be sent to REAR HQ 21 Army Group, 'A' and to HQ Ninth Army.
4. Ground Forces Replacement Command are being requested in all cases to issue the necessary orders for the Rfts to go forward in accordance with the allocation made by the Armies, without waiting for any concurrence from this HQ. However, should the C-in-C's instructions make any adjustments necessary or should Armies fail to agree, HQ 21 Army Group will notify Ground Forces Replacement Command and Armies of any necessary adjustment, or the final allocation, as the case may be.
5. In the event of HQ 21 Army Group considering that the allocation of US Rfts, as between 21 Army Group, 12 Army Group and 6 Army Group, is incorrect, reference will be made by HQ 21 Army Group to SHAEF for an adjustment. In such an event, Armies will be advised of the action taken by HQ 21 Army Group. It is requested that you will inform this HQ if you wish such reference to be made to SHAEF.
6. The following points were also discussed.
7. It is understood that the present Replacement Depots, serving with Armies, are respectively:  
No. 3 Replacement Depot, ST TROUDE serving with First US Army  
No. 18 Replacement Depot, TONGRES serving with Ninth US Army  
May this be confirmed.
8. With regard to armoured reinforcements, it is understood that at the moment, neither Armies have any appreciable number of Armoured Reinforcements. First US Army has an urgent need for at least 150, to form 30 tank crews. It was stated that First US Army has already spoken to 12 US Army Group on the subject and it was agreed that the DAG, HQ 21 Army Group would also send a signal to SHAEF also stressing the urgency of this demand and requesting that every effort should be made to find them. A Signal to the effect has been dispatched.
9. The question of casualty returns was discussed and it was agreed that the present return used by HQ 21 Army Group was sufficient. To

arrive at a basis for determining the numbers of Inf and Armd Def in Divisions it was accepted as an approximation that of the deficiencies shown

- (a) by Inf Div - up to 200 would be arms other than Inf - balance of Inf
  - (b) by Armd Div - 50% would be Inf and 50% would be Armd
- You agreed to inform this HQ as and when these approximations should be altered.

/s/ (P.J.D. REGESTER COL A(ORG)  
For Major General, IC Administration

R.E.R HQ 21 Army Group

B L a Copy to: SHAEF G(Ops) G(SD) Q(Plans)

WT Hq 21 Army Gp all Advisors 21 Army Group

Appendix 11

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP  
APO 655

21 March 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : General O'HARE

1. The attached chart (Incl No 1) was prepared to show graphically the reinforcement requirements of armies by arm or service by periods and also cumulatively.

2. Chart indicated that our Infantry requirements, D Day to 31 July, were 79.5% of the total. Previously an Infantry requirement factor of 63% had been developed after a study of reinforcement requisitions for period 18 June (D+12) to 19 August. However, adding the original overstrength of 10,000 in assault divisions and also the 25,000 reinforcements actually shipped against the initial automatic requisitions to the reinforcements requisitioned 18 June to 31 July has the effect of reducing the percent Infantry requirements to only 79.5% of the total. Since 31 July, this factor of 79.5% on Infantry has decreased slowly but continuously, and now for period D Day to 28 February 1945 we have an actual experienced Infantry factor of 73.7%.

3. This reduction in percent Infantry requirements has occurred principally during the months of December, January, and February. This decrease in percent Infantry can be explained principally by the fact that normal attrition requirements (of which Infantry amounts to only 63%) have steadily increased in numbers (not in rate of occurrence) due to increase in strength of this command. Therefore battle casualties, when represented as a percent of the total casualties, have generally decreased during months of December, January, and February (see Incl No 2) with the resulting effect that the Infantry percentage of the total reinforcement requirements has been lowered.

4. Armored requirements were highest during the months of August and September 1944, averaging about 6.5% of the total requirements for these two months. During January and February, however, armored requirements were only about 5% of the total.

5. Another pertinent point brought out by the attached chart (Incl No 1) is that the Engineer reinforcement requirements during months of December, January, and February have shown a marked increase. Prior to December, percent Engineer requirements averaged approximately 3% of the total monthly requirements. However, during December, January, and February Engineer requirements averaged approximately 5.8% of the total requirements during this period. This most probably was due to the increased number of bridging operations that were undertaken during these months.

6. Chart also indicates that TD requirements steadily increased from .6% for period D Day to 31 July to 1.7% for period D-Day to 28 February 1945.

7. For your information.

J.A.W.

HEADQUARTERS  
551st AUTO VPNS BN

APO 403  
10 February 1945

SUBJECT: Mishandling and Mistreatment of Ex-Combat Returnees and Reinforcements in the GFRS on the Continent.

TO : THE INSPECTOR GENERAL XX Corps, APO 340, U.S. Army

1. The undersigned recently spent one month in the GFRS enroute from a hospital in England to his organization. During that period he observed a great many instances of apparent negligent and wanton indifference to the needs, rights, and comforts of troops destined for combat. A few instances noted by the undersigned are given below.

2. It is my fixed opinion that a great number of WOLs may be traced directly to the treatment accorded men in the GFRS as well as a great number of sick cases. I further believe that the present method of handling combat returnees and reinforcements detracts measurably from their morale and resulting combat efficiency. I believe that, if inquiries are made among recently returned officers and men, that you will find enough like instances to cause an investigation of the entire system. I am firmly of the belief that no Division, Corps, or Army Commander would countenance such treatment of his wounded combat returnees if he were aware of the facts.

3. The following instances were observed at the 15th RD at Le Havre, France.

a. The packet to which I was attached landed at Le Havre, France in freezing weather on 14 January 1945. This packet, X-200-D, was entirely composed of sick and wounded combat returnees of the First, Third and Ninth United States Armies. They were marched four and a half miles up steep, icy covered hills and shown sagging, snow covered pyramidal tents and told off into them. These men had four blankets each. The tents were unheated and unfloored. No offer of cots or additional blankets was made. Finally, I demanded cots for the men. I was told that they would be issued if an officer would sign for them. An officer signed. I saw many stoves around this area as well as some knocked down sections of huts. Although the camp seemed well supplied with limited assignment personnel I observed no efforts to get stoves into the tents or erect huts.

b. For some reason, a great many of these men had not been paid. We were at Le Havre, France eight days and two PX rations were issued. In order that those men have rations, I spent approximately twenty-eight dollars (\$28.00) of my own money to obtain the rations. I do not begrudge this expenditure, but merely point out that some packets might have officers without funds.

c. Many groups of reinforcements, direct from the United States were marched up the steep, icy hill referred to above, under full equipment in the dead of night, given an allegedly hot meal of "C" Rations and dirty, boiled potatoes, and marched back down to the trains. I was never able to receive an explanation as to this absurd practice. The meals could have been served in the entraining area with little additional difficulty to the RD personnel.

d. The latrine facilities were filthy.

e. The following officers observed these instances as well as

many more:

Capt Charles Seton, Co "C", 26th Inf, 1st Div, APO 1,  
U. S. Army  
1st Lt J H Fields, Co "A", 10th Armd Inf Bn, 4th Armd Div,  
APO 254  
1st Lt Frank O Wilson, 84th Div Field Artillery

4. The following instances were observed at the 19th RD at Etampes, France. I was in the 179th Company. At this company there was, to my surprise, a separate mess for officers and indoor accomodations.

a. The barracks were poor. Many men were in tents. The food was only fair for the EM. The latrine facilities were poor.

b. At this particular company, the officers and EM attached as permanent personnel exhibited bullying characteristics toward transient returning combat personnel that I would not tolerate for a moment toward any type of personnel. 1st Lt J H Fields, referred to in par 3 c. above, and I heard both the company commander and the first sergeant threaten to "kick the shit" out of two very small soldiers who had been late in getting out of bed. As punishment, these men had been ordered to dig three holes, 2' x 2' x 2' in the frozen ground with no implements but a shovel. When one of the men in a polite and respectful voice demanded a court martial those bullying threats were resumed. From talks to other EM from this same depot, it appears that such bullying is general depot practice.

c. I saw no efforts made to improve the living conditions for the transient personnel, although a great number of Limited Assignment men were around, apparently doing nothing. Those men seem to be moved from depot to depot with no clear idea as to what they are to do. At the 17th Repl Depot at Metz, France, you may check this. An officer there stated to me that the 19th RD was constantly sending up LA men, who were only shipped back.

d. When the train on which I was shipped out was made up, men were marched many miles to the depot and then forced to stand in column of twos in the freezing weather for as much as two hours. The cars were in the station and ready to be loaded. Even after one group was moved through a subway to train side they were held up while a captain from the depot assembled all the officers of the train and proceeded to read, paragraph by paragraph, a movement SOP, interspersed with inane and vacuous comment. Any officer or group of officers with common sense would have seen to it that this orientation be accomplished much earlier and not at the train side.

e. The 17th RD will be able to confirm that these men were sent out with such a multiplicity of orders, no logical consolidation or grouping, as to make it almost impossible to tell in what group a man was in.

f. I could quote two personal incidents merely to show the indifference of the 19th RD personnel, but I will refrain except to say that I, a transient field officer, was treated with gross discourtesy by two lieutenant colonels probably junior to me. One of them was in the depot operations section. The other was the battalion commander of the battalion in which I was housed.

5. The misery of a long (51 hour) train ride in freezing weather, from Etampes, France, to Metz, France, was intense. It would seem that enough stoves and stove pipes could be obtained and placed in the cars to keep the soldiers of the richest nation in the world from freezing in the crowded box cars with no opportunity to exercise. As would be expected, men in each car attempted to make improvised stoves out of tin

cons. The resulting fumes added terrific headaches to the general misery. Almost the entire shipment contracted diarrhea as a result of the poor washing facilities set up with two kitchen cars attempting to feed 1500 men. One man was taken from the train with pneumonia. I have learned from a 9th Arm'd Div clearing station that several men that arrived on the train mentioned were evacuated for frost-bitten feet. I myself came down with a temperature of 102 the second day after my arrival.

6. The above mentioned instances were merely quoted as samples of the treatment of EM in Replacement Depots on the continent. I am sure that an investigation undertaken by you or your staff will uncover, from officers and EM in the XX Corps, enough examples of indifference, neglect, and even criminal carelessness in the GFRS to cause an investigation by the Inspector General.

/s/ Frank W. Ebey  
FRANK W. EBAY,  
Lt Col, 551st AAA Auto Wpns Bn,  
Commanding.

1st Ind

(10 Feb 45)

HEADQUARTERS XX CORPS, A.P.O. 340, U. S. Army, 11 February 1945.

TO: Commanding General, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, A.P.O. 887, U. S. Army. (Thru: Commanding General Third U.S. Army)

Forwarded for your information and such action as you deem advisable.

/s/ Walton H. Walker

WALTON H. WALKER

Major General, United States Army  
Commanding

AG 201.23 - GNMCI

2d Ind

(10 Feb 45)

HEADQUARTERS THIRD U.S. ARMY, APO 403, U.S. Army, 18 Feb 1945

Through: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U.S. Army.

1. The inconsiderate treatment reported in basic letter is similar to that set forth in a report from the 90th Infantry Division, which was forwarded by 1st Indorsement of this headquarters, 15 January 1945 (Incl 1).

2. It appears that the unsatisfactory conditions previously reported had not been corrected at the time Lieutenant Colonel Ebey passed through with the reinforcements.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ R. W. Hartman

R. W. HARTMAN

Lt. Col., A.G.D.

Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl - Copy 1st Ind, Hq Third US Army,  
dtd 15 Jan 45.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION  
Office of the Inspector General  
APO 9

333.5

29 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation - Replacements.

TO : Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, APO 9, US Army.

I. AUTHORITY:

1. This investigation was conducted pursuant to verbal instructions of the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, during the period 11-29 October 1944, by Lt. Col. Parker Parker, IGD, Inspector General, 9th Infantry Division, APO 9.

II. MATTER INVESTIGATED:

2. Replacements arriving at Casual Company, Rear Echelon, 9th Infantry Division, unfit for combat duty.

III. FACTS:

(Note: Figures in parenthesis at the end of each paragraph refer to supporting evidence, a list of which follows the last page of this report.)

3. Ninety-three out of 701 former members of the 9th Infantry Division who were returned from hospitals through the 3d Replacement Depot - 92d Replacement Battalion - during the period 25 September 1944-3 October 1944 - were unfit for combat duty, due to open wounds, wounds not properly healed, and from common injuries that could have been ascertained by proper screening of said enlisted men by the medical officers at the hospitals and in the replacement system. (1)

4. On 11, 13, and 14 October 1944, this Inspector General visited the dispensary, 9th Infantry Division Rear Echelon, for approximately one hour each day, for the purpose of observing the type of replacements received by this Division who requested medical aid. The Inspector General's stenographers took down verbatim the interview and diagnosis of the Assistant Division Surgeon and the patient. The thirteen men reported on in this investigation as typical examples at said sick call were obvious to any layman as being unfit for combat duty. Testimony of some of the returnees was that they had been returned by the 9th Division Surgeon to hospitals as unfit for duty only to be immediately returned by the hospitals as replacements to the 9th Infantry Division still unfit for duty. The Assistant Division Surgeon states in answer to the following question, "Are the cases that are coming to your attention obvious cases that should have been picked up by the hospital prior to the man's discharge?" "In the majority of the instances, yes." (2)

5. Casual personnel questioned on the above dates who were received from the United States through the replacement system, were found to be unfit for combat duty. The Assistant Division Surgeon states that this is common among casual replacements. (3)

6. On 9, 11, and 12 October 1944, the Division received a total of 619 replacements and 201 hospital returnees. There was issued to said replacements the following:

48	Blankets	1	Spoon
4	Belts, pistol	8	Shelter halves
4	Belts, rifle	7	Tent poles and pins
7	Canteens	16	Towels
6	Canteen covers	22	Pair underdrawers
2	Field jackets	36	Undershirts
7	Canteen cups	49	Entrenching tools
2	Forks	106	Pair overshoes
83	Handkerchiefs	67	Pair wool gloves
5	Helmet liners	1	Web belt
3	Knives	8	Raincoats
13	Pair leggins	6	Rifles
7	Mosskits	3	Shirts, OD
169	Ovorcoats	4	First aid packets
6	Packs	2	Shovel covers
2	Pair trousers, OD	30	Wool knit caps
6	Pair shoes	30	Bayonets
54	Pair socks		

The Commanding Officer of the Casual Company, 9th Infantry Division certifies that he was unable to fulfill all requirements of replacements and hospital casualties due to lack of sizes and unfilled requisitions by the Quartermaster. The 92d Replacement Battalion furnished these replacements. Due to the many deficiencies in the replacements received, a casual company had to be established for the purpose of screening replacements both for physical fitness and for shortage of equipment.  
(4)

7. On 25 July 1944, the Inspector General, 9th Infantry Division, submitted a report, Subject: "Investigation, Casual Company, 9th Infantry Division". Said report indicates that the Assistant Division Surgeon, 9th Infantry Division, was giving medical attention to 13 wounded in action and 30 battle injuries - returnees from hospitals - on 23 July 1944, who were assigned to the casual company. On 3 August 1944, a report was submitted to the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, on combat exhaustion cases returned to this Division by the 622d Medical Battalion. Of 40 cases whose medical history was investigated, five were found fit for duty and 35 were sent to the casual company for further treatment. On 3 August 1944, the Adjutant General, Lt. Col. W. L. Peverill, submitted a report to the Chief of Staff, 9th Infantry Division, which indicated that replacements on that date were short equipment and others were physically unfit for duty and were being held for further medical treatment in the casual company. This Inspector General has received verbal reports from Major Carr T. Larisey, Assistant Division Surgeon, 9th Infantry Division, during the campaign in France, Belgium, and Germany, on the lack of proper screening of replacements prior to receipt of said replacements at the casual company this Division, which indicate a laxity in the procedure at the various hospitals and replacement depots. (5)

8. A captain at the 85th Replacement Battalion, 19th Replacement Depot, sent an enlisted man to duty with an open wound, and stated to the enlisted man, in the presence of 1st Lt. Chester Braune Jr. and other enlisted men, that he had sent men to the front in much worse condition than he was. Lt. Braune, assigned to Company, E, 60th Infantry, APO 9, and who was originally assigned to the 9th Infantry Division on 1 April 1942, states that he would not accept said enlisted man as a combat soldier. (6)

#### IV. DISCUSSION:

9. Pvt John A. March 33927011, casual (US), Chronic kidney trouble to prior and after induction; was advised by the medical officer, 92d Replacement Battalion, to go on sick call when he reached the division;

no action was taken by the medical officer at the 92d Replacement Battalion.

10. Pvt William R. Humphreys, 34920544, Company A, 60th Infantry; Dermatitis, chronic, knees and buttocks; soldier had bandage on left knee which was placed there by a medical officer at the replacement depot. This was a chronic case and soldier should have been in the hospital. Any movement made by this man would cause suffering and pain.

11. Pvt Nicholas Raymond, 33672558, casual (US) - age 38<sup>1/2</sup>; Did not complete basic training due to chronic arthritis; has reported to medical officers continuously since induction.

12. Pvt Dudley L. Fish, 35705559, 9th Infantry Division: Soldier was hospitalized on 22 June 1944 as result of a march fracture. At the 93d General Hospital, England, soldier was equipped with shoe with external metatarsal bar. The 95d General Hospital discharged this soldier after equipping him with only one pair of shoes with the metatarsal bar. The hospital advised enlisted man that his unit would secure him additional shoes which required special fitting. Enlisted man joined his unit and in the mud the bar was lost from the shoe. Soldier is unfit for combat duty without bar. It is hard to understand why a general hospital would hold a man three weeks to secure a special shoe and at the same time not provide the man with extra shoes as required by regulations.

13. Pfc Alfred Di Boninico, 32760000, Company B, 60th Infantry: Hospitalized at 186th General Hospital as result of bullet wound in leg; sent to rehabilitation center; took hikes of two to three miles; went on sick call and informed medical officer of tightness of muscles; medical officer failed to look at leg; immediately thereafter put on shipment list to 10th Replacement Depot; went on sick call at 10th Replacement Depot; medical officer (1st Lt) stated "when you get to your organization they will take care of you there"; sent to 14th Replacement Depot; went on sick call, no action taken; sent to 3d Replacement Depot; went on sick call, received pills, was told that they could do nothing for him; arrived at 9th Infantry Division, Casual Company; Went on sick call and was evacuated to the 128th Evacuation Hospital, from there to the 91st Gas Treatment Battalion where he was examined by a medical officer (captain) who stated that he would send the soldier back and informed the soldier to report to the Surgeon, 9th Infantry Division, who would see that he was sent to the right place. Soldier reported to the 9th Infantry Division, was found unfit for combat duty, and was sent to the 92d Replacement Battalion and from there back to the 9th Infantry Division. Soldier was again examined at the 9th Infantry Division and found unfit for combat duty, the second time, and was evacuated to the 45th Evacuation Hospital.

14. Pvt John P. Thomas, 32934476, Company A, 39th Infantry Division; Wound, foot, mortar shell; hospitalized at 117th General Hospital; sent to rehabilitation center; reported to medical officer at rehabilitation center; transferred to 10th Replacement Depot; from there to Omaha Beach, where he saw a medical officer (captain) who told him that he could do nothing for him, that the best thing for him to do was to see his division surgeon; went on sick call a second time and was given pills. On arrival at the 9th Infantry Division, he was examined by the medical officer, who recommended complete rehabilitation.

15. Sgt Hall F. Stansill, 34831314, Company M, 60th Infantry: Returned from 45th Evacuation Hospital; examination revealed

dressed shrapnel wound, unhealed, three inches in length, right thigh.

16. Pvt John Palomas, 33465551, Company F, 39th Infantry: Returned from 5th General Hospital; blood pressure 170/30.

17. Pfc Albert Kotch, 53605566, Hq Co, 60th Infantry, and Pvt Thomas L. Graham, 55655257, Company K, 60th Infantry: Both men were returned from hospital for duty on 1 October 1944; they were returned to hospital for further treatment; they were again returned for duty on 15 October 1944, both stating that they had been to the 128th Evacuation Hospital and the 91st Gas Treatment Battalion. Both men were suffering from shrapnel wounds; one with painful scars, right thigh, and the other still had shrapnel in his right leg. The medical officers at the 91st Gas Treatment Battalion stated to the men that they could do nothing for them. These two men were evacuated to the 45th Evacuation Hospital on 14 October 1944 for reclassification and rehabilitation until fit for combat duty.

18. Pvt Frank A. Chiaradio, 33789285, Hq Co, 60th Infantry: Returned from 91st Gas Treatment Battalion; on examination at this division it was found that soldier was suffering from bronchitis, severe, with temperature. Soldier stated that at the time he was discharged from the hospital he was told that they only keep men there for ten days and return them. Soldier had been hospitalized at the 91st Gas Treatment Battalion as a result of bronchitis with temperature. Soldier was returned to 45th Evacuation Hospital for further treatment.

19. Sgt Harold M. Challistrum, 37571892, Company B, 60th Infantry: was hospitalized as result of sprained ankle and bad knee; was released from 91st Gas Treatment Battalion with bad knee; had bandage placed on knee by medical officer at 92d Replacement Battalion; was marked "duty" and sent to the 9th Infantry Division. Examination of knee at this Division revealed that man was unfit for combat duty. Soldier was evacuated to the 45th Evacuation Hospital for further treatment.

20. Pfc Cosmo Cammareri, 52820536: Soldier was hospitalized with temperature and bronchitis at 91st Gas Treatment Battalion. Soldier was returned to division; examination at division revealed (1) Hypertension, arterial, moderate severe, cause undetermined, blood pressure 178/85, and (2) Tachycardia, pulse 128, cause undetermined. (Soldier returned to 45th Evacuation Hospital).

21. The statement of Lt Jafferty, Commanding Officer, Casual Company 9th Infantry Division, indicates that replacements received through the 92d Replacement Battalion, 5d Replacement Depot, are not being properly equipped for combat, thereby causing a delay of from twelve to thirty-six hours in getting replacements to the line companies. The Inspector General has received complaints from the regiments stating that men were being received without proper equipment. Investigation reveals that this fact is true, but due to the limited supply kept on hand at the Quartermaster it is impossible at times to secure correct sizes to properly equip the individual soldier. Numerous cases have come to my attention personally of men being received at the Casual Company, 9th Infantry Division, without entrenching tools, rifles, shelter halves, and blankets.

22. The morale of the replacements received by this Division is considerably affected by the lack of equipment and the improper care given by medical officers to justifiable complaints. If an individual soldier goes on sick call at a replacement center

and is suffering from old injuries which are obvious it is the duty of the medical officer to evacuate that man to the nearest hospital unit and not direct the man to return to his unit and then see the division surgeon. As shown above, numerous men have been required to go through the replacement system two and three times suffering from the same injury.

V. CONCLUSIONS:

23. That investigation should be made of the treatment given the individual soldiers at the rehabilitation centers and in the replacement system, and that proper screening of individuals as to physical defects be made prior to permitting them to continue the chain of the replacement system.

24. Replacements received are not all properly equipped on the date received by this Division.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

25. It is recommended that this report be forwarded through command channels to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, for study and further investigation so that the deficiencies noted herein may be corrected.

/s/ Parker Parker  
PARKER PARKER  
1st Col, IGD  
Innovation General.

20 February 1945

MEMORANDUM :

TO : Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division  
APO 29, U. S. ARMY

Subject: Cadre for Training Reinforcements.

Itinerary of events:

Arrived at 36th Reinforcement Battalion 1030 hours, 3 February 1945, with instructions to report to Cadre Assignment Officer at 1330 hours for orientation and assignment. Following orientation, the 116th Infantry Cadre detail was assigned duty with the 45th Reinforcement Battalion. Transportation was provided promptly and at 1630 hours we arrived and reported to Training Officer at 45th Reinforcement Battalion. We were assigned to temporary quarters pending assignment to Training Company and on following day, 4 February 1945, attended an orientation by Col. Castle, Depot Training Officer. Information received at that time concerned, mainly, the effects of the changing tactical setup upon this particular Reinforcement system, and its resultant transfers of Battalions to new locations. This condition also served to limit the number of Reinforcements and Casuals passing through this specific Reinforcement Organization.

We were assigned to the 78th Reinforcement Battalion, but with a warning that it might be temporary, since the Battalion would probably be moved to forward areas, or, that if it did move, we might possibly go with it, or remain for a reassignment to another Battalion. The Battalion at that time possessed no Reinforcements for training. However, we did make frequent trips to the various Ranges and Training Areas for what familiarization we could achieve. On 6 February 1945, the Battalion did move to a forward area and we were re-assigned to the 448th Reinforcement Company at another location, and on the following day, assigned back to the 45th Battalion, 189th Company for training duties.

Conduct of Training:

I was assigned to Block No. 1 Training, consisting of "Individual Weapon Zeroing," Battle Presentation and Battle Medical Orientation. This Block also included a C. W. S. period which consisted of "Gas Mask Inspection" and a period of Gas Chamber instruction - handled by a Depot NCO. Each Reinforcement, or Casual, was allowed eight (8) rounds with which to zero his piece on a 1000 inch range - three rounds for triangulation, three rounds to correct sight deficiencies, two rounds to check sight alterations. Following this period came the C. W. S. instruction by Depot, which was well-presented and capable handled. We incorporated the Battle Presentation and Medical Orientation, first, in a question and answer period followed by a general covering of these subjects by lecture.

Comments:

In my opinion the Cadre Training Team method is one that achieves greater and more profound results than any other system yet devised. Reinforcements arriving at a Battalion on the way

to the Front, definitely appreciate the opportunity to obtain honest, straightforward information from officers and NCO's who have but recently returned from the Front. We found that their questions, if answered with sincere honesty, relieved their minds of a large amount of the haze and fear of combat. Their interest was avid and questions were sensible. This specific Reinforcement system is by far the finest of any I have seen.

/s/ Raymond F. Ferrari,  
RAYMOND F. FERRARI,  
1st Lieut., Q-1302087  
Co. "E", 116th Infantry

18 April 1945

Subject: Report on Temporary Duty with 18th Reinf. Depot APO 872  
U. S. Army.

To : Commanding General, 29th Inf Div., APO 29, U. S. Army.

1. Officers and non-commissioned officers of this unit were sent out to the various battalions of the depot upon arrival. The training of each of the battalions followed approximately the same pattern. Each officer supervised training of (1) of the (15) subjects which was presented the reinforcements. Non-commissioned officers were assigned as assistant instructors. The training was informal and gave the officers and non-commissioned officers much latitude to instruct in whatever phases of the subject they thought necessary for a man about to enter combat. This informal way of allowing an officer to present his subject makes it less difficult for him to present the subject. It was found that many of the reinforcements had received many false and sometimes even gruesome impressions of what they were about to face. Many of the men had received so-called combat advice from men who had fought under difficult conditions and different terrain than those men would face. Many of the men instructed had been given the impression that many German weapons are far superior to ours. Since I instructed on the machine gun, B.A.R. and enemy weapons I was able to disprove many of these beliefs by factual comparisons and allowing the men to fire our weapons and the German weapons so that they could draw their own conclusions.

2. Conclusion: I believe that this policy of sending training cadre back to train reinforcements should be continued for the following reasons:

a. To make known the latest combat tips to the reinforcements.

b. To disprove the belief that many of the men have that our riflemen do not stand a chance in combat.

c. To emphasize again that the training they have received, if properly applied, is their best insurance that they will survive the test.

### 3. Recommendations:

a. That some means be provided for acquiring more weapons, ammunition and training aids, especially German equipment so that our equipment can be compared with that of our enemies.

b. That more battle inoculation courses be installed at Reinforcement depots, in order that the men are allowed to take part in marching fire under cover of mortar and artillery fire if possible.

/s/ Thomas S. Maggio  
/t/ THOMAS S. MAGGIO  
1st Lt, 116th Inf.

COMPANY K, 116th INFANTRY  
APO 29, U. S. Army

21 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Report of Lt. Henderson on Training Reinforcements.

TO : Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division, APO 29, U. S. Army.

1. Upon arrival at the 36th Reinforcement Battalion on 3 January 1945, our men were billeted, fed, oriented and given passes for the afternoon and evening. The officers and non-commissioned officers were furnished guidos whose duties were to conduct us wherever our presence was required, and subsequently to assist in providing recreation for all who cared to participate. The following morning, January 4th, our group was sent to the 18th Reinforcement Depot with instructions to report to Lt. Col. Castle, 18th Depot training officer. Here having been billeted, fed and further oriented we were given the opportunity of meeting other personnel assigned to this same task from other divisions. Through the medium of discussion with the depot training officer and assistant training officer there was initiated the plan whereby the reinforcements would be indoctrinated to combat. Reinforcement personnel of this division were assigned to the 36th, 45th, and 97th Battalions as their sectors for training.

2. The training program was initiated with the attached charts as a guide, and with emphasis being placed on practical work and orientation as to the Ninth Army and its various components. All trainees were required to zero the weapons with which they were armed. In addition the following infantry weapons were discussed as to tactical use and were fired by the individual trainee: rifle grenade, rocket launcher, light machine gun, hand grenade and the automatic rifle. Orientation to the battle sound of enemy weapons was given the trainee by having them infiltrate positions under fire from enemy machine guns. Combat ranges embodying pertinent features of enemy tactics were established and used by trainees. A discussion was held of important medical and sanitary combat principles, stressing proper care of the feet and purification of drinking water. Battlefield preservation was emphasized throughout discussion periods at which the men were given the advantage of battle experiences and combat tips of veterans. Sufficient check of individual physical stamina was made through marches to and from training area.

3. The value of contact, exchange of views and experiences by members of the cadre from various divisions represented cannot be overestimated. In addition the opportunity afforded of relaxing from actual combat for a short while is a decided morale factor to the men on these cadres.

4. This training program is planned and put into operation by Lt. Col. Robert E. Castle, 18th Depot training officer and Captain George W. Smith, 18th Depot assistant training officer. At all times they rendered all possible aid to the training cadre and to S-3's of the reinforcement battalion.

5. The following personnel of this division were, in my opinion, outstanding in their work on this training program:

1st Lt. JOHN S. INSLEY, O2041021 - 175th Infantry

S/Sgt. Donald F. Smith, 32027045 - 175th Infantry  
S/Sgt. Robert E. Lubin, 31247216 - 175th Infantry  
S/Sgt. Hugo R. Desantis, 33486652 - 116th Infantry  
S/Sgt. Howard J. Wimsky, 36378671 - 116th Infantry

6. The basic soundness of this training program has been attested by the officers assigned to this task. Being in a formative stage the program is meeting many problems the solution of which will greatly enhance its effectiveness. In view of those continued improvements it is my opinion that the effectiveness of this program is beyond question. It is recommended that very close coordination between division training centers and 18th Depot training staff be maintained in order to eliminate duplication of effort which is now obvious. It is recommended that the facilities of the 29th Division Recreation Center be afforded the men of this Division that are on cadre to the 36th Battalion which is adjacent to this Center.

/s/ Walter A. Henderson  
/t/ WALTER A. HENDERSON,  
1st Lieutenant,  
Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS XII CORPS  
APO 312, U.S. Army

AG 372.2 (G-1)

29 November 1944

SUBJECT: Replacement System Service.

TO : Commanding General, Ground Force Replacement System, AFO 887,  
U. S. Army.

THU : Commanding General, Third United States Army, AFO 403, U.S. Army.

1. Reference your letter of 9 November 1944 asking for suggestions for improvement of replacement procedures, the following observations are submitted:

a. The present policy of requisitioning replacements forty-eight hours in advance of losses appears theoretically to be an appropriate procedure to permit getting replacements to units the day following the losses. Its successful application naturally depends, however, upon an adequate flow from the replacement battalion.

b. Replacements and RTDs are arriving at units with scattered shortages of essential equipment needed for combat. Shortages include entrenching tools, bayonets and scabbards, ammunition, shelter halves, mess equipment, overshoes, sleeping bags and sweaters. Shortages of equipment delay getting replacements into front line action, and place additional burden upon front line supply and transportation facilities. Recommend all possible steps be taken to insure all replacements and RTDs be fully equipped and equipment checked before being dispatched to units.

c. The importance of reclaiming and returning personnel to duty with their former organization cannot be overemphasized. Present policy of returning RTDs only when their specific specialties appear on current requisitions retards their return to units. Recommend that all RTDs upon discharge from hospitals be returned through the replacement system to their former units as expeditiously as possible without requisition.

d. It has been found that the quality of some officer replacements has been sub-standard. This situation has been alleviated, in part, by making as many battle-field appointments as possible. Many replacement officers are lacking in such fundamentals as map reading, knowledge of weapons and vehicles, and general principles of leadership. In many instances captains with little or no command experience have been substituted for 2nd lieutenants. It is extremely difficult to assimilate these officers in combat units. It is recommended that very careful consideration be given to officer qualifications in higher grades before substituting them for 2nd lieutenants on replacement requisitions.

e. The practice of processing replacements and RTDs together has a tendency to lower the morale of replacements, since in their fraternization the RTDs are apt to exaggerate the dangers of battle. Recommends that insofar as practicable, replacements and RTDs be processed separately.

f. Many replacements who have not been paid for long periods of time have been received by units of this command. Others are arriving with sizable amounts of American and English money in their possession. These factors place an unnecessary administrative burden upon the unit administrative centers and thus slow the assignment of replacements. Recommend that payment of replacements, change of money to appropriate currency, and advice on PTT advantages be accomplished in replacement depots prior to shipment forward.

g. Instances have occurred where replacements have been shipped to the replacement battalion minus their service records, forms 32, forms 20 and other allied papers. Due to the exigencies of operations this personnel has been applied against current replacement requisitions. This procedure throws an additional administrative burden on both the replacement battalion and the unit concerned. It also lends to improper assignment and a general lowering of the morale of the individual replacement. Recommend that no replacement be dispatched to replacement battalion for reassignment without complete set of individual records.

h. Categories of personnel in which this command has experienced difficulty obtaining reas follows: Riflemen (745), Automatic Riflemen (746), Mortar Gunners (607), Gunners LMG (604), Tank Drivers (736), Radio Operators LS (776), Litter Bearers (657), Medical Technicians (409), Surgical Technicians (P61), Bridge Builders (035), Carpenters (050), and Riggers (189). Recommend every effort be made to procure personnel of the above listed specialties.

2. Recapitulation of recommendations:

a. That all replacements and RTDs be fully equipped with necessary items of clothing and equipment before being dispatched to units.

b. That all RTDs upon discharge from hospitals be returned, through the replacement system, to their former units.

c. That very careful consideration be given when substituting officers in higher grades for 2nd lieutenants.

d. That insofar as practicable replacements and RTDs be processed separately.

e. That payment of replacements, change of money to appropriate currency and advice of PTT advantages be accomplished in replacement depots prior to shipment forward.

f. That no replacement be dispatched to replacement battalion without complete set of individual records.

g. That every effort be made to procure categories of specialists listed in paragraph 1 h above.

3. The magnitude of procurement, distribution and allocation of personnel by the Ground Force Replacement System is fully appreciated by this headquarters. The opinion of the Corps Commander is that, subject to the constructive criticisms advanced in this letter and prior to November 18, the Replacement System has functioned most satisfactorily. Since November, the stoppage of a normal flow of replacements has caused him grave concern which he has expressed strongly to the Third Army Commander.

For the Commanding General:

Copies:

Twelfth Army Group

HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
Office of the Chief of Staff

11 March 1945

353

SUBJECT: Indoctrination.

TO : Commanding General, 12th Army Group, APO 655, U.S. Army.

It has been noted with concern the fact that many reinforcements have, in the past, gone into combat without complete indoctrination prior to joining their units.

The manner in which a soldier is introduced into combat often determines whether he becomes an efficient fighter or an early casualty. To assure that each reinforcement will become an asset to his unit, it is essential that he enter combat fully acquainted with his division, his company, his leaders, his weapon, and his job. Several Divisions are preparing and following programs designed to achieve this end. A careful study of the orientation problem has been made and it is suggested that the following procedure be set up within your Division, if such procedure is not already in effect.

A provisional indoctrination unit should be formed in each division. This indoctrination unit should include at least one officer and one noncommissioned officer assistant from division headquarters, one officer from each battalion and one noncommissioned officer from each company. This should be a flexible organization utilizing only those battalion and company representatives which are scheduled to receive reinforcements. On notification by the reinforcement battalion that a requisition for reinforcements is about to be filled, the division indoctrination unit should pick up the reinforcements at the reinforcement battalion headquarters. Reinforcements should be inspected to insure that they are properly clothed and equipped. Provisions for correction of any deficiencies will be assured before each individual reinforcement is accepted. The reinforcement should then be taken by the division representatives to suitable division assembly area or areas. Here the new reinforcement should receive a minimum of 48 hours orientation instruction. During this time it is desirable to have the men grouped in accordance with their unit assignment so that the individual reinforcement can become acquainted with the men with whom he will serve. The provisional indoctrination unit should be utilized to carry on the division orientation and indoctrination instruction and to acquaint the reinforcement with his immediate future. It is highly desirable that the division commander personally welcome the reinforcements. In the event that he is not available, an appropriate division officer, preferably the Assistant Division Commander, Artillery Officer of Staff should perform this duty. In like manner, they should be addressed by the commanding officer or executive officer of each echelon through which the reinforcements pass.

The Ground Force Reinforcement Command is being instructed to train and ship reinforcements in platoon and squad units and groups of four with the view of assigning them to the same organization.

There is attached herewith a schedule of indoctrination which has been developed in the field and proven successful, and also a copy of a very fine program of training new reinforcements as adopted by the 36th Infantry Division.

By command of General LISLE HOWE:

/s/ T. B. Smith  
/t/ T. B. Smith,  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Chief of Staff

2 Incls:

- 1-Schedule of Indoctrination
- 2-Training Memo #3, 36th Inf Div.

Appendix 19.

HEADQUARTERS 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO #36, U. S. Army

15 February 1945

TRAINING MEMORANDUM

NO

3

SOP - TRAINING OF REINFORCEMENTS

1. a. When an infantry regiment receives or accumulates twenty-five or more reinforcements, the following program of instruction and orientation will be carried on within each infantry regiment.

b. Reinforcements must not be rushed into battle no matter how badly men are needed. They must be given a period of training and join their companies during a time when the unit is in reserve. Only in this way will they learn their leaders, become acquainted with the other men of their platoon, and learn their own specific duties in the fighting squad team.

2. a. Training will be conducted in the vicinity of the regimental rear areas. The Reinforcement Training Commander, and such assistants as he may need, will be designated by Regimental Commander, and should be a specially selected officer who will be rotated on the job.

b. Instructors will be taken from qualified rifle and machine-gun company NCO's.

c. Overhead for messing, quartering, supply will be provided by Regimental Service Company. Administrative and clerical details will be handled by Regimental S-1.

3. a. Where practicable, the reinforcements will be met and welcomed by Regimental Commander or Executive Officer. In all cases, Regimental Commander will make a talk to each group sometime during their training.

b. Hot food and quarters will be available immediately on arrival of each group of reinforcements. Immediate steps will be taken to fill deficiencies in clothing, weapons, and equipment of new men and to give them a complete physical check.

c. Each man will be given a personal interview and his MOS number and Form 20 checked against his statements and previous service. Special qualifications, or deficiencies, mental or physical, will be noted.

4. Training will be conducted over a period of eight (8) days and will include the following subjects:

HOURLY

a. General Orientation. Welcome; reason for training, rules of training center; history of unit, pride in unit; debutting war stories security; no fraternization; what to say if captured.

b. Disciplinary and Physical Training. Physical training 5 and neatness; bayonet training; discipline; physical hardening games.

c. Marches and March Discipline. Distance between men; use of sides of road; no smoking and no lights at night; no straggling; maintaining contact; passing word up and down column; carrying of pack and equipment.

d. German Soldier. Wehrmacht; SS Panzer; Volksgrenadier; 1 Volksturm; weapons and uniform; interrogation and handling of prisoners; crack and thump.

e. Field Sanitation. Personal cleanliness; shaving, washing; bathing; trench foot; latrines; foxhole living; C, K, and U Nations; individual cooking; handling of casualties.

f. Weapons. 24

g. Scouting and Patrolling. Including 6 hours night work; creeping and crawling. 12

h. Ground Tactics. 6

i. Mines and Booby Traps (Practical) 1

j. Village Fighting. 4

k. Gas Mask 1

l. Construction and Camouflage of foxholes and Gun Positions, Including Overhead Cover. 2

m. Medical Conference. 1

n. Division Components and Attachments. Visit Artillery, 2 Tank Destroyer and Tank Units.

o. Night Attack.

5. Reinforcements will be encouraged to ask questions and to talk informally with the instructors. In the evening, when not otherwise engaged, each instructor should be prepared to give one or more of his battle experiences. These should be checked by the Training Center Commander. They should illustrate some tactical lesson but must not, repeat not, exaggerate the dangers or hardships of combat. Stories about "outfit being wiped out", pinned down all day", or enormous casualties will be rigorously censored. No men will be impressed with the absolute necessity of staying with their outfit and fighting like hell no matter what happens. He must be indoctrinated with the idea that he cannot let his buddies down by quitting or falling back.

6. Common reinforcement faults which must be overcome are:

a. Every artillery shell makes him jump, stop, and hit the dirt.

b. He is slow to shoot. He has been told to hold his fire, until he has a definite target and not to give away his position. This is wrong. If you see, or suspect the enemy, shoot him whether you give away your position or not.

c. His physical condition is not good.

d. He lacks pride. Do not let him feel like a bastard at a family reunion.

- e. He is a buncher. Insist on proper dispersion.
- f. He will not move forward,
- g. He will not take care of his equipment.
- h. He has no knowledge of combat sanitation.
- i. Has a poor idea of what constitutes adequate protection in Field Fortifications.
- j. Doesn't know what to do when fired on except to hit the dirt.

By command of Major General DAHLQUIST:

JOHN L. ALBRIGHT  
Colonel, General Staff Corps  
Chief of Staff

HARRY B KELTON  
Lt Col, Adjutant General's Department  
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION "A"

Appendix 191

SCHEDULE FOR INDOCTRINATION COURSE  
FIRST DAY

Duration	ACTIVITY	TYPE OF ACTIVITY	MATERIALS	CONDUCTED BY
1/2 Hour	Introductory Remarks (Welcome)	Talk	None	CG, or his Representative
1 Hour	Inspection of Equipment	Inspection	Individual Equipment	Provisional Indoctrination Unit
2 Hours	Inspection of Training	Inspection	Individual Weapons	Provisional Indoctrination Unit
1/2 Hour	History of Division	Conference	Written history (1 copy to each Unit) Reinforcement	Provisional Indoctrination Unit
1 Hour	Situation-Army, Corps, and Division Front & Missions	Conference	Situation Maps	Provisional Indoctrination Unit
1 Hour	Combat Hygiene (Precautions against French Foot, use of fires, water, food, sanitation)	Conference	Displays	Provisional Indoctrination Unit
2 Hours	Combat Orientation (Chain of command, relations with civilians, straggling, malingering, etc.)	Conference	None	Provisional Indoctrination Unit

SUMMARY OF REINFORCEMENT BRANCH'S MAJOR ACTIVITIES  
OCTOBER 1943 TO 1 JUNE 1945

1. Plans for reinforcements for Operation "Overlord" were prepared by the Reinforcement Branch and published in Headquarters First U. S. Army Group's Joint Administrative Plan dated 19 April 1944. One of the principal points established by this plan was that one reinforcement battalion (separate) would be established on the continent for and in close support of each Army Corps as directed by the Army concerned, and further that one reinforcement depot for each Army would be established on the continent as early as practicable to operate under Army control.

2. Based on operational plans, an estimate of the reinforcement requirements for the Ground Forces for period D Day to D + 209 was submitted to Theater Headquarters on 27 March 1944. This estimate was the primary basis on which Theater established the required monthly reinforcement flow from the ZI to support operation "Overlord". Using this 27 March estimate of reinforcement requirements, together with the Surgeon's estimate of the evacuation policy on the continent, the Reinforcement Branch computed the personnel shipping lift required daily for shipping reinforcements to the far shore during the period D + 15 to D + 41, and later for period D + 41 to D + 89. These estimates of the daily personnel lift required for reinforcements were submitted to G-3 for incorporation in the shipping priority tables.

3. The Reinforcement Branch was primarily concerned with securing an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements of the appropriate arms and services to Armies in order to maintain units at T/O strength at all times. After the invasion of the continent, in order to help effect this uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, estimates of battle reinforcement requirements for six months in advance based on actual experience loss rates, Ground Forces troop build-up, and future operational plans were submitted monthly to Theater Headquarters.

4. On 4 June 1944, Theater Headquarters designated the Commanding General, First U. S. Army Group, as being responsible for determining and announcing the allocations and priorities on reinforcements for the Ground Force units. On 6 June, First U. S. Army Group published its first priorities by which the Ground Force Reinforcement Command would furnish reinforcements to the U. S. Ground Force major commands.

5. Up until November, 1944, when the supply of Infantry enlisted reinforcements became critically low, it was not necessary to make specific allocations of reinforcements by numbers to the various Armies. There was time, however, around the middle of July when the supply of Infantry Riflemen reinforcements became critically low, but this situation was soon alleviated by Infantry reinforcement arrivals from the ZI; however, upon recommendations from First Army and 12th Army Group, Theater Headquarters took immediate steps to requisition 28,000 Infantry Riflemen reinforcements for immediate shipment to this Theater, and changed the September reinforcement flow from the ZI so as to be composed of 85% Infantry, of which 70% would be Infantry Riflemen. Reinforcement allocations made by this headquarters to the Armies were based on a number of factors, such as current personnel shortages, reinforcement stockage in Army Depots, estimated flow of hospital returnees to each Army, and future tactical requirements as determined by G-3.

By 15 December the Infantry Riflemen shortage had reached the figure of 17,581 in 12th Army Group. The critical nature of this

riflemen shortage was brought to the Theater Commander's attention by the Army Group Commander just prior to the German Ardennes offensive in mid-December, with specific recommendations as to corrective measures that should be taken immediately. The AC of S., G-1, and Chief of the Reinforcement Branch, G-1 Section, this headquarters, were members of a group from this Theater who went to the War Department in the latter part of December in order to point out the serious nature of the reinforcement situation in this Theater at that time, and further, to do everything possible to increase and expedite the flow of Infantry and Armored reinforcements to this Theater. As a result of this Washington conference, the supply of Infantry reinforcements was greatly improved in the latter part of January and in the months that followed.

7. The Infantry conversion training program established by Theater Headquarters retrained only general assignment personnel furnished by Com Z and Air Force units. Although 12th Army Group submitted the required reports to HQ ETOUSA showing number of personnel eligible in non-combat units for this Infantry conversion training, no quotas were ever given to this command for this conversion training, and consequently no personnel were turned in to the Ground Force Reinforcement Command for this purpose.

8. Quotas for the Infantry Officer Candidate School, the school giving fundamental training to Infantry lieutenants appointed in combat, and the refresher training course for 2nd and 1st Lieutenants in branches other than Infantry (all established by Theater Headquarters in the latter part of January 1945) were received by 12th Army Group and were in turn allotted to the Armies.

9. Based primarily on Armies' analyses by arm and service of their reinforcement requisitions, the Reinforcement Branch determined the desired percentage composition by arm and service of the reinforcements to be furnished for the Ground Forces. This information was required by Theater Headquarters who looked to this headquarters for the arm and service distribution desired on reinforcements for the Ground Forces.

10. Another important function of the Reinforcement Branch was the co-ordination of reinforcement procedures between the Armies, Headquarters Ground Force Reinforcement Command, and Theater Headquarters. When deficiencies were noted in the established reinforcement procedures, 12th Army Group made recommendations to improve the situation.

11. Although initially the Army Depot and Forward Battalions were under Army Control, this system of command and control changed to the extent that in October, 1944, all of the Army Depots and Forward Battalions were under the control of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command.

12. Around the latter part of August the flow of hospital returns greatly exceeded the demands for personnel from the units due to the comparatively light fighting at that time. Therefore, in order to give the Ground Force Reinforcement Command a guide for returning this personnel to their former units, 12th Army Group established priorities for return of this personnel, based on the principle of giving preference to those particular individuals from an organization who had served the greatest length of time as members of that organization.

13. Upon recommendation from 12th Army Group in November, 1944, Theater Headquarters established the policy whereby units actually engaged in combat could requisition reinforcements, based on estimated

losses, 48 hours in advance. This policy was later rescinded after establishment of the policy of automatic return of hospital returnees.

14. During March, 1945, 12th Army Group received 33 provisionally organized rifle platoons composed of colored enlisted personnel that had been retrained as Infantry Riflemen. These platoons were assigned initially on the basis of one platoon per rifle company and not more than three platoons per division.

15. In order to conserve manpower and also to give the soldier in the front line units a much needed break through rotation to a rear area job, a policy was established in the middle of March 1945, whereby over 90% of the personnel returning to the ZI monthly for 45 days rest, relaxation and recuperation would be from lettered companies of Infantry and other personnel who were habitually in close contact with the enemy over long period of time.

16. Quotas for return of personnel to the ZI under provisions of War Department Readjustment Regulations 1-2 were received by 12th Army Group Headquarters from Theater Headquarters and were allocated to the Armies of this command and to Special Troops, this headquarters, on the basis of the number of personnel in each command having ASR scores of 85 and above.

Appendix 20.

HEADQUARTERS  
17TH REPLACEMENT DEPOT  
GFRG - FUR T OF OPNS  
APO 673 - U S ARMY

DEPOT REGULATIONS )

5 November 1944

NUMBER 65-2 )

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE  
FOR THE RECEIPT, PROCESSING AND SHIPMENT OF TROOPS  
(Those Regulations supersede all Replacement Detachment Memoranda (No 1 thru 12) and DR 65-2, 1 Oct 44)

SECTION I. GENERAL

1. The procedure provided herein will govern the receipt, processing and shipment of replacements and curs by the 17th Replacement Depot.
2. Forward battalions are authorized to modify the procedure in so far as required to meet operational requirements.
3. It is the policy of the Depot Commander that all personnel leaving units of this command be completely equipped, paid, clean and in the best possible condition for combat.

SECTION II - INCOMING

1. Movement of troops from detrucking and detraining points to battalions. Troops will be moved from detrucking or detraining points to the battalion area in accordance with instructions contained in Depot Regulations #65-1.
2. Assignment to Companies. Upon receipt of a Troop Arrival Forecast the battalion commander will allocate and attach the troops involved to one or more companies of his battalion. Insofar as practicable, incoming groups and detachments will be billeted and kept together.
3. Assignment to Platoons. Company commanders will allocate and attach groups and detachments to platoons of his company. Insofar as practicable, incoming groups and detachments will be billeted and kept together to maintain segregation and control.
4. Brief orientation by platoon commander or platoon sergeant. Immediately upon arrival in the platoon area the platoon commander or the platoon sergeant will briefly orient the incoming troops with regard to the following:

- a. Organization to which attached. Names of platoon and company commanders.
- b. Immediate processing activities.

- c. Location of orderly room, mess area, bathing and laundry facilities.

This orientation talk should include essential points, briefly and concisely stated, and will be limited to three (3) minutes.

5. Completion of Company Locator Cards and other forms if necessary. Immediately upon completion of the brief orientation Appendix A1.

talk, Company Locator Cards will be completed by each officer and soldier under the supervision of designated personnel from the battalion personnel section. In those cases where WD AGC Forms #20 and #66-1 are absent, preparation of temporary forms will be prescribed by the Depot Commander. (See Annex "A").

6. Hot meal to be served. Immediately upon completion of locator cards and forms prescribed in paragraph 5 above, troops will be marched to the company mess area for serving of a hot meal. Mess kits will be issued at that point to those incoming personnel who do not have them. It is the expressed desire of the Depot Commander that adequate provisions be made to feed all incoming troops a full, hot meal as quickly as possible after arrival in the battalion area.

7. Showdown inspection of individual clothing and equipment. As soon as practicable after the serving of a hot meal, a showdown inspection of individual clothing and equipment will be held to determine deficiencies. Deficiencies include both shortages and unserviceable clothing and equipment. Shortages will be determined on the basis of current T/E of individual clothing and equipment as promulgated from time to time by the Depot Commander. (Depot Regulations Base No. 70).

a. During the showdown inspection all live ammunition will be taken up and will thereafter be turned in to the Depot Ordnance Officer. (Reference: Depot Regulations #65-3).

b. Requisition for individual clothing and equipment to cover deficiencies revealed at the showdown inspection will be submitted to Depot S-4 immediately after the inspection in order that items may be obtained and issued to troops without delay. Requisition forms will be used as follows:

(1) For replacements belonging to NUMBERED REPLACEMENT DETACHMENTS special form "Showdown Requisition, 17th Replacement Depot (S-4)" will be used.

(2) For replacements NOT belonging to numbered replacement detachments and for casuals, WD QMC Form #400 will be used.

c. Casuals destined for return to units serviced by this Depot will be issued individual clothing and equipment in accordance with current T/E as promulgated by the Depot Commander. (Depot Regulations Base No. 70)

d. Casuals destined to be returned to units not being serviced by this Depot will be issued sufficient individual clothing and equipment to provide necessary items for the proper appearance and comfort of the individual as prescribed by the Depot Commander. (Depot Regulations Base No. 70).

e. Weapons will be issued to replacements and casuals destined to return to units being serviced by this Depot on the basis of the individual's MOS number. Weapons will be zeroed by the individual as soon as practicable, and before departure from this Depot.

f. Battalion commanders will determine units being served and those not being served by this Depot on the basis of information extracted from current station lists.

8. Verification of records: S-1 procedure.

a. When personnel arrive with no rosters, no orders and no records.

(1) Company locator cards and temporary Forms #20 and/or #66-1 will have been completed as provided in paragraph 5 above.

(2) The battalion personnel officer is responsible for the prompt completion of new WD AGO Form #24.

b. When personnel arrive with rosters or orders, but no records.

(1) Rosters or orders will be used for roll call and physical verification of presence of individuals.

(2) For completion of records see paragraph 8a(1) (2).

c. When personnel arrive with rosters or orders and with records.

(1) Roll call will be held to check physical presence of men listed thereon.

(2) Rosters or orders, corrected as a result of the roll call, will be checked against the WD AGO Forms #20, #24, and #66-1.

d. Payment of personnel. (Depot Regulations Base No. 35)

(1) Upon completion of verification of records as prescribed in paragraph 8a, b and c, payrolls will be prepared without delay for full and complete payment of each enlisted man as of the last day of the preceding month.

(2) In cases of troop arrivals late in the month, payrolls will be promptly prepared for the payment of such personnel in full up to and including the last day of the current month.

(3) In each case where payment to an individual is not made, the reason therefore will be entered in ink on the retained copy of the payroll in the space provided for his signature and such notation will be initialed in ink by the agent finance officer.

(4) The battalion personnel officer will check WD AGO Form #77 (Officer's Pay Data Card) and prepare Officer's Individual Pay Voucher in all cases where officers have not been paid up to and including the last day of the preceding month.

(5) At the request of the individual, individual pay vouchers and payrolls will be prepared for partial payments with the consent of the Depot Commander.

(6) In the case of the enlisted man, all full or partial payments will be entered in the Service Record (WD AGO Form #24).

(7) In the case of officers, all partial payments will be entered on the officers Pay Data Card (WD AGO Form No. 77) by the finance officer.

9. Postal Division Locator Cards. (Not applicable to casuals) Within twelve (12) hours after arrival, each replacement will be required to complete four (4) "Change of Address" forms (Postal Division Form - Series 46), and disposition of same will be made in accordance with current regulations (Reference: Letter, Headquarters, 17th Replacement Depot, file 311.1, subject: "Change of address cards for Replacements", dated 2 October 1944).

10. Physical Inspection. At the earliest practicable time, battalion medical officer will make a physical inspection of each incoming officer and enlisted man for vermin infestation and communicable disease as prescribed by Army Regulations.

11. Orientation Lecture. (S-2). The battalion commander is responsible for the presentation of the Standard Orientation Lecture as prescribed by the Depot Commander (S-2). The battalion commander will designate time, place and officer to give the lecture.

12. Personal Hygiene and Cleaning of Clothing and Equipment. When the above processing has been completed, battalion commanders will provide necessary facilities and time to enable each officer and enlisted man to wash and clean his individual clothing and equipment, bathe and shave, and to obtain a haircut. When a single bathing or washing area is prescribed by the Depot Commander, schedules for bathing and washing will be observed as prescribed by Depot Regulations #65-4. Battalion and company commanders will hold such inspections as necessary to insure maintenance of highest standards of neatness and cleanliness on the part of all personnel.

#### 13. Training.

a. If the above processing is completed before the end of the normal 48 hour processing period, battalion commanders will initiate a training program which will stress physical conditioning. This program will include organized athletics, calisthenics as prescribed in WD Training Circular #87, dated 17 November 1942 and road marches.

b. At the end of the 48 hour processing period, battalion commanders will place all personnel into the standard training program as prescribed by current Depot Regulations, Base No. 60.

#### 14. Reports.

a. Immediately upon completion of the processing of a shipment consisting of fifteen (15) or more replacements or casuals from a rear Depot, battalion commanders will submit a consolidated report of findings to the Depot Commander, concerning the following:

- (1) Personnel received (including a notation as to the replacement detachment number if any).
- (2) Deficiencies in individual clothing and equipment.
- (3) Pay status of personnel upon arrival.
- (4) Personal hygiene and appearance of clothing and equipment.
- (5) Deficiencies in records.

b. This report will be submitted on the form prescribed by the Depot Commander. (Form #175. See Annex "B").

### SECTION III - OUTGOING

#### Issuance of Orders.

a. Depot S-1. When requisitions have been approved, the Depot S-1 will initiate proceedings for placing personnel for shipment to receiving units on orders.

(1) WD AGO Forms #20 and #66-1 or Temporary Forms #20 and #66-1 will be assembled and from them the necessary orders will be prepared.

(2) Copies of these orders will be given immediate normal distributions by the Depot message center. Special distributions will be made through message center as follows:

(a) Depot S-3 - 8 copies.

(b) Shipping Battalion - 15 copies.

#### 2. Preparation of Shipment.

a. Action to be taken by Battalion Personnel Officer.

(1) Upon receipt of shipping orders the Battalion Personnel Officer will take the following action:

(a) Complete all entries in WD AGO Form #24 or Temporary Form #24.

(b) Assemble above forms together with allied papers according to paragraph number for each TO or SO. Allied papers will include WD AGO Form #32, supplemental Form #32 and GFRS Form #8.

(c) Notify Battalion Troop Movement Officer when records are complete and available for shipment for each paragraph and TO or SO number.

b. Action of Battalion Troop Movement Officer.

(1) Upon receipt of shipping orders the Battalion Troop Movement Officer will immediately determine status of availability of all personnel listed on the orders.

(2) At 0900, 1400 and 1700 hours daily the Battalion Troop Movement Officer will report to the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) what personnel indicated by paragraph and TO or SO number have become available since the last report.

c. Action of Depot S-3. When shipping orders are received, the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) will prepare a consolidation of personnel to be shipped for each receiving unit. This consolidation will be indicated by listing each paragraph and TO or SO number, the shipping unit and total number of personnel for each paragraph number.

#### 3. Shipment Alert.

a. Action of Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer).

(1) When personnel and records become available as reported by the battalion Troop Movement Officer the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) will take the following action:

(a) Determine departure time for groups consolidated by paragraph and TO or SO number for each receiving unit.

(b) Transmit to the Battalion Troop Movement Officer the following information:

1. Personnel to be shipped (paragraph and TO or SO numbers.)
2. Time for troops to be at assembly area.
3. Time of departure.
4. Rations required for each man.
5. Location of assembly area.

(2) The following information will be transmitted to Depot S-1 (Records Section):

(a) Personnel to be shipped (Paragraph and TO or SO numbers).

(b) Shipping time.

(c) Location of assembly area.

b. Action of Depot S-1 (Records Section).

(1) When the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) notifies the Records Section of a pending shipment, the Records Section will assemble all records (WD AGO Forms #20 and #66-1 or Temporary Forms #20 and #66-1) together with the required number of shipping orders for each shipment group.

c. Action of the Battalion Troop Movement Officer.

(1) When the Battalion Troop Movement Officer has received information that a shipment is to be made he will notify the Battalion Personnel Officer and all Companies who have personnel to be shipped.

d. Action by Battalion Personnel Officer.

(1) When the Battalion Personnel Officer has received information concerning an anticipated shipment he will accumulate all records for each shipment, (these records will include WD AGO Form #24, or Temporary Form #24, Form #32, Supplemental Form #32, MD Form #81 and GFRS Form #8.)

4. Organization and Inspection of Shipment.

a. When a Company receives information of a pending shipment, the Company Commander will:

(1) Make an inspection to see that all personnel are properly equipped and have the proper uniform for shipment.

(2) Issue rations (type "C" or "K") as prescribed by the Depot.

(3) Organize the troops in roster order and march them to the area prescribed by the Battalion Commander for final check and inspection.

b. When troops have been assembled at the location as designated in paragraph 4a(3), the Battalion Commander will have all troops inspected with particular emphasis on condition of equipment, cleanliness of troops and uniforms, proper wearing of uniforms, haircuts and shaves.

## 5. Assembly and Dispatch of Shipment.

a. Personnel: Battalions will march the troops to the prescribed assembly area at the time specified by the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer).

b. Records will be assembled by the Battalion Personnel Officer and the Depot S-1 (Records Section) and delivered to the assembly area.

c. When the troops arrive at the assembly area, the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) and Depot S-1 (Records Section representative) will verify the presence of personnel listed on the orders making up the shipment.

d. As troops are checked against the roster, they will be counted off into truck or railcar groups in roster order (from TO or SO) and promptly loaded under the supervision of the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer).

e. At the time the troops are loaded the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) will designate the senior officer or NCO in each truck or railcar as the Truck or Railcar Commander.

f. As soon as practicable after the troops are assembled for shipment, the senior officer or NCO will be designated by S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) as the Commander of Troops. At this time, he will be given complete instructions by S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) concerning the details of the shipment which will include the following:

- (1) Copy of TO or SO.
- (2) Total number of Officers and enlisted men on the shipment.
- (3) Destination of shipment and the expected time of the arrival.
- (4) Disposition of records pertaining to the personnel of the shipment.
- (5) Required discipline of troops enroute.
- (6) Copy of instructions pertaining to the shipment.

g. Before departure, the Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) will give final instructions to the Convoy Officer which will include:

- (1) Name of Commander of Troops.
- (2) Destination and routes.
- (3) Number of trucks or railcars and number of personnel.
- (4) Instructions pertinent to return of empty trucks or means of return to the Depot if shipment is made by rail.

h. When Depot S-3 (Troop Movement Officer) has determined that the shipment is ready for departure, it will be dispatched immediately.

6. Reports (Shipping Battalions).

a. Immediately upon completion of the assembly of records of the personnel of a given shipment and upon determination of complete availability of all personnel of the shipment, Battalion Commanders will prepare a report to the receiving unit concerning the following:

- (1) Personnel on orders for the shipment.
- (2) Shortage in individual clothing and equipment.
- (3) Completion of firing of individual weapons.
- (4) Status of records of personnel.
- (5) Payment of personnel.

b. This report will be rendered on 17th RD Forms No. 54 and 55, with distribution as follows:

(1) Original to the unit receiving the shipment.  
To be delivered with records.

(2) One (1) copy to the Commanding Officer, 17th Replacement Depot.

(3) One (1) copy for Battalion file.

c. Battalion S-4 will obtain verbal confirmation from the Depot S-4 as to the unavailability of clothing and equipment at the time of shipment and execute the certificate required on 17th RD Form No. 55.

d. The Depot S-1 will prepare the necessary certificate indicating completion of WD AGO Forms No. 20 and 66-1 to cover statement made in paragraph 4b of 17th RD Form No. 54. This certificate will be submitted to the shipping Battalion Commanding Officer prior to shipment.

By order of Colonel RROWN:

OFFICIAL:

CARL L. ELVER  
1st Colonel, Inf  
Executive Officer

/s/ Alton D. Shaw  
/t/ ALTON D. SHAW  
Lt Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

7 Incls:

- Incl 1 -- Annex "A" - Temporary Form 20 and/or 66-1.  
Incl 2 -- Annex "B" - Report Concerning Incoming Shipment.  
Incl 3 -- Annex "C" - Instructions for CO of Outgoing Troop Shipments.  
Incl 4 -- Annex "D" - Duties of Truck Convoy Officers.  
Incl 5 -- Annex "E" - Report on Discrepancies and Shortages.  
Incl 6 -- Annex "F" - Discrepancies and Shortages of Clothing & Equipment  
Incl 7 -- Annex "G" - Certification of Records.

DISTRIBUTION: "B"

## SECTION I

## ORGANIZATION

Designation / ----- Replacement Company

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	----- Replacement Company	
Item	Specification Serial No.	Technician	Grade	Company Headquarters	3 Platoons (Each)	Total Company	Remarks	
Captain							/ Insert number of Co.	
Company Commander	2136		1	(1)		(1)	n. Company Clerk	
First Lieutenant								
Executive Officer	2136		1	(1)		(1)		
Second Lieutenant							The company is or-	
Platoon Commander	2136		1	(1)		3	ganized in to 3 platoons of 100 reinforce-	
Total Commissioned			2	1	5		ments each; total company, 300.	
First Sergeant	502		1		1			
Staff Sergeant			2	1	5			
Mess	324		1	(1)		(1)	In accordance with	
Platoon	560		1	(1)		(3)	Sec VIII, WD Cir No.	
Supply	321		1	(1)		(1)	354 1 Sep 1944, all	
Sergeant					4	12	enlisted personnel per-	
Duty	566		1	(1)		(12)	forming duties under	
Corporal					1	1	this Table of Orga-	
Clerk-typist	405		1	(1)		(1)	nization and Equipment	
Technician Grade 4)			4		4		are designated as Ad-	
Technician Grade 5)			9		9		jutant General's troops.	
Private first class)			5		5			
Private							For specification	
Armorer	511	5	(1)			(1)	serial numbers for offi-	
Baker	017	5	(1)			(1)	cers, see TM 12-46 and	
Bugler	803	5	(1)			(1)	12-407; for enlisted	
Clerk-mail	056	5	(1)			(1)	men see TM 12-427.	
Clerk-typist	405	5	(1)			(1)		
Cook	060	4	(3)			(3)		
Cook	060	5	(3)			(3)		
Cook's Helper	590	2				(2)		
Orientation Specialist	274	4	(1)			(1)		
Special Service CO	502	5	(1)			(1)		
Supply Clerk	335	5	(1)			(1)		
Truck Driver, light	345	2	(2)			(2)		
Total Enlisted			22	5	37			
Aggregate			24	6	42			

## REPLACEMENT COMPANY

T/O & E 12-47

## CHEMICAL

1 Item	2 Allowances	3 Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Alarm, gas, M1	1	
Apparatus, decontaminating: 1-1/2 qt capacity, M-2	2	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
3 gallon, M1	3	Outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Curtain, gasproof, M1	2	Outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Kit, chemical agent detector, M9	1	Outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Mask, gas, service, combat, M5-11-7	42	1 per indiv (mask, gas, sv, light-weight, M5-11A1-6 or M5A1-11-11-6 or mask, gas, sv, will be issued in lieu of mask, gas, sv, combat M5-11-7 as directed by WD.)
Respirator, dust, M2	4	2 per wheeled, fuel consuming mtr vehicle (respirator, dust, M1, will be issued in lieu of respirator, dust, M2, until exhausted),

## ENGINEER

Net, camouflage, cotton:		
Shrimp, 29 x 29 ft	1	1 per trk, 3/4 ton.
Shrimp, 36 x 44 ft	1	1 per trk, 1-1/2 ton.
Twine, fabric garnished, 15 x 15 ft	1	1 per MG, cal..5C.

## MEDICAL

Kit, first aid: Gas casualty	2	1 per 25 indiv or maj fraction thereof outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Motor vehicle, 12 unit	1	1 per 4 fuel consuming mtr vehicle or fraction thereof.

ORDNANCE  
Weapons and Miscellaneous

Carbine, cal..30, M1	42	1 per indiv (Ord 7-SNL B-28).
Gun, machine, Browning, M1, cal..50, M2 flexible		Ord 7-SNL A-39
Mount, machine gun, cal..50, AA, M3	1	1 per MG, cal..50 (Ord 7-SNL A-37).

## Vehicles

Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4 Weapons Carrier	1	SNL G-5C7
Truck, 1-1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	1	SNL G-5C7

**Motor Transport Equipment**

1 Item	2 Allowances	3 Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Axe, handled, chopping, single-bit standard grade, 4-lb	2	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle (SNL J-6).
Chain, motor vehicle, tow, 16' long x 7/16" diam.	1	1 per trks 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 ton, incl. in theater of opr; 3 trks 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 ton in continental US.
Defroster, and deicer, electrical windshield	2	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Mattock, handled, pick, type II class F, 5-lb.	2	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle (SNL J-6).
Rope, tow, 20' long, 1" diam.	1	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle under 1-1/2 ton capacity (SNL H-9).
Shovel, general purpose, D-handled, 2 strapback, round point, No 2		1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle (SNL J-7).

**QUARTERMASTER  
Organizational Clothing**

Gloves, protective, impermeable	1	1 per 40 EM or maj fraction thereof outside continental US, when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Mittens, asbestos, M-1942	3	2 per cal..50 MG except in armd vehicles; 1 per armr (511).
Suit, protective, one-piece, impermeable	1	1 per 40 EM or maj fraction thereof outside continental US, when auth by theater of opr comdr.

**Individual Equipment**

Bag, canvas, fld, od, M-1936	5	1 per off
Belt, pistol or revolver, M-1936	42	1 per indiv armed w/carbine, cal..30, M1
Cover:		
Canteen, dismounted, M-1910	42	1 per indiv
Canvas, muzzle, rifle or carbine	42	1 per carbine, cal..30, M1
Pack, field, cargo-and-combat:		
Pack, field, cargo	37 )	1 per EM. (haversack, M1928, and carr, pk, M1928, or pack fld, will be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
Pack, field, combat	37 )	
Suspenders, pack, cargo-and-combat.	37 )	
Pocket, magazine, for carbine, cal..30, M1	84	2 per indiv armed with carbine, cal..30, M1.
Strap, carrying, gen purpose	5	1 per bag, canvas, fld, od, M-1936 (strap, carrying, bag, canvas, fld, od, M-1936 to be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
Suspenders, belt, M-1936	5	1 per off.

**Organizational Equipment**

Axe, intrenching, M-1910, w/handle	4	1 per 10 EM outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
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1 Item	2 Allowances	3 Basis of Distribution and Remarks
<b>Bag:</b>		
Canvas, water, sterilizing, porous, comp w/cover and hanger	7	1 per 50 indiv or fraction thereof (bag, canvas, water, sterilizing, complete w/cover and hanger to be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
<b>Delousing</b>	17	1 per 20 indiv or maj fraction thereof in areas where louse-borne typhus is high, when auth by the WD.
	or	
	10	1 per 35 indiv or maj fraction thereof, in areas where louse-borne typhus is low, when auth by the WD
<b>Bucket:</b>		
Canvas, water 18 qt	2	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle.
General-purpose, galv, hvy-wt, 10 w/o lip, 14 qt capacity		
<b>Can:</b>		
Corrugated, nesting, galv, w/cover:		
10-gallon	3	
16-gallon	3	
24-gallon	3	
32-gallon	3	
Water, 5-gallon	68	1 per 5 indiv or maj fraction thereof.
<b>Carrier:</b>		
Axe, intrenching, M-1910	4	1 per axe intrenching, M-1910
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910	8	1 per pick-mattock, intrenching M-1910.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1943	29	1 per shovel, intrenching, M-1943 (carr, shovel, intrenching, M-1910, to be issued when shovel, intrenching, M-1910 is issued).
		1 per table, camp, folding.
<b>Chair, folding</b>	3	
<b>Clock, alarm</b>	2	
<b>Desk, fld, (empty), fiber, Co.</b>	1	
<b>Drum, inflammable-liquid (gasoline), steel, w/carrying handle, cap. 5-gal</b>	10	2 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle; 1 per unit range, fld, M-1937
<b>File, paper, clip, wood back</b>	4	
<b>Flag, guidon, bunting</b>	1	
<b>Goggles, MI944</b>	5	2 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle; 1 per MG cal..50, lh.
<b>Heater, immersion, type, for cans, corrugated</b>	6	1 per unit, range, fld, M-1937 (heater, water for range, fld, M-1937 to be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
<b>Kit:</b>		
Barber, w/case	2	outside continental US, when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Sewing	4	1 per 12 EM or maj fraction thereof.
Lantern, gasoline, leaded fuel	7	1 per 12 EM or maj fraction thereof 2 per mess.

1 Item	2 Allowances	3 Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Pick, mattock, intrenching, M-1910 w/handle	8	1 per 5 EM outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr
Perforator, nonadjustable, 2 hole	5	1 per Co; 1 per Plat; 1 per Supply
Range, fld, M-1937 (units)	6	
Ruler, polich, maple, 18 in	5	1 per Co; 1 per Plat; 1 per Supply.
Screen, latrine, complete w/pins and poles	3	
Sharpener, pencil, office, trans- parent	5	
Shears, office, bankers, 9 in	2	Issued when available.
Shovel;		
Gen purpose, D-handled, strap- back, round-point, No.2	12	
Intrenching, M-1943	29	7 per 10 EM outside continental US, when auth by theater of opr comdr (shovel, intrenching, M-1910, wil be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
Stove, tent, M-1941, complete	76	2 per tent, sqd or 1 per tent pyramidal.
Table, camp, folding	8	1 per co; clk (off)(405); off in co repl bn
Tent:		
Kitchen, flyproof	1	1 per set of range, fld, M-1937 (fl tent, wall, large complete w/pins and poles, to be issued in lieu thereof until tent, kitchen, fly- proof is available).
Sqd, M-1942, complete w/pins and poles	38	76 tents, pyramidal, complete w/pins and poles to be issued in lieu of 38 tents, sqd until exhausted.
Tool set (complete w/tools), carpenters', No. 2	1	
Trumpet, G with slide to F	1	1 per bglr.
Tube, flexible nozzle	2	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle.
Typewriter:		
Non-portable, 11" carriage	3	3 per Co (405)(835)(274).
Portable, w/carrying case	1	1 per desk, fld, (empty), fiber, Co.
Whistle, thunderer	23	1 per off; 1st sgt; s/sgt; sgt

SIGNAL

Flashlight, TL-122 ( )	10	1 per co; off, 1st sgt, sup sgt (821); mtr vehicle.
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## SECTION 1

## ORGANIZATION

Designation: HEADQUARTERS

REPLACEMENT BATTALION

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

REPLACEMENT BATTALION

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

21 ITEM:

	SPECIFIC TION SERIAL NUMBER	TECHNICIAN GRADE	BATTALION HEADQUARTERS	DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS	ADJUTANT	CLASSIFICATION o ASSIGNMENT	TROOP MOVEMENT	SUPPLY	CHAPLAIN	TRAINING	SPECIAL SERVICE	POST EXCHANGE	ATTACHED MEDICAL	Form
2	Lieutenant Colonel	1												1
3	Battalion Commander	2136	(1)											(1)
4	Major		1		1									2
5	Executive	2136	(1)											(1)
6	Classification & Assignment	2210				(1)								(1)
7	Captain		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			7
8	Adjutant	2110		(1)										(1)
9	Classification & Assignment	2210				(1)								(1)
10	Company Commander	2900		(1)										(1)
11	Medical	3100												(1)
12	Supply	4000					(1)							(1)
13	Training	2150						(1)						(1)
14	Troop Movement	2640			(1)									(1)
15	Captain or First Lieutenant								1		1			2
16	Chaplain	5310						(1)						(1)
17	Dental	3170												(1)
18	First Lieutenant		1	1	1	1			2	1				7
19	Assistant Adjutant	2110		(1)										(1)
20	Assistant C & A	2210			(1)									(1)
21	Assistant Training	2150								(1)				(1)
22	Information & Education	5004								(1)				(1)
23	Motor Transport	0600		(1)										(1)
24	Special Service & Post Exchange	5000									(1)			(1)
25	Troop movement	2640				(1)								(1)
26	Total Commissioned		2	2	2	3	2	1	1	3	1	2		19
27	Master Sergeant					1								1
28	Sergeant Major	502		(1)										(1)
29	Technical Sergeant					1	1	1						3
30	Personnel Technician	290				(1)								(1)
31	Supply	821						(1)						(1)
32	Transportation NCO	813					(1)							(1)
33	Staff Sergeant			2	1		1			2		1		7
34	Administrative	502			(1)									(1)
35	Medical	673												(1)
36	Mess Sergeant	824		(1)										(1)
37	Supply	821		(1)										(1)
38	Training & Range	814									(2)			(2)
39	Troop Movement	566				(1)								(1)

ITEM	SPECIFICATION SERIAL NO.	TECHNICIAN GRADE	BATTALION HEADQUARTERS	DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS	ADJUTANT	CLASSIFICATION & ASSIGNMENT	TROOP MOVEMENT	SUPPLY	CHAPLAIN	TR. RATIONS	SPECIAL SERVICE	POST EXCHANGE	ATTACHED MEDICINE	TOTAL				
Sergeant		1				2		1		1		5						
Motor Sergeant	014	(1)									(1)		(1)					
Operation NCO	814										(1)		(1)					
Post Exchange Manager	352										(1)		(1)					
Troop Movement	566					(2)						(2)						
Corporal		1									1		7					
Clerk Typist	405			(1)			5						(1)					
Duty NCO	566					(5)				(1)		(6)						
Technician Grade III)																		
Technician Grade IV )																		
Technician Grade V ) - - -								14	10	21	3	7	1	8	5	13	8	90
Private First Class )																		
Private )																		
Administrative NCO	502	3									(1)		(1)					
Athletic Instructor	283	4									(1)		(1)					
Automobile Mechanic	014	4			(1)								(1)					
Barber	022	5										(2)	(2)					
Barber	022											(2)	(2)					
Basic Range Detail	521										(4)		(4)					
Chaplain Assistant	405	5								(1)			(1)					
Classification Specialist	275	3					(2)						(2)					
Classification Specialist	275	4					(4)						(4)					
Classification Specialist	275	5					(7)						(7)					
Clerk General	055	4					(1)						(1)					
Clerk General	055	5				(1)		(1)					(2)					
Clerk Mail	056				(1)								(1)					
Clerk Morning Report	055	5				(2)							(2)					
Clerk Payroll	405	4				(1)							(1)					
Clerk Payroll	405	5				(1)							(1)					
Clerk Service Record	055	5				(2)							(2)					
Clerk Stock	835	4							(1)				(1)					
Clerk Stock	835	5										(1)						
Clerk Statistical	055	3					(1)						(1)					
Clerk Statistical	055	4					(1)						(1)					
Clerk Statistical	055	5					(2)						(2)					
Clerk, Supply NCO	821	4							(1)				(1)					
Clerk, Supply	821								(2)				(2)					
Clerk, Typist	405	4							(1)				(1)					
Clerk, Typist	405	5				(2)	(3)	(1)					(1)	(1)	(1)		(9)	
Cook	060	4				(1)												
Cook	060	5				(1)												
Cook-Helper	590					(2)												
Dental Technician	855	5											(1)					
Draftsman	070	5											(1)					
Duplicating Machine Operator	128	5					(1)						(1)					
Orientation Technician	274	5											(1)					
Post Exchange Cashier	269	4											(1)					
Post Exchange Sales Clerk	373	5											(3)					
Post Exchange Sales Clerk	373												(5)					

10 & E 12-46

ITEM	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Projectionist	137	5								(1)				(1)	
Sanitary Technician	196	4											(1)	(1)	
Subsistence NCO	821	4												(1)	
Subsistence Clerk	821	5												(2)	
Surgical Technician	861	4												(1)(1)	
Surgical Technician	861	5												(3)(3)	
Training Aids	055	4											(1)		(1)
Truck Driver, Light	345	5			(7)									(1)(8)	
Utilities Repairman	121	4				(1)									(1)
Total Enlisted			18	12	22	12	8	1	12	5	14	9	11	3	
Aggregate			2	20	14	25	14	9	2	15	6	14	11	132	

## REPLACEMENT BATTALION

## CHEMICAL

1	2	3
Item	Allowances	Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Alarm, gas, M1	1	
Apparatus, decontaminating:		
1-1/2 qt, capacity, M2	9	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
3 Gallon, M1	3	3 per Co outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Kit, repair, gas, mask, universal M8	1	
Mask, gas, service, combat M5-11-7	132	1 per indiv (mask, gas, sv, light-weight M3-10A1-6 or M3A1-10A1-6 or mask, gas, sv, will be issued in lieu of mask, gas, sv, combat, M5-11-7 as dir by WD).
Respirator, dust, M2	18	2 per wheeled, fuel-consuming mtr vehicle (respirator, dust, M1, will be issued in lieu of respirator, dust, M2 until exhausted).

## ENGINEER

Electric lighting equipment, Set No. 3, 3-KVA	1	
Extinguisher, fire:		
Carbon tetrachloride, 1-gal	3	1 per kitchen; 1 per mtr pool, 1 per supply; outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Water, 4-gal, demountable, nestable, pump type	5	1 per 6 sqd tents or maj fraction thereof outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Cat, camouflage, cotton, shrimp:		
22 x 22-ft	3	1 per trk, 1/4 ton; tlr, 1/4 ton.
29 x 29-ft	2	1 per trk, 3/4 ton.
36 x 44-ft	5	1 per trk, over 3/4 ton.
Cat, instrument, drawing, comp. table, drafting, 60 x 40-in	1	1 per training sec (Col II), Do.

## MEDICAL

Passard, Geneva Convention host:	12	1 per indiv (med or dental sv); Cr
MD $\frac{1}{2}$ , complete	1	1 per med doc.
MD $\frac{1}{2}$ 60, complete	1	1 per dental off.
It:		
Dental:		
Officer, complete	1	1 per dental off.
Pvt, complete	1	1 per dental techn (855) or dental sv.

1	2	3
Item	Allowances	Basis of Distribution and Remarks
<b>1:</b>		
First Aid:		
Gas casualty, complete	5	1 per 25 indiv or maj fraction thereof outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Motor vehicle (12-unit), complete	2	1 per 4 fuel consuming mtr vehicles or fraction thereof.
<b>2:</b>		
Med:		
MCO, complete	5	1 per med ECO; med and surgical techn
Officer, complete	1	1 per med off.
Machine imprinting (for use with indiv identification tags only)	1	1 per med sec.
Continental Headquarters Medical Equipment	1	1 per med sec.
Set, gas casualty, M-2	1	Outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
<b>3:</b>		
<b>ORDNANCE</b>		
Weapons and Miscellaneous		
Turbo, cal..30, M2	116	1 per indiv not otherwise armed except med ch (ord 7-SNL B-28).
Pistol, automatic, cal..45, M1911A1	3	1 per off fld gr or higher (ord-7 SNL B-6).
<b>4:</b>		
Vehicles		
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2 wheel, cargo truck	1	To be used by Ch (SNL G-529).
1/4 ton, 4 x 4	2	SNL G-503, 1 to be used by Ch.
3/4 ton 4 x 4 weapons carrier	2	2 per hq co, SNL G-502.
2-1/2 ton, 6 x 6, cargo, w/winch	5	SNL G-508.
<b>5:</b>		
Motor Transport Equipment		
Axe, handled, chopping, single bit, standard grade, 4-lb	9	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicles, (SNL J-6).
Cabinet, spare parts, type M1, M1940	1	
Chain, motor vehicle, tow, 16' long x 7/16" diam.	5 or 1	1 per trk 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 ton incl, outside continental US 1 per 3 trks 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 ton incl, in continental US (SNL H-3).
Drefroster and deicer, electrical, windshield	9	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle when dir by CG Army or outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Enttock, handled, pick, type II, Class F, 5-lb	7	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle except 1/4 ton trks (SNL J-6).
Rope, tow, 20' long, 1" diam.	4	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle under 1-1/2 ton capacity (SNL H-9).

1	2	3
Item	Allowances	Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Knife, general purpose, D-handled, strap back, round point, No. 2	9	1 per fuel-consuming ntr vehicle (SIL J-6).
Kit set, complete w/tools:		
General Mechanic's	1	1 per ntr mech (014) (ord 6-SNL G-27).
Unit Equipment second echelon, set No. 1	1	1 per hq co (ord 6-SNL G-27).

**QUARTERMASTER**  
**Organizational Clothing**

Blouson, protective, impermeable	3	1 per 4C M. or maj fraction thereof outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Hat, protective, one-piece impermeable	3	Do.

**Individual Equipment**

Gloves, canvas, fld, od, M-1936	19	1 per off.
Belt, pistol or revolver, M-1936	132	1 per indiv armed w/pistol only or carbine cal..30, M1; indiv not otherwise furnished cartridge belt.
<b>Cover:</b>		
Canteen, dismounted, M-1910	132	1 per indiv.
Canvas, muzzle, rifle or carbine	116	1 per carbine cal..30 M1.
Pack, fld, cargo-and-combat:		
Pack, fld, cargo	113 )	1 per MI (haversack, M-1928 and carr pk, M-1928, or pk, fld, will be issued until exhausted in lieu thereof).
Pack, fld, combat	113 )	
Suspenders, pack, fld, cargo-and-combat	113 )	
Socket, magazine:		
Double web, M.	3	1 per indiv armed w/pistol.
For carbine, cal..30, M1	232	2 per indiv armed w/carbine, cal..30 M1.
Strap, carrying, general purpose	19	1 per brk, canvas, fld, od, M-1936 (strap, carrying, bag, canvas, fld, od, M-1936 to be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
Suspenders, belt; M-1936	19	1 per off.

**Organizational Equipment**

Axe:		
Handled, chiseling, single bit, standard grade, weight 4-lb	10	
Intrenching, M-1910, w/handle	12	1 per 10 MI outside continental US, when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Bug, delousing:		
	7	1 per 20 indiv or maj fraction thereof in areas where louse-borne typhus is high when auth by the WD.
	or 4	1 per 35 indiv or maj fraction thereof in areas where louse-borne typhus is low when auth by the WD.

1	2	3
Item	Allowance	Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Jug, Canvas water, sterilizing, porous, complete w/cover and hanger	3	1 per 50 indiv or fraction thereof (Jug, canvas, water, sterilizing, complete w/cover and hanger to be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
Jacket:		
Canvas, water, 18-quart	9	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle.
General purpose, galvanized, heavy-weight, w/o lin, 14 qt capacity	12	4 per med sec; 8 per lg co.
Can:		
Corrugated, nesting, galv, w/cover:		
10-gallon	2	
16-gallon	2	
24-gallon	2	
32-gallon	2	
Water, 5 gallon	37	1 per 5 indiv or maj fraction thereof.
Carrier:		
Axe, intrenching, M-1910	12	1 per axe intrenching, M-1910
Pick, mattock, intrenching, M-1910	23	1 per pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910
Snowel, intrenching, M1943	78	1 per snowel, intrenching, M-1943 (corr, snowel, intrenching, M-1910, to be used when snowel, intrenching M-1910 is issued).
Chair, folding	76	1 per table, comn, folding.
Clock, alarm	2	2 per Co has.
Desk, fld (empty fiber, company)	2	2 per Co has.
Drum, inflammable-liquid (gasoline) steel, w/carrying handle, capacity 5 gallon	14	1 per 1/4 ton trk 4 x 4, 2 per trk 2-1/2 ton; trk 3/4 ton.
File, paper, clip, wood back	12	
Goggles, M-1944	19	2 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle.
Marker, immersion type, for cans, 3	3	3 per set, range, fld, M-1937 (marker, water for range, fld, M-1937 to be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted.)
Kit:		
Barber, w/case	1	Outside continental US, when auth by theater of Our Cndtr.
Sewing	10	1 per 12 M or maj fraction thereof.
Lantern, gasoline, lended fuel machine:	24	
Duplicating, using stencil paper, hand operated, 8 x 13 in.2	12	
Paper fastening, lever-crumbler type, wire-staple, preformed light duty	12	
Calculator, hand operated	1	1 per PX sec.
Corning and listing, 8 column	1	1 per Supply sec.
Embossing (identification tag)	1	1 per AG sec.
Stencil cutting, 1-1/2" letter	1	1 per Supply Sec.

1	2	3
Item	Allowances	Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Outfit, chaplains'	1	1 per Ch (Christian or Jewish faith).
Perforator, non-adjustable 2 hole	12	
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910 w/handle	23	2 per 10 EM outside continental US when auth by theater of war comdr.
Range, field, M-1937, 4 unit	1	
Ruler, polished marble, 18 in	12	
Safe, fld, combination lock	2	1 per Bn Hqs (safe field keylock to be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted); 1 per PX.
Saw, crosscut, 2 men length 6 ft	1	1 per Hq Co.
Screen, latrine, complete w/pins & 2 poles		
Section, furniture, wood, upright, 6 cm size, with ends, 4 drawer high, 1 drawer wide.		
Sharpener, pencil, office, trans- parent	11	
Shears, office, bankers, 9-in	6	Issued during present emerg when available
Selector, qualification card	2	
Shovel:		
General purpose, D-handled, strap back, round point, No. 2	10	
Intrenching, M-1943	78	7 per 10 EM outside continental US when auth by theater of war comdr (shovel, intrenching, M-1910, will issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
Stove, tent, M-1941, complete	56	2 per sqd tent (when auth by CO)
Table, camp, folding	84	
Tent:		
Kitchen, flyproof	1	1 per set of Range, fld, M-1937 (fly tent, wall large, complete w/pins and poles to be issued in lieu thereof until Tent, kitchen, fly proof is available.)
Storage	1	1 per Supply Sec.
Squad, M-1942, complete w/pins and poles	28	
Tool Set (complete w/tools), carpenters' No. 1	1	1 per Supply Sec.
Trumpet, G w/slide to F	1	
Tube, flexible nozzle	9	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle.
Typewriter:		
Non-portable, 11-in carriage	15	
Non-portable, 26-in carriage	1	1 per Training Sec.
Portable, with carrying case	1	1 per outfit Ch.
Whistle, thunderer	23	1 per off, m/sgt, t/sgt, s/sgt, sgt, cpl in bn or sec bn.
SIGNAL		
Flashlight, TL-122	30	1 per off; sup NCO (821); Hq Co; fuel consuming mtr vehicle.
Projector, 16mm, Motion Picture	1	1 per Special Service Sec.
Screen, 6 x 8 ft for 16mm Projector	1	1 per Special Service Sec.

1

## UNIT

		HQ & HQ REPL DEPOT (T/O & E 12-42)	5 REPLACEMENT BN HQ & HQ CO (EACH) (T/O & E 12-46)	20 REPLACEMENT COMPANIES (EACH) (T/O & E 12-47)	VAR.V POSTAL UNIT (TYPE A) (T/O & E 12-501) plus 2 FINANCE UNITS	JW TRUCK CO. (TROOP) (T/O & E 10-57)	FINNANCE DISB SECTION (T/O & E 14-500 Hq's Units AB-Pay & All Units-BJ)	MILITARY POLICE CO (TYPE C) (T/O & E 19-217)	SIGNAL SERVICE ORGANIZATION (T/O & E 11-500 DA-EB-GB-GI and GG TEAM)	ENGINEER SERVICE ORGANIZATION UTILITIES (T/O & E 5-500 TYPE EE)	TOTAL
2	Brigadier General.....	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
3.	Colonel.....	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
4	Lieutenant Colonel.....	6	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11
5	Major.....	5	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	21
6	Captain.....	17	7	1	1	1	..	..	..	..	76
7	Captain or 1st Lieutenant .....	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10
8	1st Lieutenant.....	8	7	1	1	1	1	2	..	..	68
9	2nd Lieutenant.....	..	..	3	..	3	..	1	..	..	65
10	Total Commissioned.....	43	19	5	2	5	2	4	3	254	-
11	Warrant Officer.....	2	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	3
12	Master Sergeant.....	6	1	..	1	..	1	..	..	1	14
13	First Sergeant.....	1	..	1	..	1	..	1	..	..	23
14	Technical Sergeant.....	7	3	..	1	1	1	..	..	1	26
15	Staff Sergeant.....	11	7	5	2	5	2	5	2	3	155
16	Sergeant.....	1	5	12	..	6	..	8	2	5	287
17	Corporal.....	5	7	1	..	14	..	14	5	..	93
18	Technician Grade III.....	3	4	..	..	..	2	..	1	..	26
19	Technician Grade IV.....	37	19	4	7	6	4	4	4	9	246
20	Technician Grade V.....	76	51	9	11	37	7	12	15	20	613
21	Private First Class and Private.....	34	16	5	12	95	4	53	11	16	345
22	Total Enlisted.....	183	113	37	34	105	21	97	40	55	1840
23	Aggregate.....	226	132	42	36	110	24	101	40	58	2095
	* Army Postal Unit										

2d Lt - 2nd Lt - 1st Lt - Cook - 069-T/5  
 Finance Unit - 4 Clarks - 1 - 7/1 - 3 - T/5

HQ & HQ COMPANY  
REPLACEMENT DEPOT

T/O 12-42

43 OFF 2 WO 181 EM

APU (TYPE A)  
T/O 12-605  
PLUS 2 FINANCE  
UNITS  
2 OFF 34 EM

QM TRUCK CO  
T/O 13-57  
5 OFF 105 EM

FINANCE  
DISB. SECTION  
T/O 14-500  
1 WO 21 EM

MIL. POLICE CO  
(TYPE - C-)  
T/O 19-217  
4 OFF 97 EM

SIGNAL SERV  
ORGN  
T/O 11-500  
40 EM

ENG SERV  
ORGN  
T/O 5-500  
3 OFF 55 EM

ATTACHED  
UNITS  
SEE BELOW \*

HQ & HQ CO  
REPL. BN.  
T/O 12-46  
19 OFF 113EM

HQ & HQ CO  
REPL. BN.  
T/O 12-46  
19 OFF 113EM

HQ & HQ CO  
REPL. BN.  
T/O 12-46  
19 OFF 113EM

HQ & HQ CO  
REPL. BN.  
T/O 12-46  
19 OFF 113EM

HQ & HQ CO  
REPL. BN.  
T/O 12-46  
19 OFF 113EM

(4 PER BN)  
REPLACEMENT  
COMPANY  
T/O 12-47  
5 OFF 37 EM

(4 PER BN)  
REPLACEMENT  
COMPANY  
T/O 12-47  
5 OFF 37 EM

(4 PER BN)  
REPLACEMENT  
COMPANY  
T/O 12-47  
5 OFF 37 EM

(4 PER BN)  
REPLACEMENT  
COMPANY  
T/O 12-47  
5 OFF 37 EM

(4 PER BN)  
REPLACEMENT  
COMPANY  
T/O 12-47  
5 OFF 37 EM

\* ATTACHED UNITS: BAND, (1 WO, 28 EM, T/O & E 20-107)  
QM LAUNDRY PLATOON, (1 OFFICER, 61 EM, T/O & E 10-167)

## SECTION 1

## ORGANIZATION

Designation: HEADQUARTERS  
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

REPLACEMENT DEPOT  
REPLACEMENT DEPOT

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
ITEM		SPECIFICATION SER NUMBER	TECHNICIAN GRADE	HEADQUARTERS	ADJUTANT GENERAL	CLASSIFICATION & ASSIGNMENT	TROOP MOVEMENT	SUPPLY	TRANSPORTATION	MEDICAL	CHAPLAIN	TRAINING	SPECIAL SERVICE	POST EXCHANGE	HEADQUARTERS COMPANY	TOTAL
Brigadier General																1
Depot Commander		0002	(1)													1
Company		1542	(1)													1
Executive		1542	(1)													1
Lieutenant Colonel																1
Adjutant General		2110	(1)	(1)	1			1		1	1					1
Headquarters Commandant		2000	(1)													1
Classification & Assignment		2000	(1)													1
Supply		2000	(1)													1
Surgeon, Post		3001	(1)													1
Training		2520	(1)													1
Major																1
Adjutant General Assistant		2110	1	(1)	1			1	1	1	(1)	1	1			1
Executive Officer		2000	(1)								(1)	(1)				1
Information & Education		2000	(1)													1
Inspector General		2000	(1)													1
Motor Transport		2000	(1)													1
Post Exchange		2000	(1)													1
Special Services		2000	(1)													1
Troop Movement		2000	(1)													1
Captain																1
Assistant		2210	3	1	(2)	(1)		1	1	3	2	1	1			1
Chaplain		5310	(1)								(2)					1
Company Commander		2000	(1)													1
Commandant & Recreation		2000	(1)													1
Medical Officer		3000	(1)													1
Motor Transport		3000	(1)													1
Neurophysiologist		3000	(1)													1
Personnel Consultant		2000	(1)													1
Personnel Officer		2000	(1)													1
Public Relations & Historian		2000	(1)													1
Supply Officer		2000	(1)													1
Staff Judge Advocate		2000	(1)													1
Training Assistant		2000	(1)													1
Fir Lieutenant																1
Adjutant General Assistant		2110	1	(1)				1	(1)	1	2	1	1			1
Executive		2000	(1)													1
Information & Education Asst		2000	(1)													1
Public Administrative		2000	(1)													1
Special Service Assistant		2000	(1)													1
Supply Assistant		2000	(1)													1
Training Assistant		2520	(1)													1
X Total Commissioned				9	4	3	2	3	2	6	3	5	3	1	2	45
1 Warrant Officer										1	(1)					1
2 Motor Maintenance		6000														1
3 Staff Sergeant		4000		1	1	(1)		1			(1)					1
4 Master Sergeant																1
5 Administrative NCO		500														1
6 Personnel Technician		500														1
7 U.M. Supply Technician		500														1
8 Sergeant Major		500														1
9 First Sergeant		500														1
10 Technical Sergeant		500														1
11 Administrative		500														1
12 Medical Statistical		500														1
13 Personnel NCO		500														1
14 Substitution NCO		500														1
15 Supply		500														1
16 Transportation NCO		500														1
17 Staff Sergeant		500														1
18 Aircrew Mechanic		014		2	1	3		(1)								3
19 Gunner		012		(2)		(1)										2
20 Foreman		012														2
21 Warehouse		012														2
22 Mess Sergeant		012														2
23 Personnel Technician		200														2
24 Manager Post Exchange		200														2
25 Substitution NCO		021														2
26 Supply		021														2
27 Day NCO		566														2
28 Corporal		566														2
29 Duty NCO		566														2
30 Foreman		566														2
31 Technician Grade IV		500														2
32 Technician Grade V		500														2
33 Private																2
34 Accountant		268														2
35 Ambulance Driver		268														2
36 Artist		268														2

ITEM	SPECIFICATION SER NUMBER	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Athletic Instructor	283	5	TECHNICIAN GRADE	ADJUTANT GENERAL	CLASSIFICATION & ASSIGNMENT	TROOP MOVEMENT	SUPPLY	TRANSPORTATION	MEDICAL	CHAPLAIN	TRAINING	SPECIAL SERVICE	POST EXCHANGE	HEADQUARTERS COMP-NY			
Automotive Mechanic	283	4	HEADQUARTERS														
Cashier	283	(5)															
Chaplain Assistant	283		(1)														
Classification Specialist	283		(2)														
Classification Specialist	283																
Clerk, Company	283																
Clerk, General	283																
Clerk, General	283																
Clerk, Mail	283																
Clerk, Typist	283																
Cook	283																
Dental Laboratory (Tech)	283																
Dispatcher, Clerk, MV	283																
Dispatcher, Clerk, MV	283																
Dental Technician	283																
Mimeograph Operator	283																
Draftsman	283																
Entertainment Director	283																
File Clerk	283																
File Clerk	283																
Kitchen Helper	283																
Legal Clerk	283																
Legal Clerk	283																
Librarian	283																
Medical Technician	283																
Message Center Clerk	283																
Message Center Clerk	283																
Music Director	283																
Orientation Specialist	283																
Orientation Specialist	283																
Personnel Clerk	283																
Personnel Clerk	283																
Portable Generator Operator	846																
Projectionist, Motion Pict.	137																
Sanitary Technician	283																
Statistical Clerk	283																
Statistical Clerk	283																
Statistical Clerk	283																
Stenographer	283																
Stock Clerk	283																
Stock Control Clerk	283																
Stock Record Clerk	283																
Supply Clerk	283																
Supply NCO	283																
Truck Driver, Light	283																
Truck Driver, Light	283																
Utilities Repairman	283	5	CHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	UNCHARGE	
Total Enlisted			4	36	20	18	20	18	10	3	7	8	8	29		183	
Aggregate			13	40	23	20	24	21	16	6	12	11	9	31		226	

HQ AND HQ COMPANY  
REPLACEMENT DEPOT

T/C & E 12-42

Chemical		
1	2	3
Item	Allotments	Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Filter, gas, M1	1	
Apparatus, decontaminating: 1-1/2 qt capacity, M2	16	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
3 gallon, M1	3	3 per co outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Kit:		
Chemical agent detector, M9	1	Outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Repair, gas mask, universal, M8	1	
Mask, gas, service, combat, M5-11-7	226	1 per indiv (mask, gas, sv light-weight M3-10A1-6 or M3A1-6 or mask, gas, sv to be issued in lieu of mask, gas, sv, combat, M5-11-7, as dir by WD).
Respirator, dust, M2	32	2 per wheeled, fuel-consuming mtr vehicle (respirator, dust, M1 will be issued in lieu of respirator, dust, M2, until exhausted)
Engineer		
Electric lighting equipment, Set No. 3, 3-KVA	2	
Extinguisher, fire:		
Carbon dioxide, permanent shut-off, 15-lb.	1	Outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Carbon tetrachloride, 1-gallon	3	Do.
Water, 4-gallon, demountable nestable pump type	4	1 per ki tent; 2 per Sup See outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Net, camouflage, cotton:		
Shrimp:		
22 x 22 ft	8	1 per trk, 1/4 ton; tlr, 1/4 ton
29 x 29 ft	9	1 per trk, 3/4 ton; per amb; per car, 5 pass med, sedan.
36 x 44 ft	2	1 per trk, over 3/4 ton
Twine, fabric garnished	1	1 per MG (ground) cal. .50.
Set, instrument, drawing, complete	1	
Table, drafting, 60" x 40"	1	
Medical		
Bressard, Geneva Convention Chest, MD, No 4, Complete	11	1 per indiv MD; ch
Kit:		
First Aid:		
Gas casualty, complete	9	1 per 25 individuals or maj fraction thereof outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Motor vehicle, 12 unit, complete	4	1 per 4 fuel-consuming mtr vehicle or fraction thereof.
Medical:		
NCO, complete	1	1 per t sgt MD on med sv.

1 Item	2 Allowances	3 Basis of Distribution and Remarks
Officer, complete	5	1 per med off.
Water testing, poisons, treatment control, complete	1	1 per Sanitary Engineer (off)
Machine, imprinting (for use with indiv identification tag only)	2	2 per med sec.
Regimental Hq Med Equipment (9730000)	1	1 per med sec.
Ordnance Weapons and Miscellaneous		
Carbine, cal..30, M2	189	1 per indiv not otherwise armed except Med or Ch (ord 7-SNL B-28).
Gun, machine, Browning, HB, cal..50, M2, flexible	1	1 per co (ord 7-SNL A-39).
Pistol, auto, cal..45, M1911A1	15	1 per off fld gr or higher except Med or Ch (ord 7-SNL B-6).
Mount, machine gun, cal..50, AA M3	1	1 per MG, cal..50 (ord 7-SNLd-37)
Clock, message center, i2 or ML (time and date)	1	
Cer, 5 passenger, medium sedan	1	1 per Gen O. (SNL G-644).
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2 wheel, cargo	3	1 per Ch (SNL G-529).
Truck:		
1/4 ton, 4 x 4	5	3 to be used by Ch (SNL G-503).
3/4 ton, 4 x 4:		
Ambulance, KD	2	2 per med det, repl dep (SNL G-502).
Command & Reconnaissance	1	1 per Deputy Comdr (SNL G-502).
Weapons carrier	5	SNL G-502
2-1/2 ton, 6 x 6, cargo, w/winch	2	SNL G-508
Motor Transport Equipment		
Axe, handled, chopping, single bit, standard grade, 4-lb.	16	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle (SNL J-6).
Cabinet, spare parts, type 1, M-1940	2	2 per repl dep transportation sec (SNL J-15).
Chain, mtr vehicle, tow 16' long x 7/16" diam.	2	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle, 1-1/2 ton to 2-1/2 ton outside continental US.
	or 1	1 per 3 fuel-consuming mtr vehicle inside continental US (SNL M-3).
Defroster & Deicer, electric, windshield	16	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle when directed by CG Army or outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Mattock, handled, peck, type II Cl F, 5-lb.	10	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle except 1/4 ton 4x4 trks, car 5 pass med sedan (SNL J-6).
Rope, tow, 20' long, 1" diam	14	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle under 1-1/2 ton capacity (SNL H-9).
Shovel, gen purpose, D-handled strap back, round point, No. 2	15	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle except car 5 pass med sedan (SNL J-6).
Tool set (complete w/tools):		
General mechs	1	1 per mtr Mech (O14) (Ord 6-SNL G-27).
Unit equipment, Second Echelon, set No 1	1	Ord 6-SNL G-27.

1	2	3
Item	Allowances	Basis of distribution and Remarks
<b>QUARTERMASTER Organizational Equipment</b>		
Gloves, protective, impermeable	5	1 per 40 EM or maj fraction thereof, outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Mittens, asbestos, M-1942	2	2 per cal..50 MG.
Suit, protective, one-piece, impermeable	5	1 per 40 EM or maj fraction thereof, outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
<b>Individual Equipment</b>		
Bag, canvas, fld, od, M-1936	45	1 per off; WD
Belt, pistol or revolver, M-1936	226	1 per indiv armed w/pistol only or carbine, cal..30, M1; indiv not otherwise furnished cartridge belt.
<b>Cover:</b>		
Canvas, dismounted, M-1910	226	1 per indiv
Canvas, muzzle, rifle or carbine	189	1 per carbine, cal..30, M1
Pack, fld, cargo and combat:		
Peck, fld, cargo	181	) 1 per EM (haversack, M-1928 and Peck, fld, combat
Suspenders, pack, fld, cargo-and-combat	181	) 2 per indiv armed w/carbine, cal..30 M1 ) will be issued until exhausted ) in lieu thereof).
Pocket, magazine:		
Double web, EM	15	1 per indiv armed w/pistol
For carbine, cal..30, M1	378	2 per indiv armed w/carbine, cal..30 M1
Strap, carrying, gen purpose	45	1 per beg; canvas, fld, od, M-1936 (strap, carrying, beg, canvas, fld od, M-1936, will be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted)
Suspenders, belt, M-1936	45	1 per off; WD.
<b>Axe:</b>		
Handled, chopping, single-bit, std endard grade, weight 4-lb	16	6 per med sec; 10 per supply sec
Intrenching, M-1910, w/handle	18	1 per 10 EM outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
<b>Bag:</b>		
Canvas, water sterilizing, porous, complete w/cover	5	1 per 50 indiv or maj fraction thereof (bag, canvas, water sterilizing, complete w/cover and hanger will be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted ).
Delousing	11	1 per 20 indiv or maj fraction thereof in areas where louse- borne typhus is high, when auth by the WD.
	or	
	6	1 per 35 indiv or maj fraction thereof in areas where louse- borne typhus is low, when auth by the WD.
<b>Bucket:</b>		
Canvas, water, 18-qt.	16	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle.
General purpose, galv, hvy wt, w/o lip, 14 qt cap	16	4 per med sec; 12 per hq & hq Co
Cabinet, card size, length 16-in, wood, 4-drawer, 2-drawers high,		

1 Item	2 Allowances Basis of Distribution	3 and Remarks
2-drawers wide, for 3x5 cards	7	
<b>Can:</b>		
Corrugated, nesting, galv, w/cover:		
10-gallon	2	
16-gallon	2	
24-gallon	4	
32-gallon	4	
Water, 5-gallon	45	1 per 5 indiv or maj fraction thereof.
<b>Carrier:</b>		
Axe, intrenching, M-1910	18	1 per axe entrenching, M-1910
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910	36	1 per pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910
Shovel, intrenching, M-1934	128	1 per shovel, intrenching, 1934 (carr, shovel, intrenching, M-1910 to be issued when shovel intrenching M-1910, is issued).
Chair, executive, w/arms	1	
Chair, folding	144	1 per BG.
<b>Chest:</b>		
Commissary, complete w/equipment	1	1 per table, folding.
Record, fiber	3	
<b>Clipper, hair</b>	6	1 per 40 indiv or maj fraction thereof operating in extreme- ly cold areas outside the continental US when auth by theater of oper comdr.
<b>Clock, alarm</b>	2	
Desk, fld (empty), fiber, co	2	2 per hq and hq co; 1 per med sec.
Desk, executive, 5-drawer	1	1 per BG
Dictionary, desk type	1	
Drum, inflammable, liquid (gasoline), steel, w/carrying handle, capacity 5-gallon	29	2 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle, except trk 1/4 ton, and car 5-passenger, medium sedan; 1 per set of range, fld, M-1937; trk 1/4 ton, 4x4; Car, 5-passenger, medium sedan.
<b>File, paper:</b>		
Arch, board, w/o index and cover	15	
Clip, wood-back	12	
<b>Flag:</b>		
Aircraft & auto bunting	1	1 per Brig gen of the line.
Boat and fld, bunting	1	do.
Geneva Convention, red-cross, bunting, ambulance and marker	2	1 per trk, 3/4-ton, 4x4, amb.
Fly, tent, wall, small, complete w/pins and poles	2	1 per brig gen of the line; 1 per re depot hq; when operating outside continental US.
Fly, tent, wall, large, complete w/pins and poles	1	1 per hq repl depot when operating outside continental limits of US
Joggles, M-1944	32	2 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle.
Teeter, immersion type, for cans corrugated	6	3 per set of range, fld, M-1937 (teeter, veter for range fld, M-1937 will be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).

1 Item	2 Allowances	3 Basis of distribution and remarks
Lantern, gasoline, leaded fuel	20	
Machine:		
Duplicating, using stencil paper, hand operated, 8 x 13 in	3	One of which may be machine, duplicating, motor-driven if adequate power facilities exist.
Computing and listing (2-column)	1	1 per supply sec.
Calculator, hand-operated	1	1 per PX sec.
Paper, fastening, lever-or-plunger type, wire staple	10	
Kit:		
Barber, with case	1	1 per co outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Sewing	15	1 per 12 EM or maj fraction thereof.
Outfit, chaplains	3	1 per Ch, Christian or Jewish faith.
Perforator, nonadjustable, 2-hole	10	
Pick, handled, railroad, 6 to 7 lbs	6	6 per hq and hq co; 1 per med sec
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910, w/handle	36	2 per 10 EM outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr.
Plate, distinguishing, auto 6 x 9-in.	1	1 per BG.
Renge, fld, M-1937, 4 unit	2	2 per orgn mess.
Ruler, polished, maple, 18-in	20	
Safe, fld, combination lock	3	Safe, fld, keylock will be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted
Scale, weighting, platform, 4-wheel 300-lb cap	1	
Screen latrine, complete (w/pins & poles).	2	
Section furniture, wood, upright, cap-size, with ends, 4-drawer high, 1-drawer-wide.	30	
Selectcr, qualification card	2	
Sharpener, pencil, office, transparent	12	
Shrs, office, bankers, 9-in	4	
Shovel:		Issued during present emerg when av.
Gen purpose, D-handled, strapback, round point, #2	10	2 per med sec; 8 per supply sec
Intrenching, M-1943	128	7 per 10 EM outside continental US when auth by theater of opr comdr. (shovel, intrenching, M-1910, will be issued in lieu thereof until exhausted).
Trove, tent, M-1941, complete	34	2 per sqd tent (when auth by CO)
Table, camp, folding	144	
Tent, kitchen, flyproof	2	
Tent, wall, small, complete w/pins and poles	1	1 per set of range, fld, M-1937 (fly tent, wall, large, complete w/pins and poles will be issued in lieu thereof until tent, ki, flyproof, is available).

1 Item	2 Allowances Basis of distribution and remarks	3
Tent, storage, complete	1	
Tent, squad, complete	17	
Tool set (complete w/tools), Carpenters' No. 1	2	1 per Utility repairman; 1 per supply sec.
Troy, desk, wood, cap-size, 2-1/2 in	30	
Tube, flexible nozzle	16	1 per fuel-consuming mtr vehicle
Typewriter:		
Non-portable, 26-in carriage	1	1 per training sec.
Non-portable, 11-in carriage	26	1 per Clerk-typist and company clerk and steno (less one typist training sec).
Portable, w/carrying case	3	1 per outfit Ch; desk, fld.
Whistle, thunderer	25	
<b>SIGNAL</b>		
Flashlight, TL-122 ( )	87	12 per hq and hq co repl dep; 4 per med sec; 1 per off; WC, m sgt; 1st sgt; subs- NCO (821), 1 per fuel con- suming mtr vehicle, 1 EM Mess sgt.
Public address:		
Equipment, Pa-4-( )	2	
Public address:		
Sets, Pa-5-( )	3	
Projector, 35mm, motion pictures	1	
Screen, 12' x 16' for 35mm projector	1	